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Optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply function bidding

Viet Dung Dang, Nicholas R. Jennings
2003 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce - ICEC '03  
This paper presents new clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with piecewise linear demand/supply functions.  ...  We analyse the complexity of our algorithms and prove that they are guaranteed to find the optimal allocation.  ...  INTRODUCTION Traditionally, the most common forms of online auction are the simple, single-sided auctions in which a single item is traded (e.g. English, Dutch, first price sealed-bid and Vickrey).  ... 
doi:10.1145/948005.948009 dblp:conf/ACMicec/DangJ03 fatcat:67cn6vfkpvccbiqvnfgyxyx5sq

Approximately optimal mechanism design

Tim Roughgarden
2015 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
First, when is complexity -in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge -an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions?  ...  This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate two basic questions in auction theory.  ...  Does a near-optimal single-item auction require detailed distributional knowledge?  ... 
doi:10.1145/2728732.2728733 fatcat:mofyhzcs3bd35kcrm6vxgngz3y

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned [article]

Tim Roughgarden
2014 arXiv   pre-print
In the first example, we consider revenue maximization in a single-item auction with heterogeneous bidders.  ...  The second example considers welfare maximization with multiple items.  ...  Does a near-optimal single-item auction require detailed distributional knowledge?  ... 
arXiv:1406.6773v1 fatcat:5czubehre5aqtgh3werd25cqxe

Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching [article]

Michael J. Curry and Uro Lyi and Tom Goldstein and John Dickerson
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We propose a new architecture to approximately learn incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions from sampled valuations.  ...  In experiments, we show our approach successfully recovers multiple known optimal mechanisms and high-revenue, low-regret mechanisms in larger settings where the optimal mechanism is unknown.  ...  We thank Ahmed Abdelkader, Kevin Kuo, and Neehar Peri for comments on earlier drafts of this work, and Jason Hartline for helpful commentary.  ... 
arXiv:2106.07877v1 fatcat:mqjx7kkmg5fsnhkhhp7unf4xxa

Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations

Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
In this paper we study a wider range of combinatorial market designs: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal.  ...  Combinatorial markets where bids can be submitted on bundles of items can be economically desirable coordination mechanisms in multiagent systems where the items exhibit complementarity and substitutability  ...  Figure 3 shows that optimal clearing scales well on multiunit auctions and reverse auctions on the decay-decay distribution.  ... 
doi:10.1145/544757.544760 fatcat:4n4byot4tndhlavvpr46n5fvam

Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations

Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
In this paper we study a wider range of combinatorial market designs: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal.  ...  Combinatorial markets where bids can be submitted on bundles of items can be economically desirable coordination mechanisms in multiagent systems where the items exhibit complementarity and substitutability  ...  Figure 3 shows that optimal clearing scales well on multiunit auctions and reverse auctions on the decay-decay distribution.  ... 
doi:10.1145/544741.544760 dblp:conf/atal/SandholmSGL02 fatcat:7ywtblscvfckxk72y4chykibf4

Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets

Zoë Abrams
2006 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06  
We show that the revenue of the optimal omniscient auction that sells items at many different prices is within a factor of 2 of the optimal omniscient auction that sells all the items at a single price  ...  On the negative side, we show that no auction can achieve a guarantee of 1 2− the revenue of the optimal omniscient multi-price auction.  ...  Intuitively, b max is a bound on the amount any single bidder contributes to the optimal solution and 1 α is an upper bound on the fraction of the optimal revenue any single bidder contributes.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1109557.1109676 fatcat:6x6i3zixufd4to557w4577dmx4

Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?

Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos Papadimitriou, Christos Tzamos
2016 Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '16  
is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of each bidder for the item depends both on his own and the item's type.  ...  fractional partitioning (this corresponds to Myerson's auction preceded by optimal signaling).  ...  Acknowledgements We would like to thank Dirk Bergemann for helpful discussions on information revelation in auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2940716.2940789 dblp:conf/sigecom/DaskalakisPT16 fatcat:4lcwdfqtfna57fekjqreltkwfi

Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods [chapter]

Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
2001 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The underlying auction mechanisms are more sophisticated than in the single item case, and require solving an interesting optimization problem.  ...  These auctions were introduced in [6] in the context of selling an unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., rights to watch a movie broadcast).  ...  Although one might think that being a single-price auction is a serious restriction, in the single-item auction case this is not so.  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-44676-1_35 fatcat:uodkvvphpraw7mr5xnh6i2bsmm

A comparison of bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
2006 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
We focus on bidding for multiple items in a set of auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item. Hence an agent has to bid in multiple auctions to obtain item bundles.  ...  In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction.  ...  In a multi-auction setting, multiple single-item auctions are run concurrently or sequentially. A potential bidder needs to estimate closing prices of such auctions to compute optimal bids.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1124566.1124572 fatcat:qbn6ilnrvnacrnxjezudnwbsfi

Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue [article]

Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format A satisfying certain technical conditions, we run simultaneous item auctions augmented with a personalized entry fee for each bidder that must  ...  We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions.  ...  The revenue obtained from these separate entry-fee auctions on each item is upper bounded by the revenue obtained from separate optimal single item auctions on each item, giving ≤ OPT( ) (52) as desired  ... 
arXiv:2002.06702v5 fatcat:5norjxaqefazzo25qxw52tmgri

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable

S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
2022 Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation  
We introduce locality: a new property of multi-bidder auctions that formally separates the simplicity of optimal single-dimensional multi-bidder auctions from the complexity of optimal multi-dimensional  ...  This auction takes as input a valuation profile ì 𝑣 and produces as output an allocation of the items and prices to charge, Opt ì 𝐷 (ì 𝑣).  ...  of Theorem 1.1: that Bidder One wins the item in all optimal auctions on (𝑡 1 1 , 𝑡 1 2 ) when Disjointness(𝑥, 𝑦) = yes.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3490486.3538334 fatcat:7gkct6tyerc6pl6pdixruyktce

Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries

Jing Chen, Bo Li, Yingkai Li, Pinyan Lu, Michael Wagner
2018 International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming  
For single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, we prove tight upper-bounds via efficient query schemes, without requiring the distributions to be regular  ...  It is assumed that the seller knows "each single bit" of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the entire distributions.  ...  For single-item auctions, the revenue is a (1 + )-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue, with sufficiently small.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.icalp.2018.108 dblp:conf/icalp/0001LLL18 fatcat:suo2lbtcfrgh5kmhgjdmn3xiey

Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
2006 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '06  
We study the problem of bidding for multiple items in a set of simultaneous auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item.  ...  In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction.  ...  four single-item single-unit auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1160633.1160852 dblp:conf/atal/CandaleS06 fatcat:jhhmcrkbq5fpjasq4lxkv6iunm

Approximation in mechanism design

Jason Hartline
2010 Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10  
For instance, one conclusion I will make is that reserve-price-based auctions and posted pricings are approximately optimal in a wide range of settings.  ...  For instance, I will describe how mechanisms based on reserve prices are often sufficient to approximate ones parameterized by the full distribution and how some environments permit a single (prior-independent  ...  Without this independence the multiagent single-item auction does not give a reasonable upper bound on the optimal single-agent multi-item pricing.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807406.1807441 dblp:conf/bqgt/Hartline10 fatcat:ghivhjjeafdufkerf4kzie4ht4
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