26,945 Hits in 7.7 sec

Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation

Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi
2002 Social Science Research Network  
We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to (a) asymmetric players, and (b) non-linear payoff functions.  ...  Then we examine the welfare properties of the reciprocity-induced equilibrium. In many game-theoretic situations, reciprocity facilitates the achievement of cooperative outcomes.  ...  repeat and single-shot games. considered in the literature concerns the problem of enforcement of reciprocity norms.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.313180 fatcat:axnnqrcsizgh7pmneyxed2ehri


1998 Economic Inquiry  
Many subjects in these experiments exhibit reciprocity even in single-play games.  ...  Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of noncooperative behavior in small-group strategic interaction and in large-group public good environments.  ...  But how might such mutual cooperation emerge in a repeated PD game?  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x fatcat:bn7ahlxe3vdvfow4jvrqftfari

Trust Among Strangers

Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy, Gil Tolle
2002 Social Science Research Network  
Our goal in this paper was to explicate the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocation.  ...  It would therefore be a mistake to identify a social norm of trust and reciprocation with a particular strategy, since such a norm is supported by several different strategies.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.304344 fatcat:5orn5e6qknbw7jwn4rijvbmg5i

Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior

Cristina Bicchieri
2010 Politics, Philosophy and Economics  
In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation  ...  This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms.  ...  Conventions, however, can also emerge out of repeated interactions in which players eventually converge on a particular strategy profile.  ... 
doi:10.1177/1470594x10369276 fatcat:krtybsg5zffi7kqgvhjgdrxuw4

Symmetric networks foster to evolve desirable turn-taking rules in dispersion games

Akira Namatame, Hiroshi Sato
2009 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation  
We find that the efficient and fair outcome emerges relatively quickly in symmetric networks where each agent plays the game with the same number of players.  ...  Using a game-theoretic model combined with the evolutionary model, we investigate the conditions under which the desirable interaction rules will evolve and sustain in various social interaction settings  ...  This definition highlights emergence and sustainability of social norms as core issues for any theory of norms.  ... 
doi:10.1109/cec.2009.4982989 dblp:conf/cec/NamatameS09 fatcat:xgvhuanoj5e5rjtawqzuwwvxhm

The Formation of Customary Law

Francesco Parisi
2001 Social Science Research Network  
In the presence of perfect incentive alignment, cooperation will result in both the case of repeated games in which the players are faced with high discount factors, and in one-shot games.  ...  Left unconstrained, states' unilateral defection strategies would dominate in equilibrium. To cope with this reality, basic norms of reciprocity are generally recognized as rules of the game.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.262032 fatcat:ejjidfwm6zhehhagfn5w4tod4a

How history and convention create norms: An experimental study

Francesco Guala, Luigi Mittone
2010 Journal of Economic Psychology  
Normativity increases compliance and stabilizes individual behaviour in spite of changes in incentives.  ...  Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the  ...  Several authors have suggested that social norms may emerge from repeated play of coordination games, 10 but this insight until now was not supported by experimental data.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.009 fatcat:e75gvlu5s5gtxnkizoege7w6yi

The Power of Reciprocity

Andreas Diekmann
2004 Journal of Conflict Resolution  
In two experiments, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is explored in the context of a simple experimental game, "the sequential dictator."  ...  Findings show that altruistic reciprocity is frequent and robust, and the reciprocity norm does not erode if stakes are raised.  ...  For social theory, the reciprocity hypothesis is a key element in explaining the production of collective goods, the emergence of social cooperation, and the existence of social norms (Fehr and Gächter  ... 
doi:10.1177/0022002704265948 fatcat:5wchyzrtwjb53gvehmzwe4mghe


Chakrabarti P, Basu JK
2010 International Journal of Machine Intelligence  
To study the phenomenon of emergence of social norms, we have assumed that the interactions between the agents are private, i.e.; not observable to the other agents not involved in the interactions.  ...  This paper deals with study of the evolution of social conventions or norms that selects one equilibrium over others based on repeated distributed interactions between agents in a society.  ...  Norms are ingrained in our social life and play a pivotal role in all kinds of business, political, social, and personal choices and interactions.  ... 
doi:10.9735/0975-2927.2.1.93-100 fatcat:57sdxhybkbcfzi36sbc5tyehxq

Adult and adolescent social reciprocity: Experimental data from the Trust Game

Stefano R. Belli, Robert D. Rogers, Jennifer Y.F. Lau
2012 Journal of Adolescence  
Trustee behaviour was examined first in response to normative Investor cooperation, and then in response to a period of social rupture caused by reduced investments.  ...  Twenty-four adults (aged 19-35) and 27 adolescents (aged 13-14) played as 'Trustee' in an iterated Trust Game against a pre-programmed set of 'Investor' moves, said to belong to an unknown coplayer.  ...  Thomas Norman for helpful discussions on the design of the task, and Dr. Anneke Haddad for help with the programming.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.05.004 pmid:22691532 fatcat:3j6ogh2fq5atzejd4iifl4bqey

Evolving cooperation

Martin A. Nowak
2012 Journal of Theoretical Biology  
Acknowledgments I would like to thank the chief editors of the Journal for Theoretical Biology, Denise Kirschner, Yoh Iwasa and Lewis Wolpert, to invite this special issue dedicated to cooperation.  ...  I would like to thank all the authors, editors and referees who have contributed to it.  ...  A strategy for indirect reciprocity consists of a social norm and an action rule. The social norm specifies how to evaluate interactions between individuals.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.014 pmid:22281519 fatcat:vakqetgwjzdr5bk7wrvqni3er4

Reciprocal Social Strategy in Social Repeated Games

Chi-Kong Chan, Jianye Hao, Ho-fung Leung
2015 2015 IEEE 27th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI)  
In particular, their game mechanism differs from traditional repeated games in that the agents are anonymous, and the agents interact with randomly chosen opponents.  ...  Recently, Hao and Leung studied a new game theoretic approach, where a new type of repeated game as well as a new reinforcement learning based agent learning method were proposed.  ...  The first author would like to thank Dr Vera Hau of HSMC for the valuable discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ictai.2015.139 dblp:conf/ictai/ChanHL15 fatcat:uwvrbux44bgbtpni5uuvkch5wa

On the Spontaneous Emergence of Private Law

Daniele Bertolini
2016 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence  
explain the emergence of norms in the absence of centralized enforcing institutions, and (3) the comparative advantages and disadvantages in terms of the efficiency of SL compared to public centralized  ...  Section III identifies the conditions for the spontaneous emergence of efficient norms. Section IV identifies three alternative mechanisms that explain the spontaneous emergence of norms.  ...  exchanges." 83 In essence, patent pools work as a reciprocity-inducing mechanism, thereby placing future contracting in the shadow of the repeated-play bargaining game between firms.  ... 
doi:10.1017/cjlj.2016.1 fatcat:xl775ykhhvbengyh67blyh2v3e

Effects of Evolutionary Rules on Cooperative Tendencies in Franchising Networks [chapter]

Thomas Ehrmann, Brinja Meiseberg, Michael Kopel
2014 Interfirm Networks  
In particular, we argue the case for three rules that govern the evolution of cooperation -kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity.  ...  We further argue that social learning and cultural transmission mechanisms support these three rules of cooperation, so that cooperation can evolve and remain stable even in noisy and large group environments  ...  of cooperation, where strategies, beliefs, social norms, etc. are learned by observation and interaction in social groups (see Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2006) .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10184-2_5 fatcat:pbqizpisfjgmfaii5nnxw4i7ny

Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation

Adam Bear, David G. Rand
2016 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  
Agents play prisoner's dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity.  ...  (2, 19, 20) ; and a long interdisciplinary tradition of arguments suggesting that strategies developed in repeated interactions spill over to influence behavior in one-shot anonymous settings (21-25),  ...  We thank Sam Bowles, Rob Boyd, Molly Crockett, Fiery Cushman, Andy Delton, Josh Greene, Moshe Hoffman, Jillian Jordan, Max Krasnow, Adam Morris, Martin Nowak, and Erez Yoeli for helpful comments and discussion  ... 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1517780113 pmid:26755603 pmcid:PMC4743833 fatcat:yv4b7jshpjgdhlmabej5yhb6sm
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 26,945 results