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ERASMUS: Efficient Remote Attestation via Self- Measurement for Unattended Settings [article]

Xavier Carpent, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene Tsudik
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Remote attestation (RA) is a popular means of detecting malware in embedded and IoT devices. RA is usually realized as an interactive protocol, whereby a trusted party -- verifier -- measures integrity of a potentially compromised remote device -- prover. Early work focused on purely software-based and fully hardware-based techniques, neither of which is ideal for low-end devices. More recent results have yielded hybrid (SW/HW) security architectures comprised of a minimal set of features to
more » ... t of features to support efficient and secure RA on low-end devices. All prior RA techniques require on-demand operation, i.e, RA is performed in real time. We identify some drawbacks of this general approach in the context of unattended devices: First, it fails to detect mobile malware that enters and leaves the prover between successive RA instances. Second, it requires the prover to engage in a potentially expensive (in terms of time and energy) computation, which can be harmful for critical or real-time devices. To address these drawbacks, we introduce the concept of self-measurement where a prover device periodically (and securely) measures and records its own software state, based on a pre-established schedule. A possibly untrusted verifier occasionally collects and verifies these measurements. We present the design of a concrete technique called ERASMUS : Efficient Remote Attestation via Self-Measurement for Unattended Settings, justify its features and evaluate its performance. In the process, we also define a new metric -- Quality of Attestation (QoA). We argue that ERASMUS is well-suited for time-sensitive and/or safety-critical applications that are not served well by on-demand RA. Finally, we show that ERASMUS is a promising stepping stone towards handling attestation of multiple devices (i.e., a group or swarm) with high mobility.
arXiv:1707.09043v1 fatcat:6zeinja6c5e45almv3u3kbxtxm

On the TOCTOU Problem in Remote Attestation [article]

Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Sashidhar Jakkamsetti, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene Tsudik
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We propose Remote Attestation with TOCTOU Avoidance (RATA): a provably secure approach to address the RA TOCTOU problem. With RATA, even malware that erases itself before execution of the next RA, can not hide its ephemeral presence. RATA targets hybrid RA architectures (implemented as Hardware/Software co-designs), which are aimed at low-end embedded devices. We present two alternative techniques - RATAa and RATAb - suitable for devices with and without real-time clocks, respectively. Each is
more » ... pectively. Each is shown to be secure and accompanied by a publicly available and formally verified implementation. Our evaluation demonstrates low hardware overhead of both techniques. Compared with current RA architectures - that offer no TOCTOU protection - RATA incurs no extra runtime overhead. In fact, RATA substantially reduces computational costs of RA execution.
arXiv:2005.03873v2 fatcat:oewjkublwfgzpl4h773d5lu5q4

Lightweight Swarm Attestation

Xavier Carpent, Karim ElDefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene Tsudik
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17  
In the last decade, Remote Attestation (RA) emerged as a distinct security service for detecting attacks on embedded devices, cyberphysical systems (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. RA involves verification of current internal state of an untrusted remote hardware platform (prover) by a trusted entity (verifier). RA can help the latter establish a static or dynamic root of trust in the prover and can also be used to construct other security services, such as software updates and
more » ... e updates and secure deletion. Various RA techniques with different assumptions, security features and complexities, have been proposed for the single-prover scenario. However, the advent of IoT brought about the paradigm of many interconnected devices, thus triggering the need for efficient collective attestation of a (possibly mobile) group or swarm of provers. Though recent work has yielded some initial concepts for swarm attestation, several key issues remain unaddressed, and practical realizations have not been explored. This paper's main goal is to advance swarm attestation by bringing it closer to reality. To this end, it makes two contributions: (1) a new metric, called QoSA: Quality of Swarm Attestation, that captures the information offered by a swarm attestation technique; this allows comparing efficacy of multiple protocols, and (2) two practical attestation protocols -called LISAα and LISAs -for mobile swarms, with different QoSA features and communication and computation complexities. Security of proposed protocols is analyzed and their performance is assessed based on experiments with prototype implementations.
doi:10.1145/3052973.3053010 dblp:conf/ccs/CarpentDRT17 fatcat:d64tijdqxfcbranudbuei62mjm

Towards Automated Augmentation and Instrumentation of Legacy Cryptographic Executables: Extended Version [article]

Karim Eldefrawy, Michael Locasto, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Hassen Saidi
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Implementation flaws in cryptographic libraries, design flaws in underlying cryptographic primitives, and weaknesses in protocols using both, can all lead to exploitable vulnerabilities in software. Manually fixing such issues is challenging and resource consuming, especially when maintaining legacy software that contains broken or outdated cryptography, and for which source code may not be available. While there is existing work on identifying cryptographic primitives (often in the context of
more » ... in the context of malware analysis), none of this prior work has focused on replacing such primitives with stronger (or more secure ones) after they have been identified. This paper explores feasibility of designing and implementing a toolchain for Augmentation and Legacy-software Instrumentation of Cryptographic Executables (ALICE). The key features of ALICE are: (i) automatically detecting and extracting implementations of weak or broken cryptographic primitives from binaries without requiring source code or debugging symbols, (ii) identifying the context and scope in which such primitives are used, and performing program analysis to determine the effects of replacing such implementations with more secure ones, and (iii) replacing implementations of weak primitives with those of stronger or more secure ones. We demonstrate practical feasibility of our approach on cryptographic hash functions with several popular cryptographic libraries and real-world programs of various levels of complexity. Our experimental results show that ALICE can locate and replace insecure hash functions, even in large binaries (we tested ones of size up to 1.5MB), while preserving existing functionality of the original binaries, and while incurring minimal execution-time overhead in the rewritten binaries. We also open source ALICE's code at
arXiv:2004.09713v2 fatcat:dpug4wftgvdpdoiz2wx7hozmdu

HYDRA: HYbrid Design for Remote Attestation (Using a Formally Verified Microkernel) [article]

Karim ElDefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene Tsudik
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Remote Attestation (RA) allows a trusted entity (verifier) to securely measure internal state of a remote untrusted hardware platform (prover). RA can be used to establish a static or dynamic root of trust in embedded and cyber-physical systems. It can also be used as a building block for other security services and primitives, such as software updates and patches, verifiable deletion and memory resetting. There are three major classes of RA designs: hardware-based, software-based, and hybrid,
more » ... based, and hybrid, each with its own set of benefits and drawbacks. This paper presents the first hybrid RA design, called HYDRA, that builds upon formally verified software components that ensure memory isolation and protection, as well as enforce access control to memory and other resources. HYDRA obtains these properties by using the formally verified seL4 microkernel. (Until now, this was only attainable with purely hardware-based designs.) Using seL4 requires fewer hardware modifications to the underlying microprocessor. Building upon a formally verified software component increases confidence in security of the overall design of HYDRA and its implementation. We instantiate HYDRA on two commodity hardware platforms and assess the performance and overhead of performing RA on such platforms via experimentation; we show that HYDRA can attest 10MB of memory in less than 500msec when using a Speck-based message authentication code (MAC) to compute a cryptographic checksum over the memory to be attested.
arXiv:1703.02688v2 fatcat:wuggtxvwbvfghbgentun6hr2di

A Verified Architecture for Proofs of Execution on Remote Devices under Full Software Compromise [article]

Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Gene Tsudik
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Modern society is increasingly surrounded by, and accustomed to, a wide range of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Internet-of-Things (IoT), and smart devices. They often perform safety-critical functions, e.g., personal medical devices, automotive CPS and industrial automation (smart factories). Some devices are small, cheap and specialized sensors and/or actuators. They tend to run simple software and operate under control of a more sophisticated central control unit. The latter is responsible
more » ... r is responsible for the decision-making and orchestrating the entire system. If devices are left unprotected, consequences of forged sensor readings or ignored actuation commands can be catastrophic, particularly, in safety-critical settings. This prompts the following three questions: (1) How to trust data produced by a simple remote embedded device? and (2) How to ascertain that this data was produced via execution of expected software? Furthermore, (3) Is it possible to attain (1) and (2) under the assumption that all software on the remote device could be modified or compromised? In this paper we answer these questions by designing, proving security of, and formally verifying, VAPE: Verified Architecture for Proofs of Execution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first of its kind result for low-end embedded systems. Our work has a range of applications, especially, to authenticated sensing and trustworthy actuation, which are increasingly relevant in the context of safety-critical systems. VAPE architecture is publicly available and our evaluation demonstrates that it incurs low overhead, affordable even for lowest-end embedded devices, e.g., those based on MSP430 or ARV ATMega processors.
arXiv:1908.02444v2 fatcat:ttsnger7sncpjpxoyefhllgvdu

Formally Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote Attestation [article]

Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Michael Steiner, Gene Tsudik
2019 arXiv   pre-print
In this work, we take the first step towards formal verification of Remote Attestation (RA) by designing and verifying an architecture called VRASED: Verifiable Remote Attestation for Simple Embedded Devices. VRASED instantiates a hybrid (HW/SW) RA co-design aimed at low-end embedded systems, e.g., simple IoT devices. VRASED provides a level of security comparable to HW-based approaches, while relying on SW to minimize additional HW costs. Since security properties must be jointly guaranteed by
more » ... intly guaranteed by HW and SW, verification is a challenging task, which has never been attempted before in the context of RA. We believe that VRASED is the first formally verified RA scheme. To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first formal verification of a HW/SW implementation of any security service. To demonstrate VRASED's practicality and low overhead, we instantiate and evaluate it on a commodity platform (TI MSP430). VRASED's publicly available implementation was deployed on the Basys3 FPGA.
arXiv:1811.00175v4 fatcat:rs3go6hbgjculmzg7njlxxkwmq

ASSURED: Architecture for Secure Software Update of Realistic Embedded Devices

N. Asokan, Thomas Nyman, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Gene Tsudik
2018 IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems  
Secure firmware update is an important stage in the IoT device life-cycle. Prior techniques, designed for other computational settings, are not readily suitable for IoT devices, since they do not consider idiosyncrasies of a realistic large-scale IoT deployment. This motivates our design of ASSURED, a secure and scalable update framework for IoT. ASSURED includes all stakeholders in a typical IoT update ecosystem, while providing end-to-end security between manufacturers and devices. To
more » ... devices. To demonstrate its feasibility and practicality, ASSURED is instantiated and experimentally evaluated on two commodity hardware platforms. Results show that ASSURED is considerably faster than current update mechanisms in realistic settings.
doi:10.1109/tcad.2018.2858422 fatcat:xtblhx7qfngx3nanazcdwzqo54

Author Index

2021 2021 18th International Conference on Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology (ECTI-CON)  
Norakamon Wongsin Noraset Wichaipanich Norrathep Rattanavipanon Nuttakit Kijshevavithaya Nuttanan Chalittaporn Nyan Lin Htet . O Orachat Chitsobhuk P .209 P. Chancharoensook . P.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ecti-con51831.2021.9454914 fatcat:dq3nlgetyrgnhpk6pjvwvd3yiu


2021 2021 18th International Conference on Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology (ECTI-CON)  
Rattanavipanon, Kuljaree Tantayakul, Donlapark Ponnoprat, Hideya Ochiai, Touchai Angchuan, Sinchai Kamolphiwong) ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 404 An Automatic Networking Device Auditing Tool  ...  Parallel Session 3 Room 5 CS (III): Communication Systems 366 Parallel Session 3 Room 6 COM (III): Computers Releasing ARP Data with Differential Privacy Guarantees For LAN Anomaly Detection (Norrathep  ... 
doi:10.1109/ecti-con51831.2021.9454938 fatcat:leqbfwzonretvnq47h6maa7eum