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Bicriteria problem of discrete optimization in planning a multiunit construction project

Michał Podolski, D. Beben, A. Rak, Z. Perkowski
2018 MATEC Web of Conferences  
Changing the order of the execution of the units changes the value of the objective functions: the duration of the project and the cost (the sum of the disincentive penalties and incentive bonuses).  ...  The proposed model of the project is the bicriteria NPhard flow shop problem with constraints characteristic for construction projects.  ...  6] : the models for the projects with repetitive processes (the repetitive projects) and the models for the projects with "complex of operations" (the non-repetitive projects).  ... 
doi:10.1051/matecconf/201817404008 fatcat:mkddanwcoreyfa4e2o6zqqt6k4

Executive Compensation and Misconduct: Environmental Harm

Dylan Minor
2016 Social Science Research Network  
Finally, we outline some managerial and policy implications to blunt these adverse incentive e¤ects.  ...  We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and misconduct using the setting of environmental harm.  ...  In our setting, the CEO must choose between a riskier project R and a safer project S: Let p be the probability project R ( S) succeeds with the …rm being worth V RS ( V SS ); and 1 p the chance it fails  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2714438 fatcat:4on6qkcvffam5j6dk4bghmdarm

Assessing project risks from a supply chain quality management (SCQM) perspective

Barbara Gaudenzi, Abroon Qazi
2020 International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management  
The purpose of this paper is to adopt a supply chain quality perspective in order to explore and better understand the unique attributes of risks associated with project-driven supply chains for continuously  ...  The application of the proposed approach is demonstrated through a simulation case study conducted on the project of Boeing 787 Aircraft.FindingsThe conflicting incentives amongst stakeholders in a supply  ...  However, these tools have not been applied together with the scope to modelling and managing risks in complex supply chains where key supply chain stakeholders might have conflicting incentives regarding  ... 
doi:10.1108/ijqrm-01-2020-0011 fatcat:cvspyxeejndxlmpxmxk4r7rari

Cooperative Behavior analysis of Owners and Contractors Based on Brain Neurobehavioral Mechanism

Liping Zhao, Yuesen Wang, Dongye Sun, Yang Yang
2018 NeuroQuantology  
Moreover, the evolutionary game model for the relationship between the owners and contractors of railway engineering projects is established in this research.  ...  The research results about the cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor coincides with the interpretation of cooperation in the field of brain science.  ...  Acknowledgments The project presented in this article is supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (11BJY030), Science and Technology Project of Hebei province (12457206D-14) and the  ... 
doi:10.14704/nq.2018.16.5.1389 fatcat:ra7h7jbkffarpfezafgsh6kffu

Dissociable cortico-striatal connectivity abnormalities in major depression in response to monetary gains and penalties

R. Admon, L. D. Nickerson, D. G. Dillon, A. J. Holmes, R. Bogdan, P. Kumar, D. D. Dougherty, D. V. Iosifescu, D. Mischoulon, M. Fava, D. A. Pizzagalli
2014 Psychological Medicine  
In this study 26 unmedicated adults with MDD and 29 matched healthy controls (HCs) completed a monetary incentive delay task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  ...  and a different, more rostral, dACC subregion in response to monetary penalties.  ...  Dutra and N. B. Hall for their skilled assistance with this study. This study was supported by National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0033291714001123 pmid:25055809 pmcid:PMC4233014 fatcat:vowii4pnirbg7df4a7xou2g4qq

Public-Private Partnerships as Collaborative Projects: Testing the Theory on Cases from EU and Russia

Dmitri Vinogradov, Elena Shadrina
2016 Social Science Research Network  
We view PPPs as collaborative projects with information frictions. Typical public procurement contracts tackle the problems of asymmetric information.  ...  We demonstrate what specific features of a partnership can improve feasibility of projects, and thus both provide a justification of PPP as a form of public good provision, and demonstrate how and whether  ...  QED In our model, there is no specific mechanism to determine the optimal penalty on the public partner.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2728197 fatcat:g7elldp5mjftxmk527rsmyurku

Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems

D. J Aron, P. Olivella
1994 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization  
JLEO, VION1 1 Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems Debra J.  ...  Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Incentive Devices 21 the responsibility nevertheless rests with the operator.  ... 
doi:10.1093/jleo/10.1.1 fatcat:fnabml7swvbsnnz3bwhixm3ozi

Public-Private Partnerships as Collaborative Projects: Testing the Theory on Cases from EU and Russia

Dmitri Vinogradov, Elena Shadrina
2018 International Journal of Public Administration  
This paper views PPPs as collaborative projects with imperfect information between parties.  ...  Four UK and Russian cases of PPP projects are analysed within the above framework, focusing on types of contracts, contributions of both partners, and specific partnership elements.  ...  If the project fails, and it is established that the public partner delivered in line with the agreement, this implies that the private partner failed to meet the terms of the contract, and penalties are  ... 
doi:10.1080/01900692.2018.1426012 fatcat:l4y7kuqe6ncvvdiucuffsukqum

Optimal feeding buffers for projects or batch supply chains by an exact generalization of the newsvendor result

Dan Trietsch
2006 International Journal of Production Research  
Section 3 develops the model for a project with a PERT structure and statistically dependent activities.  ...  Assuming linear costs for starting activities earlier and a linear project tardiness penalty, early optimization models for project buffers addressed particular project network structures.  ...  If c n+1 >0 but g n+1 =0, then there is positive incentive to finish the project earlier.  ... 
doi:10.1080/00207540500371881 fatcat:5rysrl6k2fcs5bbtfi3wmtxt2y

Mutual Monitoring in a Multi-Period Team Setting: An Experimental Investigation

Anthony D. Nikias
2006 Social Science Research Network  
Therefore, group incentives might not be beneficial compared to individual incentives because the frequency of working with group incentives might be less compared to the two-fold repetition of the individual  ...  thorough discussion and formal proofs. .80 .5749 .3507 67.50 199.91 Table 1 : Model parameters and payments (individual incentives) The first result in Arya et al. (1997) is that with first order  ...  Appendix B Sample Questionnaire (GI penalty, no communication)  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.921499 fatcat:7522te6rs5c4dopz36rmti36wm

Reduced Caudate and Nucleus Accumbens Response to Rewards in Unmedicated Individuals With Major Depressive Disorder

Diego A. Pizzagalli, Avram J. Holmes, Daniel G. Dillon, Elena L. Goetz, Jeffrey L. Birk, Ryan Bogdan, Darin D. Dougherty, Dan V. Iosifescu, Scott L. Rauch, Maurizio Fava
2009 American Journal of Psychiatry  
Method: A monetary incentive delay task was presented to 30 unmedicated individuals with major depressive disorder and 31 healthy comparison subjects during fMRI scanning.  ...  Group differences in these regions were specific to rewarding outcomes and did not generalize to neutral or negative outcomes, although relatively reduced responses to monetary penalties in the major depression  ...  The authors thank Allison Jahn and Kyle Ratner for their assistance in early phases of this project, James O'Shea and Decklin Foster for skilled technical assistance, and Nancy Brooks, Christen Deveney  ... 
doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.08081201 pmid:19411368 pmcid:PMC2735451 fatcat:6fm2fsqmlbbfbp7v4qyxun72wm

Impaired Feedback Processing for Symbolic Reward in Individuals with Internet Game Overuse

Jinhee Kim, Hackjin Kim, Eunjoo Kang
2017 Frontiers in Psychiatry  
Using functional MRI, brain responses for these two types of reward/penalty feedback were compared between young males with problems of IGO (IGOs, n = 18, mean age = 22.2 ± 2.0 years) and age-matched control  ...  Here, using both monetary (±500 KRW) and symbolic (Chinese characters "right" or "wrong") rewards and penalties, we investigated whether behavioral performance and feedback-related neural responses are  ...  Statistical analyses were performed with a two-stage mixed effect model.  ... 
doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2017.00195 pmid:29051739 pmcid:PMC5633747 fatcat:p63pl2thfnfedcf3t66sfzn7cu

Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending

Yeon-Koo Che
2002 Contributions to Theoretical Economics  
JEL Numbers: C72, D80, G32 and L14.  ...  When the projects are repeated infinitely many times, however, the joint liability feature provides the group members with a credible means of exercising peer sanction, which can make the group lending  ...  Static Model There are n ≥ 2 risk neutral agents, each endowed with the same, potentially productive project.  ... 
doi:10.2202/1534-5971.1016 fatcat:bxokbqv4hjd6pjxrmxcbk6bkye

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis

Jason Scott Johnston
2002 University of Pennsylvania law review  
Thus, on my model, one would predict that NEPA's greatest effect would be in altering federal project agency decisions between the stage of project proposal and project finalization.  ...  Such a situation is actually the flip side of the political penalty modeled above.  ...  Under perfect and costless judicial review of a substantive cost-benefit statute, the agency proceeds with regulation whenever there is any positive probability that the regulation is cost-benefit justified  ... 
doi:10.2307/3312942 fatcat:3u2cwmcaxjfzzjpg6rx4fhfio4

Reactive Scheduling Based Multi Objectives Negotiation for Dynamic Supply Chain Model

Jia Yee CHAI, Tatsuhiko SAKAGUCHI, Keiichi SHIRASE
2007 Proceedings of International Conference on Leading Edge Manufacturing in 21st century LEM21  
As an incentive, the price is discounted by the amount of setup cost penalty that the raw material supplier may have to pay if it is to accept seven units and produce out of its EPQ amount.  ...  and vendor-managed-inventory system. • Dell with its build-to-order model that demonstrates the benefit of postponement of differentiation in product design. • Amazon.com with its e-tailer model that  ... 
doi:10.1299/jsmelem.2007.4.8f621 fatcat:lu76koqs4nai3i6aogw7j4r65e
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