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Rational Protocol Design: Cryptography against Incentive-Driven Adversaries

Juan Garay, Jonathan Katz, Ueli Maurer, Bjorn Tackmann, Vassilis Zikas
2013 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science  
We also prove composition theorems that-for the first time-provide a sound way to design rational protocols assuming "ideal communication resources" (e.g., broadcast or authenticated channels) and then  ...  Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker.  ...  may result in protocols designed to defend against highly unlikely attacks.  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2013.75 dblp:conf/focs/GarayKMTZ13 fatcat:x5kjoic45ndqlad5jf3qnqospq

How to Construct Rational Protocols with Nash Equilibrium Consistency in the UC framework [article]

Xiaoxia Jiang, Youliang Tian
2019 IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive  
In a word, the proposed rational delegated computing protocol πRDC based on incentive-driven adversary has been proven to be secure in the universally composable framework, furthermore, we effectively  ...  adversary is proposed, then we construct a rational delegated computation protocol πRDC for UCrealizing the ideal functionality FRDC .  ...  Cryptography Against Incentive-driven Adversaries Garay et al. [18] defined the rational protocol design method based on incentiveadversary in the following way. Cryptographic Security as a Game.  ... 
dblp:journals/iacr/JiangT19 fatcat:q7lp5w76infxhjqt3xk5xylj5u

SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies [article]

Sarah Azouvi, Alexander Hicks
2020 arXiv   pre-print
One interesting aspect of cryptocurrencies is their explicit consideration of incentives at the protocol level.  ...  Understanding how to incorporate this into the models used to design cryptocurrencies has motivated a large body of work, yet many open problems still exist and current systems rarely deal with incentive  ...  Cryptography meets Game Theory: Rational Cryptography Initiated by Dodis, Rabin and Halevi [39] rational cryptography is a subfield of cryptography that incorporates incentives in cryptographic protocols  ... 
arXiv:1905.08595v2 fatcat:qmg2qtn3avf4jlqaorbnix3t4e

Robust and Scalable Consensus for Sharded Distributed Ledgers [article]

Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias
2019 IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive  
that resists DoS attacks from individual nodes, (c) it deploys unpredictable rotating leaders to defend against mildly-adaptive adversaries and prevents censorship, and (d) it creates an incentive compatible  ...  MOTOR achieves these properties by making four key design choices: (a) it prioritizes robustness in adversarial environments while maintaining adequate scalability, (b) it employees provably correct cryptography  ...  , (c) the leader election mechanism is predictable and cannot defend against a round-adaptive adversary, and (d) the incentives are not aligned with the system design.  ... 
dblp:journals/iacr/Kokoris-Kogias19 fatcat:q72p5fqe7bfzvbbacc3xwg65ja

Game theory meets network security and privacy

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Quanyan Zhu, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Bacşar, Jean-Pierre Hubaux
2013 ACM Computing Surveys  
In each category, security problems, players, and game models are identified and the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs are summarized.  ...  categories based on their topics: security of the physical and MAC layers, application layer security in mobile networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography  ...  We can design security protocols that provide incentives for individual nodes to contribute in the defense.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 fatcat:55ixmohvijaelflxqrrbtnvfuu

AME Blockchain: An Architecture Design for Closed-Loop Fluid Economy Token System [article]

Lanny Z.N. Yuan, Huaibing Jian, Peng Liu, Pengxin Zhu, ShanYang Fu
2018 arXiv   pre-print
., adversarial attack, poisoning attack and membership against machine learning models.  ...  Incentive as Countermeasure of Threat PC Incentives The Potential Committee is selected in the first stage of ACP protocol.  ... 
arXiv:1812.08017v1 fatcat:m2tgekvu2jcnnbhxssob4xgh7i

Reliable Client Accounting for P2P-Infrastructure Hybrids

Paarijaat Aditya, Mingchen Zhao, Yin Lin, Andreas Haeberlen, Peter Druschel, Bruce M. Maggs, Bill Wishon
2012 Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation  
Using trace-driven simulations, we show that RCA can detect and mitigate a variety of attacks, at the expense of a moderate increase in logging overhead.  ...  Hybrid designs combine many of the advantages of infrastructurebased and peer-to-peer systems, but they also present new challenges.  ...  However, such incentives are not effective against malicious attacks of the type we consider in this paper.  ... 
dblp:conf/nsdi/AdityaZLHDMW12 fatcat:farfqu7dkzborad55sdg65gv7u

Securing Opportunistic Networks: An Encounter-based Trust-driven Barter Mechanism

Arun Kumar, Sanjay K. Dhurandher, Isaac Woungang, Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues
2021 Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications  
In this sense, this paper proposes a secure and reciprocity Encounter-based Trust-driven Barter protocol (denoted ETB), which uses a cryptography mechanism to ensure resilience against collusion attacks  ...  However, most of these protocols are susceptible to collusion attacks.  ...  Following the same trend, in this paper, we propose an Encounterbased Trust-driven Barter protocol (ETB).  ... 
doi:10.22667/jowua.2021.06.30.099 dblp:journals/jowua/KumarDWR21 fatcat:g4oe73bk3bfmfkxdkdx2uwzapq

Privacy and Data Protection by Design - from policy to engineering [article]

George Danezis, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Marit Hansen, Jaap-Henk Hoepman, Daniel Le Metayer, Rodica Tirtea, Stefan Schiffner
2015 arXiv   pre-print
The report sketches a method to map legal obligations to design strategies, which allow the system designer to select appropriate techniques for implementing the identified privacy requirements.  ...  However, apart from a few exceptions, e.g., encryption became widely used, PETs have not become a standard and widely used component in system design.  ...  State-of-the-art authentication protocols provide protections against attacks outlined above.  ... 
arXiv:1501.03726v1 fatcat:csxvtyiiprhodnquaigppcwbwi

BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service [article]

Michael Mirkin, Yan Ji, Jonathan Pang, Ariah Klages-Mundt, Ittay Eyal, Ari Juels
2020 arXiv   pre-print
There have been no successful DoS attacks to date against prominent cryptocurrencies. We present Blockchain DoS (BDoS), the first incentive-based DoS attack that targets PoW cryptocurrencies.  ...  Beyond its direct implications for operational blockchains, BDoS introduces the novel idea that an adversary can manipulate miners' incentives by proving the existence of blocks without actually publishing  ...  If a rational miner P wins, the scheduler first notifies the adversary A of . The adversary decides whether to race against .  ... 
arXiv:1912.07497v4 fatcat:mpodlisavzdnvex2fzu7k4vvuq

Collusion-Preserving Computation without a Mediator [article]

Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Vassilis Zikas
2020 IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive  
Leveraging the above identifiability property, we augment our protocol with a penalization scheme which ensures that it is not profitable to abort, thereby obtaining CP security against incentive-driven  ...  [CRYPTO 2012] to derive a definition of security in the presence of incentive-driven local adversaries which can be of independent interest.  ...  ) [6] , [28] is to model security of protocols against incentive-driven attackers.  ... 
dblp:journals/iacr/CiampiLZ20 fatcat:luwxyzhtyvfjtetvuys6zyiqd4

Balancing auditability and privacy in vehicular networks

Jong Youl Choi, Markus Jakobsson, Susanne Wetzel
2005 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Quality of service & security in wireless and mobile networks - Q2SWinet '05  
In order to ascertain that most users will not find it meaningful to disconnect or disable transponders, we design our solution with several types of user incentives as part of the structure.  ...  PROTOCOLS In the following, we present our abstract implementation, which is event-driven. For each occurring event, the corresponding protocols will be launched.  ...  Research activities range from lower layer protocol design to applications and implementational issues.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1089761.1089775 dblp:conf/mswim/ChoiJW05 fatcat:sjitdx6qgvhhbcvure4cdbo6ym

Towards Privacy-assured and Lightweight On-chain Auditing of Decentralized Storage [article]

Yuefeng Du and Huayi Duan and Anxin Zhou and Cong Wang and Man Ho Au and Qian Wang
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Prior auditing designs in centralized settings are not directly applicable here. A handful of proposals targeting DSN cannot satisfactorily address these issues either.  ...  We present an auditing solution that addresses on-chain privacy and efficiency, from a synergy of homomorphic linear authenticators with polynomial commitments for succinct proofs, and the sigma protocol  ...  OUR MAIN PROTOCOL With a streamlined smart contract template and a basic instantiation explained, we now introduce the design rationale of our main protocol and present our protocol details. A.  ... 
arXiv:2005.05531v3 fatcat:bdkmd5vvc5bi3knxfdskcsms3a

A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks

Naouel Ben Salem, Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Markus Jakobsson
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing - MobiHoc '03  
In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism that is based on a charging/rewarding scheme and that makes collaboration rational for selfish nodes.  ...  We base our solution on symmetric cryptography to cope with the limited resources of the mobile stations. We provide a set of protocols and study their robustness with respect to various attacks.  ...  A rational adversary: As we will consider and secure our protocols against very strong attacks, it should be emphasized that our protocols will not be secure against arbitrary malicious behavior.  ... 
doi:10.1145/778416.778418 fatcat:bfh4i3uav5boxf66qrlejme5sm

A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks

Naouel Ben Salem, Levente Buttyán, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Markus Jakobsson
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing - MobiHoc '03  
In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism that is based on a charging/rewarding scheme and that makes collaboration rational for selfish nodes.  ...  We base our solution on symmetric cryptography to cope with the limited resources of the mobile stations. We provide a set of protocols and study their robustness with respect to various attacks.  ...  A rational adversary: As we will consider and secure our protocols against very strong attacks, it should be emphasized that our protocols will not be secure against arbitrary malicious behavior.  ... 
doi:10.1145/778415.778418 dblp:conf/mobihoc/SalemBHJ03 fatcat:yhfhrfchanhk3gqmlv2yythbre
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