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Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents Executive Summary) A survey of multiple contraction) A conceptual framework for revision, update and non-monotonic reasoning Why indeterminacy in probability judgment?

Mauricio Reis, John Cantwell, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Isaac Levi, Alexander Nittka
(University of Konstanz, Germany) Measuring ranks via the complete laws of iterated contraction Besides the formal talks, which were attended by all the participants, there were several discussions and  ...  Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents Dagstuhl seminar 07351, August 26-30, 2007 Executive Summary .  ...  Motivation The theory of belief revision studies how a rational agent should change its beliefs when receiving or perceiving new information about the environment.  ... 

Strategic behavior and counterfactuals

Cristina Bicchieri
1988 Synthese  
Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of being objectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system.  ...  In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs  ...  The best known model of belief change is Bayesian conditionalization: beliefs are represented by probability functions defined over sentences and rational changes of beliefs are represented by conditionalization  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf00869644 fatcat:evmfprlvxzakrnpsxiiisdk22i

Passionate Reason

Richard Otte
2014 Faith and Philosophy  
33 Evans, "Externalist Epistemology, Subjectivity, and Christian Knowledge," 202. 34 I would like to thank Stephen Evans, Bas van Fraassen, Matt Frise, and Alvin Plantinga, for helpful comments on an earlier  ...  Suppose the agent changes belief by assigning H a high probability, and furthermore considers that change rational; this describes a case of extreme conversion, because there is no possible evidence for  ...  An agent using orthodox Bayesianism to manage beliefs will consider any change of belief that assigns H high probability irrational, even if the belief change were considered rational from the resulting  ... 
doi:10.5840/faithphil2014579 fatcat:qm5wji7fpzaidi6qxspmeqbjpm


Jacek Suda
2018 Macroeconomic Dynamics  
In the model, households hold twisted beliefs concerning the likelihood and persistence of recession and boom states that are affected by the Great Depression.  ...  These initial beliefs are substantially different from the true data generating process and are only gradually unwound during subsequent years.  ...  As a result, the rapidly changing beliefs about transition probability matrix bring substantial revisions of optimal investment, consumption and labor supply decisions.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s1365100516000900 fatcat:t2n4l5xbizaplishhskjkoon7e

On rational belief equilibria

Mordecai Kurz
1994 Economic Theory  
We study equilibria in which agent's belief are rational in the sense of Kurz 1-1994].  ...  Holding Rational Beliefs about future prices, producers maximize expected profits.  ...  ap{(It)+u , where 1 Belief equilibrium is an infinite sequence (p, x) of random variables under the true probability Q and a set of Rational Beliefs Qk, k ~ [0, l] such that (1) (~,~,Q,T) and (~,~,Qk  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf01213816 fatcat:tkcnsg7pgna53eelfmsfpayasm

Subjective probability: Criticisms, reflections, and problems

H. Kyburg
1978 Journal of Philosophical Logic  
degrees of belief and rational degrees of belief.  ...  But if the rationality of my beliefs tomorrow depends on my having rational beliefs today, and conditionalizing to reach tomorrow's beliefs, it follows by the Relativity of Time that the rationality of  ...  represented by a convex set of coherent probability functions, thus escaping criticism based on the alleged exactness of so-called "degrees of belief".  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf00245926 fatcat:2ggqsuf45vdzxikuk7u2kz227m

Against conditionalization

F. Bacchus, H. E. Kyburg, M. Thalos
1990 Synthese  
the incoherent believer who knows himself to be incoherent, that in his case it is never a rational change of belief to change belief by conditionalization.  ...  Now if conditionalization is the truth about rational change of belief, then such a believer has no rational way of simply "converting" to rationality.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf00484837 fatcat:n2rllx52azhordg2q76joqgzr4

Probabilistic dynamic belief revision

Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets
2008 Synthese  
We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper-Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing  ...  We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief over conditional probabilistic models.  ...  The reason is that players' beliefs about the other players' rationality may change during the game: they may lose belief in others' rationality if some "surprising" moves are made.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9369-8 fatcat:ctu4r3qxivgc7p7tqzu6anckei

Belief Shocks and the Macroeconomy

Jacek Suda
2013 Social Science Research Network  
As a result, the rapidly changing beliefs about transition probability matrix bring substantial revisions of optimal investment, consumption and labor supply decisions.  ...  Under our assumptions, expectations are changing over time and at any date t depend on initial beliefs and the actual sequence of observed states S t .  ...  AR(1) representation of 2-state Markov regime switching process S t with p = P rob(S t+1 = 1|S t = 1) and q = P rob(S t+1 = 0|S t = 0) is and error term, ν t , with zero mean and variance σ 2 ν .  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2273463 fatcat:nmzpi24d6vcnjj2efioxg6b5xq

Endogenous Uncertainty: A Unified View of Market Volatility

Mordecai Kurz
1998 Social Science Research Network  
In sum, the theory of Rational Belief offers a very simple explanation to the observed riskless rate and equity premium.  ...  This asymmetry between optimists and pessimists flows directly from the rationality conditions of beliefs and implies that at most dates the pessimists have a stronger impact on the bill market.  ...  Rationality of belief permits the pessimists to hold a probability F or G which do not correspond to any specific empirical 1981:4 and 1982:1-1992:3.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.57947 fatcat:s4xvaqh2ezbotbwwf27ouaukga

The Coherence Model of Preference and Belief Formation [chapter]

Sun-Ki Chai
2009 Social Computing and Behavioral Modeling  
probabilities p 1 and p 2 .  ...  One is "thin" rationality, in which the nature of preferences and beliefs is left unspecified, and the other is "thick" rationality, in which preferences are seen as self-regarding, materialistic, and  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-0056-2_10 fatcat:o6z2l7v6vfhvviru2yjwede37y

Game theory with translucent players

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
2018 International Journal of Game Theory  
would still be rational even if i were to switch strategies), (3) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and so  ...  Our main result is a characterization of strategies consistent with appropriate analogues of common belief of rationality.  ...  CHARACTERIZING COMMON COUN-TERFACTUAL BELIEF OF RATIONAL-ITY It is well known rationalizability can be characterized in terms of common belief of common belief of rationality in probability structures  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-018-0626-x fatcat:25h7stqvmbf2tgyhub3b7otibi

The Role of Rationality and Technological Change in Learning Process

Harisa Mardiana, Haris Kaisar Daniels
2019 Indonesian Journal of Learning Education and Counseling  
My goal in examining the role of rationality and technological change in the learning process is to investigate knowledge, the use of technology, especially in the classroom and belief from lecturers in  ...  The result of this study is that there is a relationship between rationality and technological change in the learning process.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT Thank you very much for the help and attention to Dr. Nat. rar Gregoria Illya M.Sc., Dean of Faculty of Science and Rino M.  ... 
doi:10.31960/ijolec.v1i2.64 fatcat:mn2tvbrvdnexflwzz6qlvd6nwi

Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against [chapter]

Andrew Reisner, Martin Grajner, Pedro Schmechtig
2016 Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals  
Peer disagreement, evidence of evidence, and rational requirements on belief The lesson of the Polaroid Murder example is that peer disagreement will not change what one is rationally required to believe  ...  This is the second way in which my belief that I disagree with a peer could change what is rationally required of me.  ... 
doi:10.1515/9783110496765-006 fatcat:ryb2clf7ivelhkilsli6h6ruqm

Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs

David Christensen
1991 Philosophical Review  
ilar considerations have been taken to show that a rational agent should predict that she will change her beliefs by Conditionalization.3 And most recently, some authors have argued in this same way for  ...  Now suppose that the agent changes her degree of belief in any proposition, to any degree whatsoever.  ... 
doi:10.2307/2185301 fatcat:fxroc7p5drgp5hzs6r6wef2o64
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