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We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non-cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. ... We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Finally, we discuss the extension of these results to general-sum stochastic games. ... Efficient Learning Equilibrium: Definition In this section we develop a definition of efficient learning equilibrium in the context of two-player repeated games. ...doi:10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013 fatcat:qasyd7hterfonmvjenj7jlmrqu
games with imperfect private monitoring. ... Under our condition, this set describes precisely those payoff vectors that arise in equilibrium for some private monitoring structure if either nonstationary monitoring or communication is allowed. ... on the equilibrium payoff set in the same game with any imperfect private monitoring structure. ...doi:10.3982/te2270 fatcat:fi6h6lkjsjez3ickpldfuuk2ze
We present a novel view on principal component analysis (PCA) as a competitive game in which each approximate eigenvector is controlled by a player whose goal is to maximize their own utility function. ... We analyze the properties of this PCA game and the behavior of its gradient based updates. ... A key concept in games is a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium specifies a variable for each player from which no player can unilaterally deviate and improve their outcome. ...arXiv:2010.00554v2 fatcat:fjdmz2a5ibfxnbayse7jh2wlii
The analytical core of contract theory in general and agency theory in particular is an optimization problem, whereas in imperfect competition it is an equilibrium problem. ... The reputation effect is more consistent with symmetrical information case in a repeated game and that fits well with an incomplete contractual setting. ...doi:10.4000/ei.709 fatcat:nlm7hhb5fbfe5dtok2mm2qqbjm
Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium(variational) is optimal. ... a distributed peer-to-peer market design where prosumers in local energy communities optimize selfishly their trades, demand, and flexibility activation. ... We also provide a bound on the Price of Anarchy capturing the loss of efficiency caused by market imperfections in the three nodes example. ...arXiv:1812.02301v1 fatcat:hrdqi6ntifaodmmi3axlmi77yu
Finally, the learning mechanism needed to reach an equilibrium state in the peer-to-peer market design is discussed together with privacy issues. ... Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium (variational) is optimal. ... In the three nodes model, we also provided a bound on the Price of Anarchy capturing the loss of efficiency caused by market imperfections in this example. ...doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.035 fatcat:tdd3sgptljffhe5resixpwzavi
Its relation to other refinement concepts is also discussed.” 97g:90194 90D20 92820 Cho, In-Koo (1-BRN-D; Providence, RI) Perceptrons play repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ... In the case of an economy with equal shares in production, the unique competitive equilibrium coincides with the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. ...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. ... equilibria in the literature. ... imperfect monitoring. ...doi:10.2139/ssrn.2608216 fatcat:izxf4tv3crh33hlc7qji3ze3oy
equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. ... Summary: “We consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition ...
always monitored by every other firm in the market. ... We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. ... In OE, all firms are fringe firms and, instead of optimizing against the actual industry state, firms optimize against the long-run average industry state in equilibrium. ...doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12102 fatcat:fuud7a4fsbbhjddhbbveoyychy
A leading explanation for price dispersion in posted-price markets is search costs. We incorporate this insight into a model of competing second-price auctions similar to eBay. ... We provide evidence for the model using data collected from eBay, identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to eBay's search tool. ... In general, it is not possible to separate multi-stage games of imperfect information and solve them by backwards induction. ...doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.005 fatcat:3u3bdaodsbd6feaz5q4ub5z7pm
The oligopoly equilibrium is symmetric and the market price distribution converges to Prescott's competitive equilibrium as the number of firms approaches infinity. ... in price distributions even when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in prices (see Bryant, 1980) . ... This distinction is important because I find that in the oligopoly model, only a symmetric equilibrium exists. ...doi:10.2307/2556068 fatcat:tq6ekt5yljfsvlf25rkuqfscyy
Moreover, in the conclusion of this paper, I show how the notion of equilibrium that emerges from the analysis could be useful to address the issue of dynamics. ... Undesired excess capacity has traditional room only in oligopolistic framework, like in Keynesian and Post-Keynesian models. ... But while in the "optimizing" version of the approach (see Cass  ) the economy is always in equilibrium, not only at the saddle point but also along the path followed to reach it (see Amendola and ...doi:10.4236/me.2013.411079 fatcat:kk27p5arrbgz3lawglnv4d4zsi
The results are as follow. (1) The collusion incubator environmental conditions do foster tacit collusion. (2) The tacit collusion corresponds to the unique buyer Pareto Equilibrium of a game theoretic ... model of the auction process. (3) Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of the game theoretic model. ( 4) The only remedy ... monitoring. ...doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00152.x fatcat:hrbyqsmyeraepd43ufsnszsyra
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect ... public monitoring. ... Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Public Monitoring Two players play a symmetric PD game infinitely often. ...doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.005 fatcat:pa4n2syir5cvna3dgjekp3uj2i
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