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Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems
[chapter]

2012
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

The

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_17
fatcat:2ukhjfvjozaqplrueds2vlrjei
*second**welfare**theorem*tells us that social*welfare*in an economy can be maximized at an equilibrium given a suitable*redistribution*of the endowments. ... We examine*welfare*maximization without*redistribution*. Specifically, we examine whether the clustering of traders into k submarkets can improve*welfare*in a linear exchange economy. ... As stated, however, the*second**theorem*is of limited practical value due to the infeasibility of direct transfer payments. Thus, our goal is to obtain*non*-*redistributive**second**welfare**theorems*. ...##
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An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis

1985
*
Journal of Public Economics
*

Fig. 1 . 1

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90011-8
fatcat:2j7fseplofbrtcl5uwee3mmqt4
*Redistribution*cost functions.*Theorem*I. If (q*,u*) is a solution to (P), then (q*,u*) is a solution to (D), for W = W(u*). At this solution, R[e(q*, u*)] = F.*Theorem*2. ... a (positive or negative) lump-sum transfer to each household, subject to the constraint that a*non*-decreasing function defined over individual transfers, called a*redistributive*cost function, be*non*-positive ...##
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The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

2015
*
Social Choice and Welfare
*

We study the impact of

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0893-4
fatcat:7r6ox32bjnd75jlz4gcpjx7ihu
*redistribution*on group contribution, on individuals' contributions according to their endowment and on*welfare*. ... We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a*redistribution*of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner. ... In essence this is the message of the famous*Second**Welfare**Theorem*. However, the set of conditions under which this*theorem*is valid is restrictive. ...##
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Page 932 of The American Economic Review Vol. 41, Issue 5
[page]

1951
*
The American Economic Review
*

What seems most relevant in comparing

*non*-optimal situations is the case where no*redistributions*are permitted, for the reason we do not move to Pareto optima is that our powers of*redistribution*are ... (Note that the comparison between A and A’ in the first*theorem*and between B and B’ in the*second*is a comparison of different distributions with the same national income, in a sense.) ...##
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In praise of inequality: public good provision and income distribution

1997
*
Economics Letters
*

It may seem that there is then no role for

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00179-1
fatcat:p7lxbhzkibcrvncv7vbe6x3r2i
*redistributive*policy, but it is proved that social*welfare*can be raised by creating sufficient income inequality that only the rich provide public goods. © ... These facts are stated as*theorem*2.*Theorem*2. ... It is already known that while both consumers are contributing a*redistribution*of income does not affect*welfare*. ...##
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Regular Distributive Efficiency and the Distributive Liberal Social Contract

2010
*
Journal of Public Economic Theory
*

The

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01481.x
fatcat:bc5j7ltfoze3ffy4idv3o4w4u4
*second*fundamental*theorem*of*welfare*economics then applies to distributive Pareto optima, that is, distributive optima are Walrasian equilibria relative to suitable vectors of market prices and individual ... It follows from the first and*second*regularity conditions of Definition 10 (see ... Under Assumption 1-(i), market price equilibrium is equivalent to market optimum, as a consequence of the first and*second**theorems*of*welfare*economics. ...##
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Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

2009
*
Journal of Public Economics
*

However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.008
fatcat:6cdo6oos3rbfpogba7efhzrnku
*welfare*may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and*redistribution*does not take into account ... This paper studies the relationship between*redistributive*taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions.*Redistribution*has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. ... Total*welfare*in the society, however, is highest in the*second*case. ...##
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Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement: Welfare vs. redistribution

2011
*
Acta Oeconomica
*

*Second*-best schedules strongly reduce the variances of benefits and of retirement ages of the so-called actuarially fair system, thus achieving higher social

*welfare*and lower

*redistribution*. ... of

*redistribution*. ... We only refer to the case n = 11, analysed in Esõ -Simonovits (2002) for a generalised utilitarian social

*welfare*function. 12 Assume that the indi- ...

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Optimal Redistribution in the Distributive Liberal Social Contract
[chapter]

2011
*
Studies in Choice and Welfare
*

We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17807-8_13
fatcat:54s4zdu5e5bwpd3kunevmwhsje
*non*-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient ... In-kind and monetary transfers are essentially equivalent, for social contract*redistribution*. ... The*second*one is the liberal social contract reason for the building up of a*redistributive**welfare*state in developed market economies. ...##
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Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
[chapter]

2008
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

In particular, we say a

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_48
fatcat:4ggddgvoqbblpegtzvhqnlhu3a
*non*-deficit Groves mechanism is*welfare*undominated if there exists no other*non*-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments. ...*redistribution*mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of*welfare*undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear ... By*Theorem*4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above*theorem*is not pay-only. ...##
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Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
[article]

2008
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

In particular, we say a

arXiv:0810.2865v1
fatcat:vlqsvdxfqvhbfmrochjvzjau3y
*non*-deficit Groves mechanism is*welfare*undominated if there exists no other*non*-deficit Groves mechanism that always has a smaller or equal sum of payments. ...*redistribution*mechanisms, which were introduced in [6] and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism [1,2], coincides with the family of*welfare*undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear ... By*Theorem*4, the BC mechanism in the proof of the above*theorem*is not pay-only. ...##
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Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

2014
*
Artificial Intelligence
*

*non*-deficit property. ... Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG

*redistribution*mechanism fails to

*redistribute*a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. ... With

*redistribution*, the agents'

*welfare*is n i=1 a i v i − n i=1 t i + n i=1 R(v −i ). ...

##
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Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand

2008
*
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '08
*

*non*-deficit property. ... Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG

*redistribution*mechanism fails to

*redistribute*a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. ...

*non*-deficit property. ...

##
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Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

2010
*
Games and Economic Behavior
*

We also propose

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.005
fatcat:57xhpailxjcbbkgr6co534cpn4
*redistribution*mechanisms that 1) implement e¢ cient allocation 2) satisfy individual rationality 3) never run a budget de...cit 4) may run a budget surplus that vanishes asymptotically ... We then obtain several properties of the*welfare*maximizing policy using stochastic dominance measures of increased variability and majorization arguments. ... But, an inability to*redistribute*the raised money among agents reduces their*welfare*and hence prevents reaching a fully e¢ cient outcome. ...##
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Credible Liberalization: Beyond the Three Theorems of Neoclassical Welfare Economics
[chapter]

1993
*
Economics in a Changing World
*

Acknowledgements I am especially grateful to Amartya Sen for his kind invitation to present a paper to the session on "

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-22988-8_2
fatcat:l6kj35el2zd6bahz5qeadc24fa
*Welfare*Economics and Ethics" at the conference. ... And that the*second*and third*theorems*rely on suitable mechanisms for lump-sum*redistribution*of wealth: either (i) to achieve a desirable Pareto allocation, as in the*second**theorem*; or (ii) to have ... The "*Second*Best" Case for Liberalization The third*welfare**theorem*discussed in Section 4 makes the "first best" case for liberalization. ...
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