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On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations [chapter]

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items.  ...  We consider allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much.  ...  In particular, Mu'alem and Schapira [17] prove lower bounds on the envy of truthful allocation functions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10 fatcat:obq6t36yyvg2pn46r2cuw3dh2q

Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions [article]

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, Yulong Zeng
2017 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets.  ...  We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources and, in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.  ...  In this work we design an optimal truthful envy-free auction for a fundamental model of resource allocation known as a multi-unit market with budgets.  ... 
arXiv:1602.08719v6 fatcat:w3mkdxgwtbabbl5xemy34y5zkq

Two-Person Cake-Cutting: The Optimal Number of Cuts

Julius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams
2011 Social Science Research Network  
We restrict our analysis to two players, because the properties we impose on the allocation of pie pieces are demanding and cannot all be satisfied if there are three or more players.  ...  Assumption and Properties We assume that the two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to divide a pie into two pieces, using two cuts from the center, with one piece allocated to each player.  ...  We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation .  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1946895 fatcat:q5ayfdmurbau5hfpu7s45rmr3i

Two-Person Pie-Cutting: The Fairest Cuts

Julius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams
2011 The College Mathematics Journal  
We restrict our analysis to two players, because the properties we impose on the allocation of pie pieces are demanding and cannot all be satisfied if there are three or more players.  ...  Assumption and Properties We assume that the two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to divide a pie into two pieces, using two cuts from the center, with one piece allocated to each player.  ...  We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation .  ... 
doi:10.4169/college.math.j.42.1.025 fatcat:sllbgpn5crhfzjpycnzzhfuh7y

Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms [article]

Haris Aziz and Jiashu Chen and Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Simon Mackenzie and Nicholas Mattei
2015 arXiv   pre-print
, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value.  ...  We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness  ...  Furthermore, if J is truthful or truthful-in-expectation, then J is truthful-in-expectation and if J is envy-free, J is envy-free. Proof.  ... 
arXiv:1507.06827v1 fatcat:jzx7ihd7njf4neto76ecwluqhu

Envy, Regret, and Social Welfare Loss

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka
2020 Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020  
In particular, we focus on position auctions. For position auctions, we show that for a large class of pricing schemes (which includes e.g.  ...  several papers investigated the problem of deploying black-box statistical tests to determine if an auction mechanism is incentive compatible by using the notion of IC-Regret that measures the regret of a truthful  ...  [27] investigated envy-free mechanisms in the context of indivisible items with focus on the computational complexity of finding allocations with minimum envy.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3366423.3380057 dblp:conf/www/Colini-Baldeschi20 fatcat:upyt4vizwnfirfybeilgxmtjmm

Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions

Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
2018 Operations Research  
Truthfulness/Incentive-Compatibility: Reporting the true cost should be a dominant strategy for sellers, i.e. for all non-truthful reports c i from seller i, it holds that Defining a Benchmark.  ...  Among all mechanisms that satisfy the above properties, we are interested to the one that maximizes the utility of the buyer with respect to the following benchmark.  ...  Mechanisms Envy-Free(f * ) and Envy-Free(f ) allocate 1 unit from each low-cost seller, and respectively f * r * (1) and 0 units from each high-cost seller.  ... 
doi:10.1287/opre.2017.1693 fatcat:2jze4wzncnbnbndyssbsl3xkfa

Reducing Untruthful Manipulation in Envy-Free Pareto Optimal Resource Allocation

Roie Zivan, Miroslav Dudik, Steven Okamoto, Katia Sycara
2010 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology  
Fair allocation can be achieved either by distributed protocols known as cake-cutting algorithms or by centralized approaches, which first collect the agents' preferences and then decide on the allocation  ...  Our work uses as a starting point a recent centralized algorithm that achieves an envy-free (i.e., fair) and Pareto optimal (i.e., efficient) allocation of multiple divisible goods.  ...  ., when instead of the allocation we focus on the residual surplus (the utility obtained from the allocation minus the payment enforced), it is easily seen that VCG mechanisms are envy-free: no agent has  ... 
doi:10.1109/wi-iat.2010.37 dblp:conf/iat/ZivanDOS10 fatcat:hkrnlgobang23aezitrzxgoxay

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing [article]

Erel Segal-Halevi
2019 arXiv   pre-print
The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability.  ...  If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist.  ...  While approximate or ex-ante fairness are reasonable when allocating low-value objects, such as seats in a course or in a school, they are not suitable for high-value objects, e.g., houses or precious  ... 
arXiv:1912.00459v1 fatcat:r74uasbvbbejlgoypptey2kzmq

Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions [chapter]

Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We consider the revenue of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, which is one of the most widely used mechanisms for ad auctions.  ...  We propose a randomized modification of the GSP mechanism, which eliminates the low-revenue equilibria of the GSP mechanism under some natural restrictions.  ...  revenue in VCG under truthful bidding).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_34 fatcat:vnba5gakjfeshn7f7i5sbueq4a

Fairness and Welfare Through Redistribution When Utility Is Transferable

Ruggiero Cavallo
2021 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We then set as the goal identification of a mechanism that achieves high welfare, low envy, and low disproportionality in expectation across a spectrum of fair division settings.  ...  We demonstrate that in the canonical fair division settings under any allocatively-efficient mechanism the worst-case welfare rate is 0 and disproportionality rate is 1; in other words, the worst-case  ...  RM's expected envy rate is only approximately 1/3 of GCM's, though both are quite low.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8263 fatcat:slu45bsyzfhqtlcgdropporj3m

Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations [article]

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We focus on valuations that have dichotomous marginals, in which the added value of any item to a set is either 0 or 1, and aim to design truthful allocation mechanisms (without money) that maximize welfare  ...  For ρ = 1/1 + ϵ, the allocations that it produces generate at least a ρ-fraction of the maximum welfare, and enjoy ρ-approximations for various fairness properties, such as being envy-free up to one item  ...  Consequently, the literature considers the following relaxed versions of envy freeness: (a) Envy free up to one good (EF1).  ... 
arXiv:2002.10704v3 fatcat:ij3aub5d65d23irhvo6dolivrm

Three New Complexity Results for Resource Allocation Problems [article]

Bart de Keijzer
2008 arXiv   pre-print
. - Deciding whether a resource allocation is Pareto-optimal is coNP-complete for agents with (1-)additive utility functions. - Deciding whether there exists a Pareto-optimal and envy-free resource allocation  ...  We prove the following results for task allocation of indivisible resources: - The problem of finding a leximin-maximal resource allocation is in P if the agents have max-utility functions and atomic demands  ...  In lemma 26 we prove that all allocations that correspond to such truth-assignments are envy-free. We call these allocations X ∀ -allocations.  ... 
arXiv:0810.0532v2 fatcat:glkydit3eja6jodnnlof6d7rii

Fair in the Eyes of Others [article]

Parham Shams and Aurélie Beynier and Sylvain Bouveret and Nicolas Maudet
2019 arXiv   pre-print
Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness.  ...  Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent a_i experiences approval envy towards a_j if she is envious of a_j, and sufficiently  ...  Finally, positive results can be pinpointed: the very low percentage of unanimous envy instances, and the pretty high percentage of SM-app-EF ones.  ... 
arXiv:1911.11053v1 fatcat:wbgp3rt7qfdnrkhzoak4hnmlku

Envy-free auctions for digital goods

Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '03  
Our main result is to show that no constant-competitive truthful auction is envy-free.  ...  In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue even on worst case inputs. • Truthful: any bidder's best  ...  Acknowledgments We are grateful to Amos Fiat for suggesting that we consider envy-free outcomes and for his contributions to the initial discussions on the topic; to Joan Feigenbaum for pointing us to  ... 
doi:10.1145/779928.779932 dblp:conf/sigecom/GoldbergH03 fatcat:blgbaxfvzzbm3iveq5btfzrg2i
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