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On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games [article]

Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
2012 arXiv   pre-print
The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and  ...  Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line.  ...  However, this raises the question about the approximability of 2-Facility and 3-Facility Location on the line by deterministic imposing mechanisms.  ... 
arXiv:1207.0935v1 fatcat:ig6evfgagfe73n4ivlw5nfqir4

On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games

Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
2014 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and  ...  Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line.  ...  However, this raises the question about the approximability of 2-Facility and 3-Facility Location on the line by deterministic imposing mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2665005 fatcat:3qaznlmiqvgwzkbug4vbxuvd3i

On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games [chapter]

Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and  ...  Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line.  ...  However, this raises the question about the approximability of 2-Facility and 3-Facility Location on the line by deterministic imposing mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39206-1_38 fatcat:7aepk5shzbbppj6guhk3ln227q

Facility Location Games With Fractional Preferences

Chi Kit Ken Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location information as well  ...  Our objective is to place two facilities on [0, L] to maximize the social utility or the minimum utility. For each objective function, we propose deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms.  ...  Conclusion To conclude, we proposed a new variant of the facility location game, named as the fractional preference model and we mainly focused on deterministic mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11458 fatcat:stkp57nelba7pittiesgn3bwly

Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games

Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Zeyuan Allen Zhu
2010 Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10  
They focused on the facility game where agents and facilities are located on the real line. Alon et al. studied the mechanisms for the facility games in a general metric space [1].  ...  We first prove an Ω(n) lower bound of the social cost approximation ratio for deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. Our lower bound even holds for the line metric space.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Zhenming Liu for stimulating discussions and commenting on a draft of this paper. We also thank Wei Chen, Mingji Xia and Yuan Zhou for helpful discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807342.1807393 dblp:conf/sigecom/LuSWZ10 fatcat:sgos3px3jfbwjjv3kottwyu6da

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey [article]

Hau Chan, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Bo Li, Minming Li, Chenhao Wang
2021 arXiv   pre-print
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due  ...  At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the  ...  Fotakis and Tzamos [38] proved that a winner-imposing extension of the Proportional Mechanism of [55] is strategyproof and achieves a 4k-approximation for the k-Facility Location game on the real line  ... 
arXiv:2106.03457v2 fatcat:tmv6sd3cjfehhaznv6d4ebgcei

Mechanism Design with Exchangeable Allocations [article]

Qiang Zhang
2016 arXiv   pre-print
By using facility location games as an example, we provide a truthful mechanism that optimizes social welfare in central exchanges.  ...  Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like to stay close to (or away from) the facility, we demonstrate  ...  Now let us consider an illustrative example on facility locations games. Facility location games.  ... 
arXiv:1609.04782v1 fatcat:3u65ubufnvbopphnsloik3saxi

Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location at Limited Locations [article]

Toby Walsh
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We consider here the impact of such constraints on the location of facilities on the performance of strategy proof mechanisms for locating facilities.We study four different performance objectives: the  ...  Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice?  ...  When facilities are not limited in their location, the only deterministic and strategy proof mechanism for locating two facilities on the line with a bounded approximation ratio for either the optimal  ... 
arXiv:2009.07982v2 fatcat:iekvrv3w2jhf7fxsda2t2gjfje

Market Mechanisms for Local Electricity Markets: A review of models, solution concepts and algorithmic techniques

Georgios Tsaousoglou, Juan S. Giraldo, Nikolaos G. Paterakis
2022 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews  
accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the  ...  If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User  ...  Naturally, there is a price (dual variable) for each node (corresponding power balance constraint). For this reason this mechanism is also called Locational Marginal Pricing.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.rser.2021.111890 fatcat:zlxfciaf6bahbn3sp7u7tj7j2q

Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location with Capacity Limits [article]

Toby Walsh
2020 arXiv   pre-print
An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities.  ...  We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal  ...  Theorem 6 For 2k agents, any deterministic and strategy proof mechanism to locate two facilities of capacity k has an approximation ratio for the total distance of at least k − 1.  ... 
arXiv:2009.07986v1 fatcat:c2xsgpv4wzevnoynsdttltk2wi

Page 9428 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2004k [page]

2004 Mathematical Reviews  
In this paper we discuss the quiet accumulation game in which the hider is informed of the location searched on a turn only if the seeker finds an object there.  ...  The sharing rule proposed in this paper is the Harsanyi transferable- utility value of the game—which is based on the users’ marginal contributions to the bargaining power of coalitions.” 2004k:91014 91A10  ... 

Electric Vehicle Charging Scheduling in Green Logistics: Challenges, Approaches and Opportunities [article]

Luyang Hou, Chun Wang, Jun Yan
2021 arXiv   pre-print
charging scheduling problems for the management of the future green logistics.  ...  In green logistics, a well-scheduled charging ensures an efficient operation of transportation and power systems and, at the same time, provides economical and satisfactory charging services for drivers  ...  A Micro-grid is a small-scale power production and delivery system comprising distributed generation facilities co-located with the loads they serve.  ... 
arXiv:2103.07635v1 fatcat:s63yfitub5b6fllkr4t3vukx5y

In Defense of Bureaucracy in the Metric Facility Location Problem [article]

Nick Gravin, Dominik Scheder
2012 arXiv   pre-print
Thus, our work is the first among those on incentive compatible facility location that treats effectively (with a constant factor of approximation) the general case of an arbitrary number of facilities  ...  Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players.  ...  . , 2010] ] further improved these lower bounds to (n − 1)/2 for deterministic mechanisms and 1.045 for randomized mechanisms in the two-facility game.  ... 
arXiv:1202.1231v2 fatcat:5sc4zvmthjfzvnidhz4mhpegk4

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective

Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13  
We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a tree, where a set of n strategic agents report their locations and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location  ...  The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we introduce, for the first time, a general and clean family of strategyproof (SP) mechanisms for facility location on tree networks.  ...  The characterization of SP mechanisms for facility location settings has been studied thus far mainly with respect to deterministic mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482543 dblp:conf/sigecom/FeldmanW13 fatcat:cjxvbej7gvcw5emunaoa5arnpe

Shapley Facility Location Games [article]

Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz
2017 arXiv   pre-print
In most facility location games considered in the literature, users are assumed to act deterministically: given the facilities chosen by the players, users are attracted to their nearest facility.  ...  Our third main result is a bound on the Price of Anarchy of this class of games, as well as showing the bound is tight.  ...  Acknowledgments This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n • 740435).  ... 
arXiv:1709.10278v2 fatcat:qf5qindzivh2zbgaazj5blikhq
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