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Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
2015
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '15
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A cornerstone in the prior-independent revenue maximization literature is a result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showing that the second price auction without a reserve achieves (n − 1)/n of the optimal ...
We construct a randomized mechanism that strictly outperforms the second price auction in this setting. Our mechanism inflates the second highest bid with a probability that varies with n. ...
Inflated Second Price Auction We will consider a variant of the second price auction, which will sometimes inflate the bid of the second-highest bidder before offering that bid as a fixed price for the ...
doi:10.1145/2764468.2764489
dblp:conf/sigecom/FuILS15
fatcat:qo636j3bwnhixgxydwkcobarem
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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A cornerstone in the prior-independent revenue maximization literature is a result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showing that the second price auction without a reserve achieves (n-1)/n of the optimal ...
We construct a randomized mechanism that strictly outperforms the second price auction in this setting. Our mechanism inflates the second highest bid with a probability that varies with n. ...
Inflated Second Price Auction We will consider a variant of the second price auction, which will sometimes inflate the bid of the second-highest bidder before offering that bid as a fixed price for the ...
arXiv:1507.08042v1
fatcat:grqvoudlhbgcpaudp75ygdekua
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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do better than the second-price auction. ...
We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. ...
Fu et al. [2015] introduced a randomized prior-independent auction called (ε, δ)-inflated second-price auction: with probability ε it runs a second-price auction, and with the rest of the probability ...
arXiv:2207.09429v1
fatcat:7sbnn3bfujdnfpvjsw3uvwnydq
Economics and emotion: Institutions matter
2005
Games and Economic Behavior
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We first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions. ...
Next we consider whether knowledge of the intensity of a participant's emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic variables ...
seconds prior to exiting the auction. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.017
fatcat:u5s2g4ewk5clzlq56uv3fr64xy
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. ...
We suggest using the Buyer Trade Reduction (BTR) mechanism, a variant of McAfee's mechanism, which is feasible and simple (in particular, deterministic, truthful, prior-independent, anonymous). ...
The third inequality comes from the probability that the seller i is chosen as one of the first two quantiles, which is with probability precisely ...
arXiv:1903.06696v2
fatcat:iwpya5n4gjejhe5p6kbdf2xg4a
Bayesian Mechanism Design
[chapter]
2018
Modeling Strategic Behavior
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The aforementioned unit-demand pricing problem with independently distributed values can be simplified with approximation. ...
An important special case of multi-dimensional mechanism design is single-agent pricing; the unit-demand pricing problem is a paradigmatic challenge problem. ...
My perspective on these problems, solutions, and concepts; and thus their presentation herein; has been shaped by a number of collaborations. ...
doi:10.1142/9789813239944_0012
fatcat:ljlthfwdjrfm3igyrm5crq5ym4
Managing electricity procurement cost and risk by a local distribution company
2004
Energy Policy
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It is shown that the LDC's procurement decision is consistent with least-cost procurement subject to a cost-exposure constraint, and that an internet-based multi-round auction can produce competitive price ...
A local electricity distribution company (LDC) can satisfy some of its future electricity requirements through self-generation and volatile spot markets, and the remainder through fixed-price forward contracts ...
Second, it does not afford each seller the immediate opportunity to revise its price offer to beat the offers from other sellers. ...
doi:10.1016/s0301-4215(02)00317-8
fatcat:qa7sf355tng75irq4szccruv2y
Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
2009
The American Economic Review
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We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether ...
We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. ...
The logic of Proposition 2 holds exactly as before: because the second-highest value in the auction is random, the auction price must be higher than the sequential mechanism's price to deter entry, if ...
doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1544
fatcat:kydf2ojqrzfhvo6tvjuizqs4xq
High-performance bidding agents for the continuous double auction
2001
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '01
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We develop two bidding algorithms for real-time Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs) using a variety of market rules that offer what we believe to be the strongest known performance of any published bidding ...
Under various market rules and limit price distributions, our modified Gjerstad-Dickhaut ("MGD") strategy outperforms the original GD, and generally dominates the other strategies. ...
Second, we use larger initial margins than in [2] , and the mj values are not statistically independent: the limit prices of the less valuable units influence the initial margins of the more valuable ...
doi:10.1145/501158.501183
dblp:conf/sigecom/TesauroD01
fatcat:qwbjedrddze5zifh355cmsi3t4
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
2005
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '05
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Second, we show that the form of this auction is independent of the competitive framework used. ...
Finally, we generalize a result from [8] and extend our understanding of the nature of the optimal competitive auction by showing that the optimal competitive auction occasionally offers prices that are ...
For a randomized bid-independent auction, f (b-i) is a random variable. We denote the probability density of f (b-i) at z by ρ bi (z). We denote the profit of a truthful auction A on input b as A(b). ...
doi:10.1145/1064009.1064028
dblp:conf/sigecom/HartlineM05
fatcat:zg7uigoimjgjnezen4fndzmfpe
The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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very large number of random sequential auction instances. ...
This result applies to both first-price and second-price sequential auctions. Moreover, it applies regardless of the tie-breaking rule used to generate equilibria in these sequential auctions. ...
At a price p, buyer i remains in the auction as long as there is at least one buyer j still in the auction who buyer i is willing to pay a price p to beat; that is, v i,i − p > v i,j . ...
arXiv:1905.00853v1
fatcat:5w5b37oj65h7xp5ctrnlr32mnq
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
2004
Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '04
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We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. ...
We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value-and time-strategyproof. ...
The characterization allows for randomized price schedules, as long as the randomness is independent of an agent's reported type. ...
doi:10.1145/988772.988784
dblp:conf/sigecom/HajiaghayiKP04
fatcat:x6hmwwzm2zce7epguwfmvfcp3m
INFORMATION REVELATION AND BUYER PROFITS IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT COMPETITION
2010
Journal of Industrial Economics
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Expected prices are lowest of all when the sellers learn no information about the outcome of the first contest before competing in the second. ...
Expected prices are lowest in this final case because simultaneous (or independent) sales eliminate the competition-degrading effects of both the sellers' receipt of information and their attempts to manipulate ...
In the auction literature this setting is referred to as a first-price, sealed bid auction in an independent, private values environment. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00411.x
fatcat:roxtwduqlnfd5ocakta5contz4
Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions
2014
Management science
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We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders are equally likely to win. ...
In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction. ...
The first is a second price auction without reserve, while the second is a second price auction with optimal (revenue-maximizing) reserve. ...
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2009
fatcat:ctd3mj7rhbc7rgd2c7gr6lhjvy
LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
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2020 pre-print arXiv:1905.01526v4 fatcat:llliuwemz5aaxe7cark4f3daaaOther Versions
by running eager second price auctions with reserve r. ...
We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. ...
We believe that some of the techniques developed for lazy second price auctions can be applied to eager second price auctions as well. ...
arXiv:1905.01526v5
fatcat:hpfri2baazgw7knuv4oamtn67u
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