A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2010; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Filters
Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation
2002
Social Science Research Network
We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to (a) asymmetric players, and (b) non-linear payoff functions. ...
Then we examine the welfare properties of the reciprocity-induced equilibrium. In many game-theoretic situations, reciprocity facilitates the achievement of cooperative outcomes. ...
repeat and single-shot games. considered in the literature concerns the problem of enforcement of reciprocity norms. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.313180
fatcat:axnnqrcsizgh7pmneyxed2ehri
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
1998
Economic Inquiry
Many subjects in these experiments exhibit reciprocity even in single-play games. ...
Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of noncooperative behavior in small-group strategic interaction and in large-group public good environments. ...
But how might such mutual cooperation emerge in a repeated PD game? ...
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x
fatcat:bn7ahlxe3vdvfow4jvrqftfari
Trust Among Strangers
2002
Social Science Research Network
Our goal in this paper was to explicate the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocation. ...
It would therefore be a mistake to identify a social norm of trust and reciprocation with a particular strategy, since such a norm is supported by several different strategies. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.304344
fatcat:5orn5e6qknbw7jwn4rijvbmg5i
Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior
2010
Politics, Philosophy and Economics
In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation ...
This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. ...
Conventions, however, can also emerge out of repeated interactions in which players eventually converge on a particular strategy profile. ...
doi:10.1177/1470594x10369276
fatcat:krtybsg5zffi7kqgvhjgdrxuw4
Symmetric networks foster to evolve desirable turn-taking rules in dispersion games
2009
2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
We find that the efficient and fair outcome emerges relatively quickly in symmetric networks where each agent plays the game with the same number of players. ...
Using a game-theoretic model combined with the evolutionary model, we investigate the conditions under which the desirable interaction rules will evolve and sustain in various social interaction settings ...
This definition highlights emergence and sustainability of social norms as core issues for any theory of norms. ...
doi:10.1109/cec.2009.4982989
dblp:conf/cec/NamatameS09
fatcat:xgvhuanoj5e5rjtawqzuwwvxhm
The Formation of Customary Law
2001
Social Science Research Network
In the presence of perfect incentive alignment, cooperation will result in both the case of repeated games in which the players are faced with high discount factors, and in one-shot games. ...
Left unconstrained, states' unilateral defection strategies would dominate in equilibrium. To cope with this reality, basic norms of reciprocity are generally recognized as rules of the game. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.262032
fatcat:ejjidfwm6zhehhagfn5w4tod4a
How history and convention create norms: An experimental study
2010
Journal of Economic Psychology
Normativity increases compliance and stabilizes individual behaviour in spite of changes in incentives. ...
Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the ...
Several authors have suggested that social norms may emerge from repeated play of coordination games, 10 but this insight until now was not supported by experimental data. ...
doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.009
fatcat:e75gvlu5s5gtxnkizoege7w6yi
The Power of Reciprocity
2004
Journal of Conflict Resolution
In two experiments, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is explored in the context of a simple experimental game, "the sequential dictator." ...
Findings show that altruistic reciprocity is frequent and robust, and the reciprocity norm does not erode if stakes are raised. ...
For social theory, the reciprocity hypothesis is a key element in explaining the production of collective goods, the emergence of social cooperation, and the existence of social norms (Fehr and Gächter ...
doi:10.1177/0022002704265948
fatcat:5wchyzrtwjb53gvehmzwe4mghe
INTELLIGENT MEANS OF ANALYZING NORM EMERGENCE IN A HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY OF BOTH BIASED AND UNBIASED AGENTS IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFERENT BI-MATRIX GAMES
English
2010
International Journal of Machine Intelligence
English
To study the phenomenon of emergence of social norms, we have assumed that the interactions between the agents are private, i.e.; not observable to the other agents not involved in the interactions. ...
This paper deals with study of the evolution of social conventions or norms that selects one equilibrium over others based on repeated distributed interactions between agents in a society. ...
Norms are ingrained in our social life and play a pivotal role in all kinds of business, political, social, and personal choices and interactions. ...
doi:10.9735/0975-2927.2.1.93-100
fatcat:57sdxhybkbcfzi36sbc5tyehxq
Adult and adolescent social reciprocity: Experimental data from the Trust Game
2012
Journal of Adolescence
Trustee behaviour was examined first in response to normative Investor cooperation, and then in response to a period of social rupture caused by reduced investments. ...
Twenty-four adults (aged 19-35) and 27 adolescents (aged 13-14) played as 'Trustee' in an iterated Trust Game against a pre-programmed set of 'Investor' moves, said to belong to an unknown coplayer. ...
Thomas Norman for helpful discussions on the design of the task, and Dr. Anneke Haddad for help with the programming. ...
doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.05.004
pmid:22691532
fatcat:3j6ogh2fq5atzejd4iifl4bqey
Evolving cooperation
2012
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Acknowledgments I would like to thank the chief editors of the Journal for Theoretical Biology, Denise Kirschner, Yoh Iwasa and Lewis Wolpert, to invite this special issue dedicated to cooperation. ...
I would like to thank all the authors, editors and referees who have contributed to it. ...
A strategy for indirect reciprocity consists of a social norm and an action rule. The social norm specifies how to evaluate interactions between individuals. ...
doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014
pmid:22281519
fatcat:vakqetgwjzdr5bk7wrvqni3er4
Reciprocal Social Strategy in Social Repeated Games
2015
2015 IEEE 27th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI)
In particular, their game mechanism differs from traditional repeated games in that the agents are anonymous, and the agents interact with randomly chosen opponents. ...
Recently, Hao and Leung studied a new game theoretic approach, where a new type of repeated game as well as a new reinforcement learning based agent learning method were proposed. ...
The first author would like to thank Dr Vera Hau of HSMC for the valuable discussions. ...
doi:10.1109/ictai.2015.139
dblp:conf/ictai/ChanHL15
fatcat:uwvrbux44bgbtpni5uuvkch5wa
On the Spontaneous Emergence of Private Law
2016
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence
explain the emergence of norms in the absence of centralized enforcing institutions, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages in terms of the efficiency of SL compared to public centralized ...
Section III identifies the conditions for the spontaneous emergence of efficient norms. Section IV identifies three alternative mechanisms that explain the spontaneous emergence of norms. ...
exchanges." 83 In essence, patent pools work as a reciprocity-inducing mechanism, thereby placing future contracting in the shadow of the repeated-play bargaining game between firms. ...
doi:10.1017/cjlj.2016.1
fatcat:xl775ykhhvbengyh67blyh2v3e
Effects of Evolutionary Rules on Cooperative Tendencies in Franchising Networks
[chapter]
2014
Interfirm Networks
In particular, we argue the case for three rules that govern the evolution of cooperation -kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. ...
We further argue that social learning and cultural transmission mechanisms support these three rules of cooperation, so that cooperation can evolve and remain stable even in noisy and large group environments ...
of cooperation, where strategies, beliefs, social norms, etc. are learned by observation and interaction in social groups (see Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2006) . ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10184-2_5
fatcat:pbqizpisfjgmfaii5nnxw4i7ny
Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation
2016
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Agents play prisoner's dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. ...
(2, 19, 20) ; and a long interdisciplinary tradition of arguments suggesting that strategies developed in repeated interactions spill over to influence behavior in one-shot anonymous settings (21-25), ...
We thank Sam Bowles, Rob Boyd, Molly Crockett, Fiery Cushman, Andy Delton, Josh Greene, Moshe Hoffman, Jillian Jordan, Max Krasnow, Adam Morris, Martin Nowak, and Erez Yoeli for helpful comments and discussion ...
doi:10.1073/pnas.1517780113
pmid:26755603
pmcid:PMC4743833
fatcat:yv4b7jshpjgdhlmabej5yhb6sm
« Previous
Showing results 1 — 15 out of 26,945 results