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Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems [chapter]

Bundit Laekhanukit, Guyslain Naves, Adrian Vetta
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The second welfare theorem tells us that social welfare in an economy can be maximized at an equilibrium given a suitable redistribution of the endowments.  ...  We examine welfare maximization without redistribution. Specifically, we examine whether the clustering of traders into k submarkets can improve welfare in a linear exchange economy.  ...  As stated, however, the second theorem is of limited practical value due to the infeasibility of direct transfer payments. Thus, our goal is to obtain non-redistributive second welfare theorems.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_17 fatcat:2ukhjfvjozaqplrueds2vlrjei

An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis

Richard Harris, David Wildasin
1985 Journal of Public Economics  
Fig. 1 . 1 Redistribution cost functions. Theorem I. If (q*,u*) is a solution to (P), then (q*,u*) is a solution to (D), for W = W(u*). At this solution, R[e(q*, u*)] = F. Theorem 2.  ...  a (positive or negative) lump-sum transfer to each household, subject to the constraint that a non-decreasing function defined over individual transfers, called a redistributive cost function, be non-positive  ... 
doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90011-8 fatcat:2j7fseplofbrtcl5uwee3mmqt4

The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

Agathe Rouaix, Charles Figuières, Marc Willinger
2015 Social Choice and Welfare  
We study the impact of redistribution on group contribution, on individuals' contributions according to their endowment and on welfare.  ...  We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a redistribution of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner.  ...  In essence this is the message of the famous Second Welfare Theorem. However, the set of conditions under which this theorem is valid is restrictive.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0893-4 fatcat:7r6ox32bjnd75jlz4gcpjx7ihu

Page 932 of The American Economic Review Vol. 41, Issue 5 [page]

1951 The American Economic Review  
What seems most relevant in comparing non-optimal situations is the case where no redistributions are permitted, for the reason we do not move to Pareto optima is that our powers of redistribution are  ...  (Note that the comparison between A and A’ in the first theorem and between B and B’ in the second is a comparison of different distributions with the same national income, in a sense.)  ... 

In praise of inequality: public good provision and income distribution

Jun-ichi Itaya, David de Meza, Gareth D. Myles
1997 Economics Letters  
It may seem that there is then no role for redistributive policy, but it is proved that social welfare can be raised by creating sufficient income inequality that only the rich provide public goods. ©  ...  These facts are stated as theorem 2.Theorem 2.  ...  It is already known that while both consumers are contributing a redistribution of income does not affect welfare.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00179-1 fatcat:p7lxbhzkibcrvncv7vbe6x3r2i

Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

JEAN MERCIER YTHIER
2010 Journal of Public Economic Theory  
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics then applies to distributive Pareto optima, that is, distributive optima are Walrasian equilibria relative to suitable vectors of market prices and individual  ...  It follows from the first and second regularity conditions of Definition 10 (see  ...  Under Assumption 1-(i), market price equilibrium is equivalent to market optimum, as a consequence of the first and second theorems of welfare economics.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01481.x fatcat:bc5j7ltfoze3ffy4idv3o4w4u4

Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

Neslihan Uler
2009 Journal of Public Economics  
However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account  ...  This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving.  ...  Total welfare in the society, however, is highest in the second case.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.008 fatcat:6cdo6oos3rbfpogba7efhzrnku

Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement: Welfare vs. redistribution

P. Eső, A. Simonovits, J. Tóth
2011 Acta Oeconomica  
Second-best schedules strongly reduce the variances of benefits and of retirement ages of the so-called actuarially fair system, thus achieving higher social welfare and lower redistribution.  ...  of redistribution.  ...  We only refer to the case n = 11, analysed in Esõ -Simonovits (2002) for a generalised utilitarian social welfare function. 12 Assume that the indi-  ... 
doi:10.1556/aoecon.61.2011.1.2 fatcat:5gli56dxx5cjhfvcut3ujtbknm

Optimal Redistribution in the Distributive Liberal Social Contract [chapter]

Jean Mercier Ythier
2011 Studies in Choice and Welfare  
We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient  ...  In-kind and monetary transfers are essentially equivalent, for social contract redistribution.  ...  The second one is the liberal social contract reason for the building up of a redistributive welfare state in developed market economies.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_13 fatcat:54s4zdu5e5bwpd3kunevmwhsje

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms [chapter]

Krzysztof Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis
2008 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In particular, we say a non-deficit Groves mechanism is welfare undominated if there exists no other non-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments.  ...  redistribution mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of welfare undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear  ...  By Theorem 4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above theorem is not pay-only.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48 fatcat:4ggddgvoqbblpegtzvhqnlhu3a

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms [article]

Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis
2008 arXiv   pre-print
In particular, we say a non-deficit Groves mechanism is welfare undominated if there exists no other non-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments.  ...  redistribution mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of welfare undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear  ...  By Theorem 4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above theorem is not pay-only.  ... 
arXiv:0810.2865v1 fatcat:vlqsvdxfqvhbfmrochjvzjau3y

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
2014 Artificial Intelligence  
non-deficit property.  ...  Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments.  ...  With redistribution, the agents' welfare is n i=1 a i v i − n i=1 t i + n i=1 R(v −i ).  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006 fatcat:nur7q64wfbfxdken3utjq3h5cq

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
2008 Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '08  
non-deficit property.  ...  Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments.  ...  non-deficit property.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1386790.1386825 dblp:conf/sigecom/GuoC08 fatcat:atam6h42rbbvbndt65bxu6c6c4

Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu
2010 Games and Economic Behavior  
We also propose redistribution mechanisms that 1) implement e¢ cient allocation 2) satisfy individual rationality 3) never run a budget de...cit 4) may run a budget surplus that vanishes asymptotically  ...  We then obtain several properties of the welfare maximizing policy using stochastic dominance measures of increased variability and majorization arguments.  ...  But, an inability to redistribute the raised money among agents reduces their welfare and hence prevents reaching a fully e¢ cient outcome.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005 fatcat:57xhpailxjcbbkgr6co534cpn4

Credible Liberalization: Beyond the Three Theorems of Neoclassical Welfare Economics [chapter]

Peter J. Hammond
1993 Economics in a Changing World  
Acknowledgements I am especially grateful to Amartya Sen for his kind invitation to present a paper to the session on "Welfare Economics and Ethics" at the conference.  ...  And that the second and third theorems rely on suitable mechanisms for lump-sum redistribution of wealth: either (i) to achieve a desirable Pareto allocation, as in the second theorem; or (ii) to have  ...  The "Second Best" Case for Liberalization The third welfare theorem discussed in Section 4 makes the "first best" case for liberalization.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22988-8_2 fatcat:l6kj35el2zd6bahz5qeadc24fa
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