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Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems
[chapter]
2012
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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The second welfare theorem tells us that social welfare in an economy can be maximized at an equilibrium given a suitable redistribution of the endowments. ...
We examine welfare maximization without redistribution. Specifically, we examine whether the clustering of traders into k submarkets can improve welfare in a linear exchange economy. ...
As stated, however, the second theorem is of limited practical value due to the infeasibility of direct transfer payments. Thus, our goal is to obtain non-redistributive second welfare theorems. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_17
fatcat:2ukhjfvjozaqplrueds2vlrjei
An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis
1985
Journal of Public Economics
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Fig. 1 . 1 Redistribution cost functions.
Theorem I. If (q*,u*) is a solution to (P), then (q*,u*) is a solution to (D), for W = W(u*). At this solution, R[e(q*, u*)] = F. Theorem 2. ...
a (positive or negative) lump-sum transfer to each household, subject to the constraint that a non-decreasing function defined over individual transfers, called a redistributive cost function, be non-positive ...
doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90011-8
fatcat:2j7fseplofbrtcl5uwee3mmqt4
The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment
2015
Social Choice and Welfare
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We study the impact of redistribution on group contribution, on individuals' contributions according to their endowment and on welfare. ...
We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a redistribution of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner. ...
In essence this is the message of the famous Second Welfare Theorem. However, the set of conditions under which this theorem is valid is restrictive. ...
doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0893-4
fatcat:7r6ox32bjnd75jlz4gcpjx7ihu
Page 932 of The American Economic Review Vol. 41, Issue 5
[page]
1951
The American Economic Review
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What seems most relevant in comparing non-optimal situations is the case where no redistributions are permitted, for the reason we do not move to Pareto optima is that our powers of redistribution are ...
(Note that the comparison between A and A’ in the first theorem and between B and B’ in the second is a comparison of different distributions with the same national
income, in a sense.) ...
In praise of inequality: public good provision and income distribution
1997
Economics Letters
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It may seem that there is then no role for redistributive policy, but it is proved that social welfare can be raised by creating sufficient income inequality that only the rich provide public goods. © ...
These facts are stated as theorem 2.Theorem 2. ...
It is already known that while both consumers are contributing a redistribution of income does not affect welfare. ...
doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00179-1
fatcat:p7lxbhzkibcrvncv7vbe6x3r2i
Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract
2010
Journal of Public Economic Theory
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The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics then applies to distributive Pareto optima, that is, distributive optima are Walrasian equilibria relative to suitable vectors of market prices and individual ...
It follows from the first and second regularity conditions of Definition 10 (see ...
Under Assumption 1-(i), market price equilibrium is equivalent to market optimum, as a consequence of the first and second theorems of welfare economics. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01481.x
fatcat:bc5j7ltfoze3ffy4idv3o4w4u4
Public goods provision and redistributive taxation
2009
Journal of Public Economics
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However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account ...
This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. ...
Total welfare in the society, however, is highest in the second case. ...
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.008
fatcat:6cdo6oos3rbfpogba7efhzrnku
Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement: Welfare vs. redistribution
2011
Acta Oeconomica
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Second-best schedules strongly reduce the variances of benefits and of retirement ages of the so-called actuarially fair system, thus achieving higher social welfare and lower redistribution. ...
of redistribution. ...
We only refer to the case n = 11, analysed in Esõ -Simonovits (2002) for a generalised utilitarian social welfare function. 12 Assume that the indi- ...
doi:10.1556/aoecon.61.2011.1.2
fatcat:5gli56dxx5cjhfvcut3ujtbknm
Optimal Redistribution in the Distributive Liberal Social Contract
[chapter]
2011
Studies in Choice and Welfare
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We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient ...
In-kind and monetary transfers are essentially equivalent, for social contract redistribution. ...
The second one is the liberal social contract reason for the building up of a redistributive welfare state in developed market economies. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_13
fatcat:54s4zdu5e5bwpd3kunevmwhsje
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
[chapter]
2008
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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In particular, we say a non-deficit Groves mechanism is welfare undominated if there exists no other non-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments. ...
redistribution mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of welfare undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear ...
By Theorem 4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above theorem is not pay-only. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48
fatcat:4ggddgvoqbblpegtzvhqnlhu3a
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
[article]
2008
arXiv
pre-print
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In particular, we say a non-deficit Groves mechanism is welfare undominated if there exists no other non-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments. ...
redistribution mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of welfare undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear ...
By Theorem 4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above theorem is not pay-only. ...
arXiv:0810.2865v1
fatcat:vlqsvdxfqvhbfmrochjvzjau3y
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
2014
Artificial Intelligence
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non-deficit property. ...
Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. ...
With redistribution, the agents' welfare is n i=1 a i v i − n i=1 t i + n i=1 R(v −i ). ...
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006
fatcat:nur7q64wfbfxdken3utjq3h5cq
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
2008
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '08
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non-deficit property. ...
Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. ...
non-deficit property. ...
doi:10.1145/1386790.1386825
dblp:conf/sigecom/GuoC08
fatcat:atam6h42rbbvbndt65bxu6c6c4
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
2010
Games and Economic Behavior
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We also propose redistribution mechanisms that 1) implement e¢ cient allocation 2) satisfy individual rationality 3) never run a budget de...cit 4) may run a budget surplus that vanishes asymptotically ...
We then obtain several properties of the welfare maximizing policy using stochastic dominance measures of increased variability and majorization arguments. ...
But, an inability to redistribute the raised money among agents reduces their welfare and hence prevents reaching a fully e¢ cient outcome. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005
fatcat:57xhpailxjcbbkgr6co534cpn4
Credible Liberalization: Beyond the Three Theorems of Neoclassical Welfare Economics
[chapter]
1993
Economics in a Changing World
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Acknowledgements I am especially grateful to Amartya Sen for his kind invitation to present a paper to the session on "Welfare Economics and Ethics" at the conference. ...
And that the second and third theorems rely on suitable mechanisms for lump-sum redistribution of wealth: either (i) to achieve a desirable Pareto allocation, as in the second theorem; or (ii) to have ...
The "Second Best" Case for Liberalization The third welfare theorem discussed in Section 4 makes the "first best" case for liberalization. ...
doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22988-8_2
fatcat:l6kj35el2zd6bahz5qeadc24fa
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