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Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions
[chapter]
2005
Combinatorial Auctions
These three approaches each dramatically reduce the number of iterations needed to determine the ascending proxy outcome. ...
In chapter 19, Leyton-Brown, Nudelman, and Shoham use CATS to predict the running times of algorithms for the winner determination problem. ...
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0001
fatcat:nc46sf5srvhttb23ov4d3zsk3i
An overview of combinatorial auctions
2007
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
These three approaches each dramatically reduce the number of iterations needed to determine the ascending proxy outcome. ...
In Chapter 19, Leyton-Brown, Nudelman and Shoham use CATS to evaluate the running times of algorithms for the winner determination problem. ...
doi:10.1145/1345037.1345039
fatcat:x7c4htwp5zgclkz4w57ifgmf5q
Spectrum Auction Design
2013
Review of Industrial Organization
The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. ...
The combinatorial clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on packages of lots. ...
This rule has worked reasonably well in the FCC's simultaneous ascending auctions; but in a combinatorial clock auction with Vickrey-nearest-core pricing, we need a more complex rule: one that is based ...
doi:10.1007/s11151-013-9376-x
fatcat:6iy2djzad5eg3editvovdnhiza
Accelerating Combinatorial Clock Auctions Using Bid Ranges
2014
2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Our design reduces the complexity both for the bidders and auctioneer, and is verified with computational simulations. ...
In this paper, we introduce bid ranges, with an additional sealed-bid phase before a Combinatorial Clock auction for information elicitation. ...
We believe that the reduced complexity makes combinatorial auctions more accessible for common applications such as finding carriers for transportation requests. ...
doi:10.1109/hicss.2014.38
dblp:conf/hicss/QiuN14
fatcat:4o3sgh6ipbfwjlfy5nvli4e62e
Spectrum Auction Design: Simple Auctions for Complex Sales
2013
Social Science Research Network
We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. ...
The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations. ...
This way, the number 45 1 A single stage combinatorial clock auction has been proposed in [7] . Such a single-stage ascending clock auction format was used in Nigeria [8], for example. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2302649
fatcat:dqhcgnghkrhlzpsl6pdzwjdksm
Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance
2019
Games and Economic Behavior
This paper addresses three concerns with ascending price Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs); price guidance toward efficiency relevant packages, computational burden, and susceptibility to collusive bidding ...
We propose a descending price Combinatorial Clock Auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to alleviate all of these concerns. ...
Summary of Conclusions Iterative clock auctions provide useful price feedback for bidders in complex combinatorial environments. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.001
fatcat:4dbwnqxu7zblbggqfisjw4z67e
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
2010
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
In a combinatorial auction, a set of resources is for sale, and agents can bid on subsets of these resources. ...
In a voting setting, the agents decide among a set of alternatives by having each agent rank all the alternatives. Many of the key research issues in these two domains are similar. ...
For other bidding languages, the complexity of the winner determination problem may be different. ...
doi:10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y
fatcat:7tbreanrrrhmjjorivhzzaow6a
Combinatorial Auction Design
2003
Management science
C ombinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. ...
Combinatorial auction designs include single-round, first-price sealed bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms, uniform and market-clearing price auctions, and iterative combinatorial auctions. ...
Coping with Computational Complexity The computational complexity of winner determination in combinatorial auctions is not an incidental topic. ...
doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585
fatcat:6zon76plyfbdfbi6lutpi2ok6i
The Landscape of Electronic Market Design
2005
Management science
The -hardness of the winner-determination problem opens the door for an algorithmic approach to combinatorial auctions. ...
In the FCC auction-design debate of the early 1990s, it was determined that a "combinatorial" or "package bid" auction should not be considered because the general combinatorial auction winner-determination ...
doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0345
fatcat:5cp7d3fgs5hnbl77kgtnhedhhm
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
1999
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. ...
It sets up a virtual multi-round auction in which a virtual agent represents each original bid bundle and places bids, according to a fixed strategy, for each good in that bundle. ...
In this paper we address the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions.
2 The complexity problem There has been much work in economics and game theory on designing combinatorial auctions. ...
dblp:conf/ijcai/FujishimaLS99
fatcat:fzxieitxdbdz7ikmqacvfd7y5e
Combinatorial auctions
2007
Annals of Operations Research
In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. ...
These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation ...
The basic winner determination formulations have already been studied in the literature on combinatorial auctions. ...
doi:10.1007/s10479-007-0179-z
fatcat:dt2oav6acjesjcdfbqz3526dqa
The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture
2014
The American Economic Review
The first example of a continuous combinatorial auction is found in Brewer and Plott (1996) , who represented the allocation problem in terms of binary confects of packages that created both the flexibility ...
for widespread application and the computational speed required ...
In the 1990s, the FCC was considering the adoption of a combinatorial auction as a replacement for the simultaneous, rounds-based, ascending price auction that the FCC had used to auction parts of the ...
doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.452
fatcat:w2jlvggtnrhwvpix4gkuz6y7iy
Auctions and bidding
2011
ACM Computing Surveys
In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. ...
and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. ...
This work began when SP and JAR worked at the Center for Coordination Science at MIT -we both learnt a lot in our time there. ...
doi:10.1145/1883612.1883617
fatcat:5lupctonfzcl5ndw5vo3lrwgnm
Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
2005
Sadhana (Bangalore)
In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. ...
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. ...
Sandholm [84] provides a good summary of winner determination algorithms for combinatorial auctions. ...
doi:10.1007/bf02706244
fatcat:2ogs3gof4zfqzdqdwzw5t3myli
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
[chapter]
2005
Combinatorial Auctions
Formal convergence properties have not been proved for RAD or AkBA, although RAD reduces to a simultaneous ascending price auction for substitutes valuations. ...
However, continuous combinatorial auctions can be infeasible because the winner-determination problem must be resolved whenever a new bid is submitted. ...
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0003
fatcat:idwce6c7fnf23fam3sdifjg2gi
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