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On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
<span title="2016-05-13">2016</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
In this work we embark on a mechanism design approach and investigate the existence of truthful mechanisms.  ...  The objective then is to find an allocation, so that each player is guaranteed her maximin share.  ...  Conclusions We embarked on the existence of truthful mechanisms for approximate maximin share allocations.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.04026v1">arXiv:1605.04026v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2co4yga74ff33hkht5iost345y">fatcat:2co4yga74ff33hkht5iost345y</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200911100620/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.04026v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/37/f5/37f5507898a008f58e84eb4c707d5c8881de2cd5.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.04026v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations [article]

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
<span title="2020-12-24">2020</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
(EF1), and giving each player at least her maximin share.  ...  For the case that players have submodular valuations with dichotomous marginals, we design such a deterministic truthful allocation mechanism.  ...  [2] studied deterministic truthful allocation mechanisms for approximating the maximin share for additive valuations.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.10704v3">arXiv:2002.10704v3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ij3aub5d65d23irhvo6dolivrm">fatcat:ij3aub5d65d23irhvo6dolivrm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200812065400/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.10704v2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download [not primary version]" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <span style="color: #f43e3e;">&#10033;</span> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.10704v3" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Implementation under ambiguity

Luciano I. de Castro, Zhiwei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique  ...  The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de Castro-Yannelis [11]), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences.  ...  mechanism (a game in which players report their private information) for which truth telling is its equilibrium (based on some game theoretic solution concept), and the truth telling equilibrium yields  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ahwktnqo7baxrjmwg57phibqmm">fatcat:ahwktnqo7baxrjmwg57phibqmm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160415135824/http://economics.emory.edu/home/documents/Seminars%20Workshops/Seminar-2015-Yannelis-1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/93/cd/93cd282e714b74555299fcc660db49e2c8c80b47.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
<span title="2022-03-04">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Recently, there has been a surge of papers studying computational questions regarding various different notions of fairness for the indivisible case, like maximin share fairness (MMS) and envy-freeness  ...  Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing on infinitely divisible  ...  A characterization of truthful mechanisms for two agents, showing that truthfulness and fairness are incompatible (in the sense that there is no truthful mechanism with bounded fairness guarantees under  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.07551v2">arXiv:2202.07551v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/4iingy3g5rfjxgm3x2lbphag7a">fatcat:4iingy3g5rfjxgm3x2lbphag7a</a> </span>
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Fair Division of Indivisible Goods Among Strategic Agents [article]

Siddharth Barman, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Pooja Kulkarni, Shivika Narang
<span title="2019-01-27">2019</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods.  ...  In particular, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2 - ε) times her maximin share and the welfare of the computed allocation  ...  We develop a truthful auction which efficiently computes an allocation where each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2 − ε) times her maximin share and the social welfare of the computed allocation  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.09427v1">arXiv:1901.09427v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/27dbmot6offbhat4u4xktqfrv4">fatcat:27dbmot6offbhat4u4xktqfrv4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20191024001338/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.09427v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/71/ef/71ef13c5bc76f37ef33541f950e279b57e0fe8bb.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.09427v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes

Eric Budish
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="University of Chicago Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/uobky7wwvja53fhgaveu6hr3c4" style="color: black;">Journal of Political Economy</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment-for example, assigning schedules of courses to students-based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in  ...  Its performance is explored on real data, and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice: all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets, and most  ...  Agent i's maximin share is the consumption bundle max min {x , … , x } , TABLE 1 1 Comparison of Alternative Mechanisms Mechanism Efficiency (Truthful Play) Fairness (Truthful Play) Incentives  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1086/664613">doi:10.1086/664613</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/hngsnsu235cpbnpihpy73r6244">fatcat:hngsnsu235cpbnpihpy73r6244</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808183624/http://www.immorlica.com/marketDesign/Harvard/reading/budish-approxceei-jpe-2011.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f7/0f/f70f810b4fcc0e0a2358d2cbafac958c8ed61ab1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1086/664613"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Mechanism Design for Team Formation [article]

Mason Wright, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
<span title="2015-01-04">2015</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have desirable theoretical properties.  ...  We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature.  ...  A maximin share for an agent is the agent's least-preferred bundle in a maximin split for the agent.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00715v1">arXiv:1501.00715v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zrfvbz3kevajnd4pnryt2pb5ui">fatcat:zrfvbz3kevajnd4pnryt2pb5ui</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200915180915/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.00715v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f4/53/f45370375a113ea9474941a051dd616bb151d006.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00715v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The combinatorial assignment problem

Eric Budish
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/yv67paqbtvfztccljfns7qzypq" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT &#39;10</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment-for example, assigning schedules of courses to students-based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in  ...  Its performance is explored on real data, and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice: all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets, and most  ...  Agent i's maximin share is the consumption bundle max min {x , … , x } , TABLE 1 1 Comparison of Alternative Mechanisms Mechanism Efficiency (Truthful Play) Fairness (Truthful Play) Incentives  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807480">doi:10.1145/1807406.1807480</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/bqgt/Budish10.html">dblp:conf/bqgt/Budish10</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fe2hvqezsfgqdldcu4arrdj3oq">fatcat:fe2hvqezsfgqdldcu4arrdj3oq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808183624/http://www.immorlica.com/marketDesign/Harvard/reading/budish-approxceei-jpe-2011.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f7/0f/f70f810b4fcc0e0a2358d2cbafac958c8ed61ab1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807480"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Truthful Mechanism Design for Multiregion Mobile Crowdsensing

Yu Qiao, Jun Wu, Hao Cheng, Zilan Huang, Qiangqiang He, Chongjun Wang
<span title="2020-08-19">2020</span> <i title="Hindawi Limited"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/6o4hgxplrbehxg4t53ub7zmfha" style="color: black;">Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing</a> </i> &nbsp;
We design two objectives for the proposed multiregion scenario, namely, weighted mean and maximin.  ...  In the age of the development of artificial intelligence, we face the challenge on how to obtain high-quality data set for learning systems effectively and efficiently.  ...  ii) For a multiunit budget-feasible mechanism, we propose a novel method via a proportional share allocation rule instead of the random sampling method applied in [5] .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/8834983">doi:10.1155/2020/8834983</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/pnjpigozh5eondhqftdyyfj6ny">fatcat:pnjpigozh5eondhqftdyyfj6ny</a> </span>
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Information and incentives in labor-managed economies

William Thomson
<span title="">1982</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/e3irf3spwjgr5dyipk7dfnda2m" style="color: black;">Journal of comparative economics (Print)</a> </i> &nbsp;
for one i Claim 1: For truth-telling to be a dominant strategy, it is necessary that, for all be independent of a l that such that Proof: max( a, 2 -aI.' 1) , il=l 1.  ...  Proposition 6 : 6 There exists no auctioneer mechanism implementing P~ on EF in maximin strategies. Proof: It basically follows the proof of Proposition 3. In the auctioneer mechanism (W;(M.  ...  to the list of truthful announcements is one prescribed by p .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(82)90035-x">doi:10.1016/0147-5967(82)90035-x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/pqxykgetmba25jyg4ib4zs33h4">fatcat:pqxykgetmba25jyg4ib4zs33h4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100730173353/http://www.econ.umn.edu/%7Eeconlib/mnpapers/1980-129.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9c/85/9c85c20101fc573d80e11c79fd599dab31dc1123.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(82)90035-x"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives [article]

Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige
<span title="2022-05-16">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
The maximin share was a natural candidate for a feasible share for additive valuations. However, Kurokawa, Procaccia and Wang [2018] show that it is not feasible.  ...  We show that a SM-dominating feasible shareone that dominates every self-maximizing (SM) feasible share – does not exist for additive valuations (and beyond).  ...  The notion of a share giving incentive for truthful reporting should not be confused with the notion of an allocation mechanism being incentive compatible.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.07519v1">arXiv:2205.07519v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/6c24oueqvrh6hfu2jent4tuco4">fatcat:6c24oueqvrh6hfu2jent4tuco4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220524010719/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.07519v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/fc/93/fc933e51b327408d511b27f55e3e8d469758e557.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.07519v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
<span title="2021-09-17">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
corresponding allocations not only are EFX but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-strategic setting!  ...  Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria which all induce EFX allocations.  ...  Besides MMS, there exist other fairness criteria based on the notion of maximin shares, like pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS) [20] and groupwise maximin share fairness (GMMS) [10] .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08644v1">arXiv:2109.08644v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fysxan22ajeavgqfmnvz4jiu6m">fatcat:fysxan22ajeavgqfmnvz4jiu6m</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210924155712/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.08644v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/1c/b5/1cb5cba8a53511a84feec9b6b0606e1d9db6150c.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08644v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Algorithmic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: A Survey and New Questions [article]

Haris Aziz, Bo Li, Herve Moulin, Xiaowei Wu
<span title="2022-02-17">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Particularly, in this survey, we focus on indivisible items, for which absolute fairness such as envy-freeness and proportionality cannot be guaranteed.  ...  The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance.  ...  Maximin Share Fairness Besides the worst case guarantee studied by Hill [1987] , one popular relaxation of PROP is the maximin share fairness, motivated by the following imaginary experiment.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.08713v1">arXiv:2202.08713v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/kovxtvlrkngt3fgamxbxkax2aa">fatcat:kovxtvlrkngt3fgamxbxkax2aa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220219013736/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2202.08713v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/41/25/412514ce99468edc267f1e6cf70a8cd6bf27b184.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.08713v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations [article]

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
<span title="2022-03-24">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
In this work we attempt to give every agent a high value ex-post, and specifically, a constant fraction of his maximin share (MMS).  ...  share up to one item, and more importantly, at least half of his MMS.  ...  However, for general additive valuations, there are impossibility results for truthful mechanisms, and they carry over to universally truthful mechanisms.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04909v4">arXiv:2102.04909v4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ui3imgmy4zgohdw23rvetpzjgq">fatcat:ui3imgmy4zgohdw23rvetpzjgq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220508051847/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.04909v4.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/69/52/6952faaeebeefda153385edf12cad7656b83f4da.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04909v4" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Vangelis Markakis
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/vfwwmrihanevtjbbkti2kc3nke" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
We focus on four such notions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS).  ...  In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality.  ...  A direct implication of our results is the non-existence of truthful allocation mechanisms for two agents that achieve any constant approximation of PMMS, EFX, or even EF.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/6">doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ijcai/AmanatidisBM18.html">dblp:conf/ijcai/AmanatidisBM18</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/jtimorlwknbn5hzw7escssl4gq">fatcat:jtimorlwknbn5hzw7escssl4gq</a> </span>
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