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Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/vfwwmrihanevtjbbkti2kc3nke" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
We also show that a non-decreasing payment rule imposes a structure on the auction game that enables us to search for an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium much more efficiently than in the general case  ...  In contrast, we show that many other payment rules are non-decreasing.  ...  We would like to thank our colleagues at ETHZ for making such collaborations possible.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/15">doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/15</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ijcai/BosshardWS18.html">dblp:conf/ijcai/BosshardWS18</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/igy72qpcz5cwlb65iuvpqdns2i">fatcat:igy72qpcz5cwlb65iuvpqdns2i</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190428075417/https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0015.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b7/a4/b7a4e242421907679609d24f920b267a5dbc4656.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/15"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken
<span title="2018-07-19">2018</span>
In contrast, we show that many other payment rules are non-decreasing.  ...  In this paper, we introduce non-decreasing payment rules. Under such a rule, the payment of a bidder cannot decrease when he increases his bid, which is a natural and desirable property.  ...  We would like to thank our colleagues at ETHZ for making such collaborations possible.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-207658">doi:10.5167/uzh-207658</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/rdyotrmljvc43dzse4ziqjgpfu">fatcat:rdyotrmljvc43dzse4ziqjgpfu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20211019042656/https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/207658/1/0015.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b3/6e/b36e66bf9ee65381d05f0dc235908743c7f2f5a3.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-207658"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Understanding the Relationship Between Core Constraints and Core-Selecting Payment Rules in Combinatorial Auctions [article]

Robin Fritsch, Younjoo Lee, Adrian Meier, Ye Wang, Roger Wattenhofer
<span title="2022-04-27">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow bidders to express complex preferences for bundles of goods being auctioned. However, the behavior of bidders under different payment rules is often unclear.  ...  Finally, we study the consequences on the behavior of the bidders and show that no over-bidding exists in any Nash equilibrium for non-decreasing core-selecting payment rules.  ...  If G is an induced subgraph of G and a payment rule is not non-decreasing for k , then the payment rule is also not non-decreasing for k. Proof.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.11708v2">arXiv:2204.11708v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/atewex6hhnbxbddl3jne4memku">fatcat:atewex6hhnbxbddl3jne4memku</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220503130144/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.11708v2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c5/1d/c51df44c233af8dfb20299a6ddde3ce5356c849b.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.11708v2" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions [chapter]

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
For payment rules that are independent of the winner's bid, we prove a strong optimality result for the canonical second-price auction.  ...  In a combinatorial auction (CA) with item bidding, several goods are sold simultaneously via single-item auctions.  ...  First, they are one of the simplest auction formats that could conceivably admit performance guarantees for non-trivial combinatorial auction problems.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_25">doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_25</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/4pwh6ac6krenhgkahdblolpmyi">fatcat:4pwh6ac6krenhgkahdblolpmyi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130107222201/http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/simul.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/89/57/8957df9741d1633619ff1ca1287849d96d779f6d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_25"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Software frameworks for advanced procurement auction markets

Martin Bichler, Jayant R. Kalagnanam
<span title="2006-12-01">2006</span> <i title="Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/i6iajiiyxvgz3ob6jwcn2pufni" style="color: black;">Communications of the ACM</a> </i> &nbsp;
Volume discount auctions facilitate negotiations on large quantities of a good [6]; combinatorial auctions allow bids on bundles of goods [4]; and multiattribute auctions facilitate negotiation on multiple  ...  T raditional auctions such as the English and first-price sealed-bid auctions have been adopted as another tool for procurement negotiations.  ...  For example, in procurement situations, it can be advan- Auction Rules Auction Protocol -Interaction rules -Bidding language Allocation Rules -Allocation objectives -Allocation constraints Payment Rules  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1183236.1183239">doi:10.1145/1183236.1183239</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/4ml5g3fzk5a3bjjrdgtwqe4l2m">fatcat:4ml5g3fzk5a3bjjrdgtwqe4l2m</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121030080119/http://dss.in.tum.de:80/files/bichler-research/2006_bichler_advanced_procurement_markets.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/ab/46/ab46175f37c179e0553c747099ac6a797698d04b.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1183236.1183239"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness).  ...  We apply these techniques for several types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Daniel Lehmann, Ron Lavi and Liad Blumrosen for helpful comments and Gil Kalai for an early discussion.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/kvexzlajvngtvgn5caskw7bpty">fatcat:kvexzlajvngtvgn5caskw7bpty</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20151017195909/http://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/2002/AAAI02-058.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/c6/46/c64692f6815f2d3cf546392af6f4a06ac98ebf94.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions

Martin Bichler, Alexander Pikovsky, Thomas Setzer
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2bq67muntvahlgzwn7lfoncyt4" style="color: black;">Business &amp; Information Systems Engineering</a> </i> &nbsp;
Combinatorial auctions are promising auction formats for industrial and public procurement.  ...  Potential advantages of using combinatorial auctions include lower overall spend, low transaction costs for multi-item negotiations, fairness and market transparency for suppliers as well as high allocative  ...  This can mostly be attributed to higher allocative efficiency of these auctions. j Decreased transaction costs for complex procurement negotiations: Combinatorial auctions allow for effective negotiations  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-008-0014-3">doi:10.1007/s12599-008-0014-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/65xt6jjbt5a5rpziwrpgckxu2u">fatcat:65xt6jjbt5a5rpziwrpgckxu2u</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170821152150/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs12599-008-0014-3.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/86/ac/86acd9afd52ec9adb6814a1855282e9ad913d0d8.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-008-0014-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

A Participation Incentive Market Mechanism for Allocating Heterogeneous Network Services

Juong-Sik Lee, Boleslaw K. Szymanski
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="IEEE"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/lgc2un3ucjf3fgwb7o42q3s7d4" style="color: black;">GLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference</a> </i> &nbsp;
The combinatorial winner selection yields the optimal resources allocation in a single-round auction for heterogeneous resources.  ...  However, the recurring nature of auction for network services causes least wealthy bidders to exit the auction as they persistently lose under the traditional combinatorial winner selection that focuses  ...  Pricing Network Resources To describe the pricing rule of the proposed PI-GVA mechanism, we denote by ⊕ G(b k ) = I (b k ) ⋅b k r k ⋅ S(b k ) (9) This pricing rule guarantees that the payment of each  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2009.5426184">doi:10.1109/glocom.2009.5426184</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/globecom/LeeS09.html">dblp:conf/globecom/LeeS09</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/qibhmjgyhfcs5asvmg4ezvmisq">fatcat:qibhmjgyhfcs5asvmg4ezvmisq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110331172857/http://cgi2.cs.rpi.edu/~szymansk/papers/globecom09-auction.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f7/ea/f7ea79d5384514fcfbf8247110d64d85bde37e60.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2009.5426184"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>

Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="IEEE"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/wl6t75bdqrdlrgsukwo2coosly" style="color: black;">2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology</a> </i> &nbsp;
An auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule.  ...  On the other hand, we show these two conditions cannot coexist in combinatorial auctions under some minor condition.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank anonymous IAT reviewers and audiences in WINE/AMEC workshops for helpful comments. This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat.2010.186">doi:10.1109/wi-iat.2010.186</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/iat/TodoIY10.html">dblp:conf/iat/TodoIY10</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ivwfagddrrfvzikxpiyty2zbse">fatcat:ivwfagddrrfvzikxpiyty2zbse</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829023226/http://www.site.uottawa.ca/~nelkadri/CSI5389/Papers/174-Todo_et_al_WI-IAT2010.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b0/17/b017f3b3c55123c0539c46aaac374f50e33b0535.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat.2010.186"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ieee.com </button> </a>

Implementing a strategyproof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction and extending to ascending auction

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Shigeo Matsubara, Atsushi Iwasaki
<span title="">2007</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/6fttqtnr45cdlfowvq2jrkd32m" style="color: black;">Systems and Computers in Japan</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol.  ...  ., truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can  ...  Corbo for helpful comments.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1002/scj.20748">doi:10.1002/scj.20748</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ipngf6llafc3vjlh32nhkbjatm">fatcat:ipngf6llafc3vjlh32nhkbjatm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808230519/http://www.itolab.nitech.ac.jp/~ito/papers/itota-aaai2005.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/3d/b5/3db5cfd2a9f9a2e2e6452520a3f8d05937bcdc64.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1002/scj.20748"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> wiley.com </button> </a>

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction [article]

Bernhard Kasberger, Alexander Teytelboym
<span title="2022-03-22">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We characterize equilibria in the CMRA that feature auction-specific forms of truthful bidding, demand expansion, and demand reduction for settings in which bidders have either decreasing or non-decreasing  ...  The Combinatorial Multi-Round Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format which has already been used in several recent European spectrum auctions.  ...  With non-decreasing marginal values, the payments are again the same as in the VCG auction. Theorem 5.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11783v1">arXiv:2203.11783v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ccxkkdz6qjcztppeyvpnsnaavi">fatcat:ccxkkdz6qjcztppeyvpnsnaavi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220327015647/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.11783v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4e/6a/4e6aa67204a4d7ced30ced3c1cff74c095e9abcc.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11783v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions

Ryuji Sano
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
We analyze incentives in ascending combinatorial auctions under complete information.  ...  This paper considers a class of combinatorial auctions with ascending prices, which includes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and core-selecting auctions.  ...  (2007) formulate ascending combinatorial auctions with non-linear and non-anonymous prices.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587254">doi:10.2139/ssrn.1587254</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/vykc4mpgu5harif5loxusuicci">fatcat:vykc4mpgu5harif5loxusuicci</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829120012/http://infoshako.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp/~naoki50/Sano.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d7/9d/d79d6ecda490a6843a28ff0343a69bb5a98ebfee.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1587254"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders [article]

Sujit Gujar, Y Narahari
<span title="2010-04-24">2010</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded.  ...  The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders).  ...  Acknowledgment The first author would like to acknowledge the Infosys Technologies Pvt Ltd for awarding Infosys fellowship to pursue PhD.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0524v3">arXiv:0902.0524v3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2wkvzebimvg3rkidsgd6e3wuqu">fatcat:2wkvzebimvg3rkidsgd6e3wuqu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/download/arxiv-0902.0524/0902.0524.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> File Archive [PDF] </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0524v3" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions [chapter]

David C. Parkes
<span title="2005-12-09">2005</span> <i title="The MIT Press"> Combinatorial Auctions </i> &nbsp;
The rule requires quantities bid in the auction are (weak) monotonically decreasing. Similar rules have since become standard in ascending CAs. an auction to bid.  ...  Activity rules (Milgrom 2000) introduce further restrictions, such as requiring that a bidder bids for a decreasing market share as prices increase during an auction.  ... 
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Information Feedback in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions [chapter]

Alcxandcr Pikovsky, Martin Bichlcr
<span title="">2005</span> <i title="Physica-Verlag HD"> Wirtschaftsinformatik 2005 </i> &nbsp;
The need for new auction mechanisms that allow complex bids such as bundle or multi-attribute bids has been raised in many situations.  ...  Beyond strategic problems, the design of these advanced auction formats exhibits hard computational problems. Pricing is one of the major challenges in designing iterative combinatorial auctions.  ...  As in traditional auction design, the allocation rules, the auction protocol and the payment rules impact the bidders' strategies.  ... 
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