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On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
[chapter]
2009
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. ...
We consider allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. ...
In particular, Mu'alem and Schapira [17] prove lower bounds on the envy of truthful allocation functions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10
fatcat:obq6t36yyvg2pn46r2cuw3dh2q
Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets. ...
We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources and, in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency. ...
In this work we design an optimal truthful envy-free auction for a fundamental model of resource allocation known as a multi-unit market with budgets. ...
arXiv:1602.08719v6
fatcat:w3mkdxgwtbabbl5xemy34y5zkq
Two-Person Cake-Cutting: The Optimal Number of Cuts
2011
Social Science Research Network
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We restrict our analysis to two players, because the properties we impose on the allocation of pie pieces are demanding and cannot all be satisfied if there are three or more players. ...
Assumption and Properties We assume that the two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to divide a pie into two pieces, using two cuts from the center, with one piece allocated to each player. ...
We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation . ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1946895
fatcat:q5ayfdmurbau5hfpu7s45rmr3i
Two-Person Pie-Cutting: The Fairest Cuts
2011
The College Mathematics Journal
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We restrict our analysis to two players, because the properties we impose on the allocation of pie pieces are demanding and cannot all be satisfied if there are three or more players. ...
Assumption and Properties We assume that the two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to divide a pie into two pieces, using two cuts from the center, with one piece allocated to each player. ...
We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation . ...
doi:10.4169/college.math.j.42.1.025
fatcat:sllbgpn5crhfzjpycnzzhfuh7y
Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value. ...
We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness ...
Furthermore, if J is truthful or truthful-in-expectation, then J is truthful-in-expectation and if J is envy-free, J is envy-free. Proof. ...
arXiv:1507.06827v1
fatcat:jzx7ihd7njf4neto76ecwluqhu
Envy, Regret, and Social Welfare Loss
2020
Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020
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In particular, we focus on position auctions. For position auctions, we show that for a large class of pricing schemes (which includes e.g. ...
several papers investigated the problem of deploying black-box statistical tests to determine if an auction mechanism is incentive compatible by using the notion of IC-Regret that measures the regret of a truthful ...
[27] investigated envy-free mechanisms in the context of indivisible items with focus on the computational complexity of finding allocations with minimum envy. ...
doi:10.1145/3366423.3380057
dblp:conf/www/Colini-Baldeschi20
fatcat:upyt4vizwnfirfybeilgxmtjmm
Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions
2018
Operations Research
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Truthfulness/Incentive-Compatibility: Reporting the true cost should be a dominant strategy for sellers, i.e. for all non-truthful reports c i from seller i, it holds that Defining a Benchmark. ...
Among all mechanisms that satisfy the above properties, we are interested to the one that maximizes the utility of the buyer with respect to the following benchmark. ...
Mechanisms Envy-Free(f * ) and Envy-Free(f ) allocate 1 unit from each low-cost seller, and respectively f * r * (1) and 0 units from each high-cost seller. ...
doi:10.1287/opre.2017.1693
fatcat:2jze4wzncnbnbndyssbsl3xkfa
Reducing Untruthful Manipulation in Envy-Free Pareto Optimal Resource Allocation
2010
2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology
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Fair allocation can be achieved either by distributed protocols known as cake-cutting algorithms or by centralized approaches, which first collect the agents' preferences and then decide on the allocation ...
Our work uses as a starting point a recent centralized algorithm that achieves an envy-free (i.e., fair) and Pareto optimal (i.e., efficient) allocation of multiple divisible goods. ...
., when instead of the allocation we focus on the residual surplus (the utility obtained from the allocation minus the payment enforced), it is easily seen that VCG mechanisms are envy-free: no agent has ...
doi:10.1109/wi-iat.2010.37
dblp:conf/iat/ZivanDOS10
fatcat:hkrnlgobang23aezitrzxgoxay
Fair Division with Bounded Sharing
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability. ...
If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. ...
While approximate or ex-ante fairness are reasonable when allocating low-value objects, such as seats in a course or in a school, they are not suitable for high-value objects, e.g., houses or precious ...
arXiv:1912.00459v1
fatcat:r74uasbvbbejlgoypptey2kzmq
Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We consider the revenue of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, which is one of the most widely used mechanisms for ad auctions. ...
We propose a randomized modification of the GSP mechanism, which eliminates the low-revenue equilibria of the GSP mechanism under some natural restrictions. ...
revenue in VCG under truthful bidding). ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34
fatcat:vnba5gakjfeshn7f7i5sbueq4a
Fairness and Welfare Through Redistribution When Utility Is Transferable
2021
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
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We then set as the goal identification of a mechanism that achieves high welfare, low envy, and low disproportionality in expectation across a spectrum of fair division settings. ...
We demonstrate that in the canonical fair division settings under any allocatively-efficient mechanism the worst-case welfare rate is 0 and disproportionality rate is 1; in other words, the worst-case ...
RM's expected envy rate is only approximately 1/3 of GCM's, though both are quite low. ...
doi:10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8263
fatcat:slu45bsyzfhqtlcgdropporj3m
Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
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2020 pre-print arXiv:2002.10704v2 fatcat:s4wemhaaifb6xfvhz4vux2lm4mOther Versions
We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is either 0 or 1, and aim to design truthful allocation mechanisms (without money) that maximize welfare ...
For ρ = 1/1 + ϵ, the allocations that it produces generate at least a ρ-fraction of the maximum welfare, and enjoy ρ-approximations for various fairness properties, such as being envy-free up to one item ...
Consequently, the literature considers the following relaxed versions of envy freeness: (a) Envy free up to one good (EF1). ...
arXiv:2002.10704v3
fatcat:ij3aub5d65d23irhvo6dolivrm
Three New Complexity Results for Resource Allocation Problems
[article]
2008
arXiv
pre-print
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. - Deciding whether a resource allocation is Pareto-optimal is coNP-complete for agents with (1-)additive utility functions. - Deciding whether there exists a Pareto-optimal and envy-free resource allocation ...
We prove the following results for task allocation of indivisible resources: - The problem of finding a leximin-maximal resource allocation is in P if the agents have max-utility functions and atomic demands ...
In lemma 26 we prove that all allocations that correspond to such truth-assignments are envy-free. We call these allocations X ∀ -allocations. ...
arXiv:0810.0532v2
fatcat:glkydit3eja6jodnnlof6d7rii
Fair in the Eyes of Others
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness. ...
Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent a_i experiences approval envy towards a_j if she is envious of a_j, and sufficiently ...
Finally, positive results can be pinpointed: the very low percentage of unanimous envy instances, and the pretty high percentage of SM-app-EF ones. ...
arXiv:1911.11053v1
fatcat:wbgp3rt7qfdnrkhzoak4hnmlku
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
2003
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '03
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Our main result is to show that no constant-competitive truthful auction is envy-free. ...
In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue even on worst case inputs. • Truthful: any bidder's best ...
Acknowledgments We are grateful to Amos Fiat for suggesting that we consider envy-free outcomes and for his contributions to the initial discussions on the topic; to Joan Feigenbaum for pointing us to ...
doi:10.1145/779928.779932
dblp:conf/sigecom/GoldbergH03
fatcat:blgbaxfvzzbm3iveq5btfzrg2i
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