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Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines

Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Nicolas Thibault
2012 Theoretical Computer Science  
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in order to minimize the makespan  ...  In this paper, we show the existence of randomized truthful (non-polynomial-time) algorithms with expected approximation ratio equal to 3/2 for different scheduling settings (identical machines with and  ...  In this paper, we study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in order to  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2011.10.006 fatcat:onnrwd5e5vdcze535nzosclybu

Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times [chapter]

Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Fanny Pascual, Nicolas Thibault
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling selfish tasks on a single machine or on a set of m parallel machines.  ...  For the model without payments, we prove that there is no (2 − )-approximate deterministic truthful algorithm and no ( 3 2 − )-approximate randomized truthful algorithm when the tasks' lengths are private  ...  The work of Evripidis Bampis and Fanny Pascual was partly supported by the French ANR grant ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 "CoCoRICo-CoDec".  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_2 fatcat:t5pd5lzd3rb7nphcehu3nex7qu

Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines

Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Fanny Pascual
2006 Theoretical Computer Science  
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling selfish tasks (or agents)-whose objective is the minimization of their completion times-on parallel identical machines in order to  ...  We present (randomized) truthful mechanisms for both the centralized and the distributed settings that improve the (expected) approximation guarantee (price of anarchy) of the SPT mechanism.  ...  In Section 3, we consider the selfish task allocation model and we give a centralized algorithm which is truthful even if the values of the lengths are not restricted, and has an expected approximation  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2006.07.057 fatcat:5kluxbneezfh7ibxlw37u67yb4

Randomized Truthful Algorithms for Scheduling Selfish Tasks on Parallel Machines [chapter]

Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Nicolas Thibault
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in order to minimize the makespan  ...  We consider the following process: at first the agents declare the length of their tasks, then given these bids, the protocol schedules the tasks on the machines.  ...  In this paper, we study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in order to  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12200-2_5 fatcat:wyrmsumuwjbhjceyrjh43afbc4

Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents [chapter]

A. Ferrante, G. Parlato, F. Sorrentino, C. Ventre
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Our results improve the existing ones which provide truthful mechanisms dealing with finite type sets only and do not preserve the approximation ratio of the underlying algorithm.  ...  We provide a truthful mechanism that is (c · (1 + ))-approximate if the underlying algorithm is c-approximate and weakly-monotone.  ...  We wish to thank the authors of [APPP04b] for providing us with a full version of their paper.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11671411_12 fatcat:k5z2joy3nrecfk72p5iq425v7y

Selfish Multi-User Task Scheduling

Thomas Carroll, Daniel Grosu
2006 2006 Fifth International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing  
In this paper we formulate and study a new scheduling problem called Selfish Multi-User Task Scheduling.  ...  Each user is selfish and her goal is to minimize the makespan of her own tasks. We model this problem as a non-cooperative, extensive-form game.  ...  [2] considered a different approach by investigating selfish tasks and they devised a truthful (2− 1/m)-approximate mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ispdc.2006.44 dblp:conf/ispdc/CarrollG06 fatcat:eybv4nq55ffxpgigiwc2dzpvga

Algorithmic Game Theory and Scheduling [chapter]

Evripidis Bampis, Eric Angel, Fanny Pascual
2007 Handbook of Approximation Algorithms and Metaheuristics  
-Local scheduling policies in which the schedule on each machine depends only on the loads of the machine. -each machine can give priorities to the tasks and introduce delays. α-approx.  ...  Aim: Find the best (or a near optimal) NE PS = (value of the GOF in the best NE)/OPT Example: -PS=1 for the KP model -PS=4/3-1/3m for the CKN model (with LPT l.p.)Approximate StabilityAim: Relax the notion  ...  machines [AS05] Results for the AT model Conclusion • Future work: -Links between LS and game theory -Many variants of scheduling problems -Repeated games …  ... 
doi:10.1201/9781420010749.ch81 fatcat:ajtnjfom4vbsncm5izchkp7rsi

A Truthful Dynamic Workflow Scheduling Mechanism for Commercial Multicloud Environments

Hamid Mohammadi Fard, Radu Prodan, Thomas Fahringer
2013 IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems  
In this paper, we introduce a pricing model and a truthful mechanism for scheduling single tasks considering two objectives: monetary cost and completion time.  ...  We theoretically analyze the truthfulness and the efficiency of the mechanism and present extensive experimental results showing significant impact of the selfish behavior of the cloud providers on the  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), project TRP 72-N23, and by the Standortagentur Tirol, project RainCloud.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tpds.2012.257 fatcat:5qxx2o5sgvhbzafffovrsp3xje

Scheduling without Payments [chapter]

Elias Koutsoupias
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2.  ...  This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks.  ...  There is a truthful in expectation mechanism without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines with approximation ratio (n + 1)/2 when the objective is the social cost and n(n + 1)/2 when  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_14 fatcat:odivegd6lvdd7dane6nqncvnve

Scheduling Without Payments

Elias Koutsoupias
2013 Theory of Computing Systems  
Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2.  ...  This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks.  ...  There is a truthful in expectation mechanism without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines with approximation ratio (n + 1)/2 when the objective is the social cost and n(n + 1)/2 when  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00224-013-9473-0 fatcat:ta6l3y3mzzectpxbyir6fpn56u

Real-Time Competitive Environments: Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks

Anwar Mohammadi, Nathan Fisher, Daniel Grosu
2012 2012 24th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems  
: -Sheikh et al. [2011]: Multiprocessor periodic scheduling using gametheoretic concepts -Porter [2004]: Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling -None of these prior works on scheduling considers  ...  Related Work • Value/Utility Allocation in Non-Competitive Real-Time Systems: -Baruah et al. [1991]: On-line scheduling in the presence of overload.  ...  Approximate Mechanisms For any > 0, EDF-MAXVAL-APROX is truthful and returns an allocation with social welfare no less than 1 − times the optimal obtainable social welfare in time polynomial in 1/ and  ... 
doi:10.1109/ecrts.2012.25 dblp:conf/ecrts/MohammadiFG12 fatcat:s2pmfblwe5ggnbt3m2fnh57f64

Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification

Alessandro Ferrante, Gennaro Parlato, Francesco Sorrentino, Carmine Ventre
2009 Theoretical Computer Science  
Our results improve the existing ones which provide truthful mechanisms dealing only with finite type sets and do not preserve the approximation ratio of the underlying algorithm.  ...  We provide a truthful mechanism that is c · (1 + )-approximate if the underlying algorithm is c-approximate and weakly-monotone.  ...  Fourth author's research was supported by the European Project FP6-15964, Algorithmic Principles for Building Efficient Overlay Computers (AEOLUS) and by DFG grant Kr 2332/1-2 within Emmy Noether Program  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.024 fatcat:4yykzfmejrbh7lbnkvkyagqapu

Game-theoretic aspects of distributed computing

Chryssis Georgiou
2010 ACM SIGACT News  
I, Spain) for their cordial help and support.  ...  Acknowledgements Paul Spirakis and I would like to thank the DISC'09 Organization Committee chairs, Antonio Fernández Anta (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain) and Vicent Cholvi Juan (Universitat Jaume  ...  Efficient Coordination Mechanisms for Selfish Scheduling, by Ioannis Caragiannis. Ioannis presented coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on unrelated machines.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1711475.1711497 fatcat:xxjmav5vkzd3hkxcbkgv55wu5i

An Improved Randomized Truthful Mechanism for Scheduling Unrelated Machines [article]

Pinyan Lu, Changyuan Yu
2008 arXiv   pre-print
We also generalize our result to a 0.8368m-approximation mechanism for task scheduling with m machines, which improve the previous best upper bound of 0.875m(Mu'alem and Schapira 2007).  ...  This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper (Nisan and Ronen 1999), where they gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines.  ...  Formally we give a 1.6737-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for task scheduling with two machines.  ... 
arXiv:0802.2851v1 fatcat:drhvgvvcyvf75o2bgwdj3f7hk4

An Improved Randomized Truthful Mechanism for Scheduling Unrelated Machines

Pinyan Lu, Changyuan Yu, Marc Herbstritt
2008 Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science  
This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [NR99], where they gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines.  ...  We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism design setting.  ...  Formally we give a 1.6737-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for task scheduling with two machines.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.stacs.2008.1314 dblp:conf/stacs/LuY08 fatcat:veqgt26p2vg3zmlpquqvkz2cca
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