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On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7ljisdx4yfhzbmhados4oxci6y" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC &#39;11</a> </i> &nbsp;
In order to quantify the efficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions, we study the corresponding games and present new bounds on their price of anarchy, improving the recent results of  ...  For more general equilibrium classes (i.e., mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria), we present an upper bound of 2.310 on the price of anarchy.  ...  We provide new social welfare guarantees for generalized second price auctions that are expressed as bounds on the price of anarchy of the corresponding games over equilibria of particular classes, improving  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993588">doi:10.1145/1993574.1993588</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/CaragiannisKKK11.html">dblp:conf/sigecom/CaragiannisKKK11</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/f7ehgils4fbbdduaaxxquci5uq">fatcat:f7ehgils4fbbdduaaxxquci5uq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829013358/https://www.ceid.upatras.gr/webpages/faculty/caragian/ec11.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/e0/1d/e01d0d40fc43a777da7a0a86bd63e52dc8ac7df1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993588"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions [article]

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
<span title="2016-07-26">2016</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.  ...  One major technical issue in second-price-type auctions is the no-overbidding assumption.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07684v1">arXiv:1607.07684v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/b5t3xgmk75bi7iymdoelblnnl4">fatcat:b5t3xgmk75bi7iymdoelblnnl4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200828010355/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.07684v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/88/31/88319927af3118748a429d25d428d7fdb27af6fc.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07684v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding

Kevin A. Bryan
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
GENERALIZED SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS WITH HIERARCHICAL BIDDING The sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common  ...  The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction.  ...  This line of research has shown that, unlike second-price Vickrey auctions, Generalized Second Price auctions are not necessarily efficient -that is, GSP may lead to allocations that do not maximize the  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1186525">doi:10.2139/ssrn.1186525</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/4wb5wkzsdva2hdjkbeuagk6ut4">fatcat:4wb5wkzsdva2hdjkbeuagk6ut4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170809061907/https://digarchive.library.vcu.edu/bitstream/handle/10156/2296/thesisdoublespace.pdf?sequence=1" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/10/86/1086ec51f532acd1b93cc15e0c413e8c4506d66a.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1186525"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
<span title="2017-05-28">2017</span> <i title="AI Access Foundation"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/4ax4efcwajcgvidb6hcg6mwx4a" style="color: black;">The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research</a> </i> &nbsp;
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.  ...  One major technical issue in second-price-type auctions is the no-overbidding assumption.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5272">doi:10.1613/jair.5272</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/7gcmpshgivh2vj4xu2enqe3nue">fatcat:7gcmpshgivh2vj4xu2enqe3nue</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190427144032/https://jair.org/index.php/jair/article/download/11062/26240" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/ad/5c/ad5c57e2a2b676be9f2b85c7f8b83201d14d35a6.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5272"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Auction Design with Advised Bidders

Andrey Malenko, Anton Tsoy
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="ACM"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/hpnmh2mwnjh33dhw6rbzplc2xq" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the The Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications</a> </i> &nbsp;
When advisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize efficient equilibria of static auctions and equilibria of the English auction under the NITS condition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008) ).  ...  Under NITS, any equilibrium of the English auction dominates any efficient equilibrium of any static auction in terms of both efficiency and the seller's revenue.  ...  Lemma 2 states that to characterize equilibria of a rich class of static auctions and compare their efficiency and revenue to dynamic auctions, one can simply analyze equilibria of the second-price auction  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260860">doi:10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260860</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/journals/sg/MalenkoT16.html">dblp:journals/sg/MalenkoT16</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ulwxf5tgqberhfifmb7llrdmfa">fatcat:ulwxf5tgqberhfifmb7llrdmfa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190223150417/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5178/5b179a5338402b7322741f1ba9be2b84bdf3.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/51/78/51785b179a5338402b7322741f1ba9be2b84bdf3.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260860"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Auction Theory

Robert J. Weber
<span title="">2003</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
The symmetric equilibria of both sequential first-price and sequential second-price auctions are determined. Both sequential auctions are efficient, and therefore generate equal seller revenues.  ...  The strategic equivalence of first-price and Dutch auctions in general is noted, as is the practical equivalence of second-price and English auctions in the private values setting.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.001">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wsyapc7dx5d37b67pijdr3h3qu">fatcat:wsyapc7dx5d37b67pijdr3h3qu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060907060200/http://grizzly.la.psu.edu/%7Evkrishna/book/GEB%20review.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d9/d4/d9d48f0b3da4d611b000af4a33049e91849e7be1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.001"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

AUCTIONS WITH LEAKS ABOUT EARLY BIDS: ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL BEHAVIOR

Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, Todd R. Kaplan, Ro'i Zultan
<span title="2020-10-26">2020</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tbimpvntdjecbkgyq4fepmui7y" style="color: black;">Economic Inquiry</a> </i> &nbsp;
In second-price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection. (JEL D44, C72, C91)  ...  Equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second-price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules.  ...  For example, efficiency under low leak probabilities is higher in all equilibria of the second-price auction compared to the equilibrium of the first-price auction.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12953">doi:10.1111/ecin.12953</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/27stjkfdvzhxfiy7lwrdeu7mfy">fatcat:27stjkfdvzhxfiy7lwrdeu7mfy</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210716205735/https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/21233/4/FullText.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c7/79/c7792353754e5fed504ca0424c7c45b22c4c3ef7.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12953"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

Paul Milgrom
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
The generalized second price auction used for sponsored-search advertising is a tight simplification of a series of second-price auctions that eliminates the lowest revenue equilibrium outcomes and leaves  ...  Prominent auction and matching mechanisms are tight simplifications of mechanisms studied in economic theory and often incorporate price-adjustment features that facilitate simplification.  ...  The next step in this research program is to apply the principles of simplification to invent and evaluate new mechanisms.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/quapiij6h5bmleberiz6iquygy">fatcat:quapiij6h5bmleberiz6iquygy</a> </span>
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Coopetitive Ad Auctions [article]

Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens
<span title="2012-09-04">2012</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
In contrast, we show that an appropriate first-price auction has nice equilibria in a single-slot ad auction --- all equilibria that satisfy a natural cooperative envy-freeness condition select the welfare-maximizing  ...  We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual benefit and a benefit-aware Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, perform  ...  In contrast, we show that equilibria of the first-price auction which satisfy a cooperative envy-freeness condition have a natural performance guarantee similar to that of a second-price auction.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0832v1">arXiv:1209.0832v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/axwt3mrlvfbdbdjxgdfwd5bm4a">fatcat:axwt3mrlvfbdbdjxgdfwd5bm4a</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/download/arxiv-1209.0832/1209.0832.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> File Archive [PDF] </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0832v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment

MATTHEW. O. JACKSON, ILAN KREMER
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="Oxford University Press (OUP)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/4gp7xsp5mndehl3evvt3ibyvbi" style="color: black;">The Review of Economic Studies</a> </i> &nbsp;
All equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient, while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient.  ...  We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting.  ...  We are grateful for financial support from the Guggenheim Foundation, the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences, and the National Science Foundation under grants SES-9986190 and SES-0316493  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00404.x">doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00404.x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zo3uss6sdffwrdrs7v2z6dabaq">fatcat:zo3uss6sdffwrdrs7v2z6dabaq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170812152438/http://authors.library.caltech.edu/7568/1/JACres06.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/33/30/3330d0f685fed7ea044fb20bb3ea0eb8ad9549b0.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00404.x"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

On revenue in the generalized second price auction

Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Eva Tardos
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/s4hirppq3jalbopssw22crbwwa" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web - WWW &#39;12</a> </i> &nbsp;
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for selling sponsored search advertisements. In this paper we consider the revenue of this auction.  ...  Most previous work of GSP focuses on envy free equilibria of the full information version of this game. Envy-free equilibria are known to obtain at least the revenue of the VCG auction.  ...  A single item auction serves as a example for the first inequality: a single-item second price auction has many equilibria, some generating positive revenue and some generating zero.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2187836.2187886">doi:10.1145/2187836.2187886</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/www/LucierLT12.html">dblp:conf/www/LucierLT12</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/jz3orwkbjzb3ra2erwqvmhd7z4">fatcat:jz3orwkbjzb3ra2erwqvmhd7z4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170810055246/http://renatoppl.com/papers/gsp-revenue.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a3/dc/a3dc8edc7d2c5cfe10fcc2fbd0535e99aefba871.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2187836.2187886"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Chapter 23 Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions [chapter]

Katerina Sherstyuk
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Elsevier"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tgv5wjqhijckrg7tb3o2kmca5a" style="color: black;">Handbook of Experimental Economics Results</a> </i> &nbsp;
The EC in these experiments not only generate less revenue than SB auctions, but they are also no more efficient.  ...  Experiments on demand reduction With the research extending from single-unit to multi-unit auctions, the first question was whether and when desirable efficiency properties of single-unit auctions generalize  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00023-6">doi:10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00023-6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/uipzeaxtwfe6hkwxeo6dnq4jju">fatcat:uipzeaxtwfe6hkwxeo6dnq4jju</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170811134923/http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_02-7-01.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/5e/62/5e62572c33bdffa62dabce728a344799855816fb.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00023-6"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Computational Analysis of Perfect-Information Position Auctions [article]

David R.M Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown
<span title="2014-08-04">2014</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
After experimentation with other designs, the major search engines converged on the weighted, generalized second-price auction (wGSP) for selling keyword advertisements.  ...  We considered seven widely studied valuation models from the literature and three position auction variants (generalized first price, unweighted generalized second price, and wGSP).  ...  Each bidder pays the amount of his bid. uGSP The unweighted, generalized second-price auction, used by Yahoo! from 2002-2007.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.0703v1">arXiv:1408.0703v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/gdm7iiq2mff2pgw6inlusstsay">fatcat:gdm7iiq2mff2pgw6inlusstsay</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191023175505/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.0703v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4a/b7/4ab70567abb7055eb4eed87534c38568c32586af.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.0703v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano, Stefano Lovo
<span title="">2001</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/qq4ijsawy5cuxl5pxjq6mo6zoy" style="color: black;">Economics Letters</a> </i> &nbsp;
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the  ...  sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.  ...  of the expected efficiency and revenue generated by the VCG auction.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00394-3">doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00394-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/b2v3jsiolffbpnpi3h2wvawz5i">fatcat:b2v3jsiolffbpnpi3h2wvawz5i</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060430115433/http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk:80/%7Euctpgla/EL.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a9/e2/a9e28656fc9da57ea7723f5cc5d637b6baba874e.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00394-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists

Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev, Emiel Maasland
<span title="2010-06-01">2010</span> <i title="Mohr Siebeck"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/nakfsaihhzh27cnvlb7bhlujp4" style="color: black;">Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum.  ...  We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium. JEL classification: C72; D44 (M.C.W.  ...  Moreover, in contrast to the optimal auction, the right-tochoose auction is 'approximately' efficient in the sense that the surplus it generates is close to the maximal one.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1628/093245610791343049">doi:10.1628/093245610791343049</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/d4vm4fvq4vak5gyuxbn3qrks5u">fatcat:d4vm4fvq4vak5gyuxbn3qrks5u</a> </span>
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