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Price of Fairness in Budget Division for Egalitarian Social Welfare [article]

Zhongzheng Tang, Chenhao Wang, Mengqi Zhang
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We are interested in assessing the quality of fair solutions, i.e., in measuring the system efficiency loss under a fair allocation compared to the one that maximizes (egalitarian) social welfare.  ...  Asymptotically tight bounds are provided both for the price of fairness and the efficiency guarantee of aggregation rules.  ...  Acknowledge The authors thank Xiaodong Hu and Xujin Chen for their helpful discussions, and anonymous referees for their valuable feedback.  ... 
arXiv:2010.09637v2 fatcat:hbz7dpdzubakjouzmdajyg66ia

Price of Fairness in Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice

Marcin Michorzewski, Dominik Peters, Piotr Skowron
2020 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We study the price of imposing such fairness axioms on utilitarian social welfare.  ...  We show that no division rule satisfying IFS can guarantee to achieve more than an O(1/√m) fraction of maximum utilitarian welfare, in the worst case.  ...  Marcin Michorzewski and Piotr Skowron were supported by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: "Normative Comparison of Multiwinner Election Rules).  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5594 fatcat:wq2lxcyqqvg2vo4n2c6yvk2qta

Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2015 Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on Symposium on Theory of Computing - STOC '15  
the Nash social welfare.  ...  Given a set of indivisible items and a set of agents having additive valuations, our goal is to allocate the items to the agents in order to maximize the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, i.e.,  ...  On the other extreme, maximizing fairness is often associated with maximizing the egalitarian social welfare objective, i.e., the minimum value across all agents: max x min i v i (x).  ... 
doi:10.1145/2746539.2746589 dblp:conf/stoc/0001G15 fatcat:xmo4e4jbn5cblbki2raoyu72pe

Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules [article]

Haris Aziz, Aditya Ganguly
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as well as preferences over the projects).  ...  An experimental study indicates the relative performance of different rules as well as the price of enforcing fairness axioms.  ...  This impact has been referred to as the price of fairness in other contexts.  ... 
arXiv:2101.11722v1 fatcat:xw5r7riea5cg3negykmnp4w3va

On fair allocations

Jean-Paul Chavas
2008 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
We define the most efficient fair allocations and explore the implications of fairness for economic behavior, pricing and redistribution policies.  ...  We use the benefit function to investigate the welfare cost of fairness.  ...  Acknowledgement I would like to thank Laura Schechter and an anonymous reviewer for useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.004 fatcat:di7byui6sbb3xjrwk73765dlkm

The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods [article]

Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We also introduce the concept of strong price of fairness, which captures the efficiency loss in the worst fair allocation as opposed to that in the best fair allocation as in the price of fairness.  ...  We mostly provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the worst-case efficiency loss for allocations satisfying these notions, for both the price of fairness and the strong price of fairness.  ...  We are grateful to the reviewers of IJCAI 2019 and Theory of Computing Systems for many helpful comments, and to Ioannis Caragiannis for pointing us to the price of envy-freeness result by Bertsimas et  ... 
arXiv:1905.04910v2 fatcat:c7yyp5gwqvhbhfpmqo2dud6xpe

Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting

Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi
2009 Social Science Research Network  
We develop an auction system that determines a fair number of komi for holding black stones in a GO game, and hence the right to the first move.  ...  Moreover, the conditions of egalitarian and budget-balancedness are achieved.  ...  In our model of one indivisible good (a priority right), with a divisible good at zero initial amount, we seek for a solution that is egalitarian, budget-balanced as natural requirements of the application  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1405294 fatcat:4upt24ezvbagzck22os4txssgy

Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

Duygu Yengin
2012 The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics  
Their main result, Theorem 2.9 in GM, is the characterization of a subclass of welfare-egalitarian mechanisms with Pareto-efficiency (i.e. assignmentefficiency and budget-balance), solidarity, and unanimity  ...  of mechanisms in Theorem 2.9 of GM and the lack of budget-balance of the mechanisms in our Theorem 1.  ...  Another concern for the center is the trade off between the amount of budget-deficit generated and fairness notion imposed.  ... 
doi:10.1515/1935-1704.1789 fatcat:lrxbpdlhgzfyxi2b3lq2zhwqcq

Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2018 SIAM journal on computing (Print)  
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, with the goal of maximizing the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, i.e., the Nash social welfare  ...  prices.  ...  Acknowledgments The second author would like to thank Paul Dütting, Zhiyi Huang, and Tim Roughgarden for stimulating discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1137/15m1053682 fatcat:7vvugmroz5arbhcwoh6ruwpw7m

Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis
2015 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, with the goal of maximizing the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, i.e., the Nash social welfare  ...  prices.  ...  Acknowledgments The second author would like to thank Paul Dütting, Zhiyi Huang, and Tim Roughgarden for stimulating discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2845926.2845931 fatcat:ueph54uftffxzakb3ftn6npqeu

Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting [chapter]

Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We develop an auction system that determines a fair number of komi for holding black stones in a GO game, and hence the right to the first move.  ...  Moreover, the conditions of egalitarian and budget-balancedness are achieved.  ...  In our model of one indivisible good (a priority right), with a divisible good at zero initial amount, we seek for a solution that is egalitarian, budget-balanced as natural requirements of the application  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_51 fatcat:fjl3i7emi5cwxcdth5zwwp3koq

Role of Budget Impact in Drug Reimbursement Decisions

Joshua Parsons Cohen, Elly Stolk, Maartje Niezen
2008 Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law  
social welfare function Utility of group 2 =~ . ™ Egalitarian solution Utility of group 1 Figure 1 Alternative Optimality Criteria.  ...  As such, the criteria do not appear to be a sufficient condition for improvement in social welfare because they preclude improvements in social welfare that result when there are actual winners and losers  ... 
doi:10.1215/03616878-2007-054 pmid:18325899 fatcat:gh724be77fezrgqugwoyjxibcy

Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations

Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, Ranjani G. Sundaram, Peter Sanders, Fabrizio Grandoni, Grzegorz Herman
2020 European Symposium on Algorithms  
The p-mean welfare is parameterized by an exponent term p ∈ (-∞, 1] and encompasses a range of welfare functions, such as social welfare (p = 1), Nash social welfare (p → 0), and egalitarian welfare (p  ...  We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among n agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods.  ...  Note that social welfare is a standard measure of (economic) efficiency, whereas egalitarian welfare is a fairness objective.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.esa.2020.11 dblp:conf/esa/BarmanBKS20 fatcat:lzbatefbcrcq3knfb5kbv3jjwi

On the Price of Fairness of Allocating Contiguous Blocks [article]

Ankang Sun, Bo Li
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Our objective is to understand the extent to which welfare is inevitably sacrificed by enforcing the allocations to be fair, i.e., price of fairness (PoF).  ...  However, these fair allocations barely exist for indivisible items, and thus in this work, we focus on the relaxations of maximin share fairness and proportionality up to one item, which are guaranteed  ...  Fair Division of Goods In this section, we discuss the PoF for indivisible goods. We start with MMS fairness in Section 3.1 and then PROP1 fairness in Section 3.2.  ... 
arXiv:2205.10836v1 fatcat:air26sl4abepxinubykqshll7a

Robust Allocations with Diversity Constraints [article]

Zeyu Shen and Lodewijk Gelauff and Ashish Goel and Aleksandra Korolova and Kamesh Munagala
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We show in a formal sense that the Nash Welfare rule that maximizes product of agent values is uniquely positioned to be robust when diversity constraints are introduced, while almost all other natural  ...  We consider the problem of allocating divisible items among multiple agents, and consider the setting where any agent is allowed to introduce diversity constraints on the items they are allocated.  ...  Figure 1 : 1 The plots of (1 − q min ) for Social Welfare (SW), Nash Welfare (NW), and γ-Fairness for γ = 0.5, 0.1, −1.  ... 
arXiv:2109.15015v1 fatcat:acpkvfsoy5hvlo6h4v6lgakcnm
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