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On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms
2007
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In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. ...
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. ...
The property of an allocation rule to have a unique payment scheme completing the allocation rule to a truthful mechanism is called revenue equivalence. ...
doi:10.4230/dagsemproc.07271.11
fatcat:k2xqwft2ibggdkhckxayplyhea
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
2006
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '06
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Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use. ...
We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. ...
Thus, we impose rank-equivalence as a constraint on any auction mechanism that we design, i.e., the truthful mechanism must result in the same ranking as the original mechanism in place. ...
doi:10.1145/1134707.1134708
dblp:conf/sigecom/AggarwalGM06
fatcat:j3p2c27445dlxfuw3pa6th2p3m
Auction design with a risk averse seller
1999
Economics Letters
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We show that for every incentive compatible selling mechanism there exists a mechanism which provides deterministically the same expected revenue. ...
We consider auctions with a risk averse seller in independent private values environments with risk neutral buyers. ...
For any incentive compatible mechanism fp i :; t i :g n i=1 , there is a mechanism in the same equivalence class with deterministic revenue. ...
doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00115-9
fatcat:tj6trobzurdunajmb6anqrkwv4
Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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sequence of the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution. ...
Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, based on individuals' incentives to report their preferences. ...
It can be easily proven that, the minimum revenue equilibrium as a selling mechanism will rendre bidders truthful: everyone gets its maximum utility by bidding the truth. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_2
fatcat:7rgn5jf7n5f6npk4p2crqcl4z4
Approximately Revenue-Maximizing Auctions for Deliberative Agents
2021
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
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In particular, we use Myerson (1981) to construct the first non-trivial (i.e., dependent on deliberation costs) upper bound on revenue in deliberative auctions. ...
In addition, we show that in many deliberative environments the only optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms take the form of sequential posted-price auctions. ...
The following theorem relates the expected revenue of truthful mechanisms in the two environments. Theorem 11. For any truthful DDM M in E, there is mechanism N where: 1. ...
doi:10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8270
fatcat:rg5tmrvzszar5pcemjsuemfi6i
Competitive Auctions for Markets with Positive Externalities
[article]
2011
arXiv
pre-print
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The main contribution of this paper is a truthful competitive mechanism for subadditive valuations. ...
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the ...
This revenue is the maximum that any truthful mechanism could get on t( ). ...
arXiv:1107.5221v1
fatcat:olcqg6sdmzf73ammbn3tofrwlq
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
2015
Games and Economic Behavior
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(Robert Kleinberg) 1 Please refer to our Related Work section for a survey on a rich literature discussing optimal auctions in other models, e.g., Crémer and McLean [7] and Rahman [19] . ...
We consider the design of dominant strategy incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions for an indivisible good, when bidders' values are drawn from a correlated distribution. ...
Thus, the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism improves on the revenue of any deterministic truthful mechanism by at least a factor of 1896 1894 > 1.001. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010
fatcat:xnldddcnnvc7tlibnkxhplluwu
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
2011
Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '11
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to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-inexpectation mechanism, and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees 5 3 approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal ...
We show that the 5 3 -approximation mechanism provides the same approximation ratio also with respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism. ...
Maximizing revenue in a truthful-in-expectation mechanism is equivalent to solving a linear program specified below, where subscript i ranges over bidders (i.e. i = 1, 2, 3) and subscript s ranges over ...
doi:10.1145/1993636.1993655
dblp:conf/stoc/DobzinskiFK11
fatcat:ixf35q2aijhqvft3wyd7mnvq3m
Single-Call Mechanisms
2015
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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One obstacle is that truthful payments depend on outcomes other than the one realized, such as the lengths of non-shortest-paths in a shortest-path auction. ...
Single-call mechanisms are a powerful tool that circumvents this obstacle -they implicitly charge truthful payments, guaranteeing truthfulness in expectation using only the outcome realized by the mechanism ...
Revenue. The following lemma implies that a lower bound on the factor of approximation to revenue is equivalent to a lower bound on precision. LEMMA 4.6. ...
doi:10.1145/2741027
fatcat:xnuiygeskjbcnnt3zddmfsdt5i
Single-call mechanisms
2012
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12
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One obstacle is that truthful payments depend on outcomes other than the one realized, such as the lengths of non-shortest-paths in a shortest-path auction. ...
Single-call mechanisms are a powerful tool that circumvents this obstacle -they implicitly charge truthful payments, guaranteeing truthfulness in expectation using only the outcome realized by the mechanism ...
Revenue. The following lemma implies that a lower bound on the factor of approximation to revenue is equivalent to a lower bound on precision. LEMMA 4.6. ...
doi:10.1145/2229012.2229084
dblp:conf/sigecom/WilkensS12
fatcat:lympcxc4rnat3hm4nflvacawrq
How to manipulate truthful prior-dependent mechanisms?
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
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In the meanwhile, as pointed out by the Wilson's Principle, a mechanism should reply as little as possible on the accuracy of prior type distribution. ...
These results echo the recent literature on prior-independent mechanism design. ...
With this lemma, we only consider truthful mechanism family {M f (·) |f (·) ∈ F n } and the truthful BNE of every mechanism in it. ...
arXiv:1606.02409v2
fatcat:zlwcfm55pzchnblmerk43olmgq
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
2009
Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '09
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In this sense, such mechanisms are prime candidates to be designed using multi-armed bandit techniques. ...
We show that this truthful restriction imposes statistical limits on the achievable regretthe achievable regret isΘ(T 2/3 ), while for traditional bandit algorithms (without the truthful restriction) the ...
equivalence holds in this case. ...
doi:10.1145/1566374.1566388
dblp:conf/sigecom/DevanurK09
fatcat:mlvu2dmsrncizofv4zl3gsgeqq
Revenue maximization with dynamic auctions in IaaS cloud markets
2013
2013 IEEE/ACM 21st International Symposium on Quality of Service (IWQoS)
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We address the two main challenges of revenue maximization and auction truthfulness. ...
., Spot Instances in Amazon EC2), or use static on-demand pricing in which the price cannot respond quickly to market dynamics (e.g., On-demand Instances in Amazon EC2). ...
Hence, it suffices to focus only on truthful mechanisms when revenue is of interest. Subsequently, our discussion on capacity allocation focuses on truthful mechanisms. ...
doi:10.1109/iwqos.2013.6550265
dblp:conf/iwqos/0030LL13
fatcat:omcn3ziysjdcdg24dkzdnjcimy
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
2005
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '05
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The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which allocates all ...
items, while we provide the design of an asymptotically revenuemaximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the items. ...
We thank Rakesh Vohra for bringing several references to our attention, and for a delightful discussion in which he helped us to hone our economic sensibilities. ...
doi:10.1145/1064009.1064014
dblp:conf/sigecom/BorgsCIMS05
fatcat:frnoebq4rfcyhpejh34gxdvhnq
Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization
2012
2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)
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We first propose a VCG-based auction mechanism, which can maximize the revenue while enforcing the truthfulness. ...
In this paper, we study the problem of how to use auction mechanisms to allocate the relay nodes and charge the source nodes, such that the revenue of the seller, e.g., the base station, is maximized. ...
The Myerson mechanism is based on the characterization of truthful mechanism [7, Theorem 13.6]. ...
doi:10.1109/icc.2012.6363632
dblp:conf/icc/YangFX12
fatcat:wgtrijuouzbzndazh7csw43bja
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