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On avoiding vote swapping

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin
2015 Social Choice and Welfare  
In this paper we analyse the problem of vote swapping in representative democracies.  ...  Vote swapping consists of exchanging votes between two voters from two different jurisdictions in order to beat a candidate that both voters dislike.  ...  The only other paper on vote swapping is Hartvigsen (2006) . In that paper, the author analyses how websites can best implement vote swapping.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0923-2 fatcat:j4a3enueefcpbicx7fszttompi

Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications

Henry T. C. Hu, Bernard Black
2008 European Financial Management  
Equity decoupling involves unbundling of economic, voting, and sometimes other rights customarily associated with shares, often in ways that may permit avoidance of disclosure and other obligations.  ...  We extend here our prior work, which focused on equity decoupling ( Hu and Black, 2006 , by providing a systematic treatment of debt decoupling and an initial exploration of hybrid decoupling.  ...  Depending on the jurisdiction, avoidable rules can include: • Rules against 'vote buying'.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2008.00450.x fatcat:biygazt3efamdbrlljtlyqhwrq

Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications

Henry T.C. Hu, Bernard S. Black
2008 Social Science Research Network  
Equity decoupling involves unbundling of economic, voting, and sometimes other rights customarily associated with shares, often in ways that may permit avoidance of disclosure and other obligations.  ...  We extend here our prior work, which focused on equity decoupling ( Hu and Black, 2006 , by providing a systematic treatment of debt decoupling and an initial exploration of hybrid decoupling.  ...  Depending on the jurisdiction, avoidable rules can include: • Rules against 'vote buying'.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1084075 fatcat:sllnalbjtje57kwxxos23edxjm

Equity Swaps and Implications in Company Law: An Examination of Singapore Law

Christopher C. Chen
2012 Social Science Research Network  
The article accepts that non-disclosure of economic interests might have an impact on market efficiency and corporate governance.  ...  This article explores issues from the use of equity swaps by corporate stakeholders under Singapore law.  ...  The underlying assumption is that shareholders are likely to consider their self-interest in exercising such rights and take care in doing so to avoid having a negative effect on the share price.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1983657 fatcat:zhvwnxinfrb5xmn3arlpn2mmji

The Art of Voting

Jeremy Pilcher
2015 Electronic Visualisation and the Arts (EVA 2015)  
In 2007 a federal appeals court decided that at least one form of these vote-swapping sites were constitutionally protected.  ...  The aim of these sites was to enable voters in different states to swap votes.  ...  The vote swapping sites invited decisions to be made as to whether a vote in one state should be able to be swapped with one in another state.  ... 
doi:10.14236/ewic/eva2015.17 dblp:conf/eva/Pilcher15 fatcat:tysyricx2bethgpa7bp6ygqeki

Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery [chapter]

Britta Dorn, Ildikó Schlotter
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We initiate a parameterized and multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery, focusing on the case of k-approval.  ...  We consider the computational complexity of a problem modeling bribery in the context of voting systems.  ...  The argument here relies heavily on our bound on the cost: to obtain optimality, the briber needs certain swaps to be performed in a "parallel" fashion (i.e., within the same vote) to avoid expensive swaps  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17493-3_12 fatcat:wb2ml7neozei5pjghyz6dxu7du

Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery

Britta Dorn, Ildikó Schlotter
2011 Algorithmica  
We initiate a parameterized and multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery, focusing on the case of k-approval.  ...  We consider the computational complexity of a problem modeling bribery in the context of voting systems.  ...  The argument here relies heavily on our bound on the cost: to obtain optimality, the briber needs certain swaps to be performed in a "parallel" fashion (i.e., within the same vote) to avoid expensive swaps  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00453-011-9568-4 fatcat:mml5hgsqxfhk5hn4ffsw6wpmhm

Pairwise Liquid Democracy

Markus Brill, Nimrod Talmon
2018 Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
Based on the framework of distance rationalization, we introduce novel variants of voting rules that are tailored to the liquid democracy context.  ...  In a liquid democracy, voters can either vote directly or delegate their vote to another voter of their choice.  ...  distance rationalizable voting rule may depend on the structure of the pairwise delegation graph, such rules generally violate the one man-one vote property as discussed by [Christoff and Grossi, 2017  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/19 dblp:conf/ijcai/BrillT18 fatcat:xrjv2mjl3zbrrmjmbosjcjseuy

On Swap Convexity of Voting Rules

Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski
2020 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
Obraztsova et al. (2013) have recently proposed an intriguing convexity axiom for voting rules. This axiom imposes conditions on the shape of the sets of elections with a given candidate as a winner.  ...  In this paper, we (1) propose several families of voting rules that are convex in the sense of Obraztsova et al.; (2) put forward a weaker notion of convexity that is satisfied by most common voting rules  ...  To avoid confusion, from now on we will refer to the notion of convexity from Definition 3.1 as ∃-convexity.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5560 fatcat:p2clf6rrxnf5tfb2fvfha42cxi

Identifying the Legal Contours of the Separation of Economic Rights and Voting Rights in Publicly Held Corporations

Chris W. Waddell, Kendrick Nguyen, Evan Epstein, Francis Daniel Siciliano, Joseph A. Grundfest
2010 Social Science Research Network  
(UK) LLP 227 addresses the question of whether an investor can avoid federal reporting obligations through the use of total return equity swaps.  ...  s jurisdiction is based on a broad definition of swaps. The SEC!  ...  This Report summarizes the state of the literature on the complex issues of decoupling transactions, empty voting, negative voting, and vote buying.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1695183 fatcat:35n56xrnxbafbdvql4l2af4ote

Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions

Henry T.C. Hu, Bernard S. Black
2008 Social Science Research Network  
These forms of decoupling pose important risks to the one-share-one-vote paradigm that underlies conventional models of corporate governance and shareholder voting.  ...  voting ownership as well.  ...  they are entitled to vote, thus avoiding over-voting.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1030721 fatcat:zqndtwyfxnel5ak64hqtsjhm24

Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners [article]

Christopher M. Homan, Lane A. Hemaspaandra
2007 arXiv   pre-print
In the year 1876 the mathematician Charles Dodgson, who wrote fiction under the now more famous name of Lewis Carroll, devised a beautiful voting system that has long fascinated political scientists.  ...  Acknowledgments In an undergraduate project in one of our courses, G. Goldstein, D. Berlin, K. Osipov, and N.  ...  The present paper was motivated by their exciting experimental insight, and seeks to prove rigorously that a greedy approach can be frequently successful on Dodgson elections.  ... 
arXiv:cs/0509061v3 fatcat:ryokzoipijht7c6r6tuhh3vwra

A O( m), deterministic, polynomial-time computable approximation of Lewis Carroll's scoring rule [article]

Jason Covey, Christopher Homan
2008 arXiv   pre-print
Over a series of rounds, our scoring rules greedily choose a sequence of edits that modify exactly one voter's preferences and whose marginal cost is no greater than any other such single-vote-modifying  ...  We provide deterministic, polynomial-time computable voting rules that approximate Dodgson's and (the "minimization version" of) Young's scoring rules to within a logarithmic factor.  ...  Note that in this case, the swaps between c and b do not actually reduce c's vote deficit, since c is already beating b. Candidate d is losing to c and b by one vote each.  ... 
arXiv:0804.1421v1 fatcat:ewynj5a77baxfecqz5ds3uq4ca

Lie on the Fly: Strategic Voting in an Iterative Preference Elicitation Process [article]

Lihi Dery, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Meir Kalech
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We also provide a careful voting center which is aware of the possible manipulations and avoids manipulative queries when possible.  ...  In an empirical study on four real-world domains, we show that in practice manipulation occurs in a low percentage of settings and has a low impact on the final outcome.  ...  We compare manipulative voters to truthful voters in (a) a careful voting center and (b) a naïve voting center that does not attempt to avoid manipulations.  ... 
arXiv:1905.04933v1 fatcat:u5dfl3pbrbbgra6asee36dx4de

Very Hard Electoral Control Problems [article]

Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra, Alexander Hoover, David E. Narváez
2018 arXiv   pre-print
So, to gain one vote over c 1 , swap q with c 1 in v 1 (we already swapped q with c 1,1 ) and to gain one vote over c 2 , swap q with c 2 in v 2 (we already swapped q with c 1,2 ).  ...  or z i candidates, i.e., one swap in votes other than Block I and Block II votes is useless.  ...  If ℓ i,j = x t (x t ) then q can gain one vote over c i in the corresponding Block I vote with only one swap.  ... 
arXiv:1811.05438v1 fatcat:havxenaxljdcpnewg7cb6uvr2y
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