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Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs

Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, Shikha Singh, Michael Wagner
2019 European Symposium on Algorithms  
How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem.  ...  We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P NEXP .  ...  We are ready to define non-cooperative rational interactive proofs. Definition 8 (Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proof). Fix an arbitrary string x and language L.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.esa.2019.29 dblp:conf/esa/0017M019 fatcat:qzysidq7izgi7lxro3rpe2rrke

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs [article]

Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, Shikha Singh
2019 arXiv   pre-print
For example, we show that with a polynomial utility gap, the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs is exactly P^NEXP.  ...  How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem.  ...  We are ready to define rational proofs with non-cooperative provers. Definition 8 (Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proof). Fix an arbitrary string x and language L.  ... 
arXiv:1708.00521v5 fatcat:qi4aftqw4vhrxj6pg42kcizitm

Page 823 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2000a [page]

2000 Mathematical Reviews  
The main results show that, by repetition, nonmyopic bounded rational players can reach a limit full-information non- myopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy, and, vice versa, if a limit full-information  ...  [Vorob’ev, NikolaiNikolaevich]} On probabilities of pure strategy n-tuples in non-cooperative games. Game theory and applications, IV, 87-93, Nova Sci. Publ., Commack, NY, 1998.  ... 

Synthesis of Controllable Nash Equilibria in Quantitative Objective Game

Shaull Almagor, Orna Kupferman, Giuseppe Perelli
2018 Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
In particular, we study the price of stability and price of anarchy of the rational-synthesis game and use them to explain the cooperative and non-cooperative settings of rational synthesis.  ...  In particular, we show that the cooperative and non-cooperative versions of quantitative rational synthesis are 2EXPTIME-complete and in 3EXPTIME, respectively -- not harder than the complexity known for  ...  Acknowledgments We are grateful to Bastien Maubert for the careful reading and for detecting an error in the complexity analysis of the strong rational-synthesis problem in an earlier version of this paper  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/5 dblp:conf/ijcai/AlmagorKP18 fatcat:ib7opxz5ivg55eoevin73fs7je

It's on Me! The Benefit of Altruism in BAR Environments [chapter]

Edmund L. Wong, Joshua B. Leners, Lorenzo Alvisi
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
, or rational and network loss is explicitly considered.  ...  However, in most cases, interactions with a particular peer or the service itself eventually end, resulting in some last exchange in which departing participants have no incentive to contribute.  ...  peers can irreparably harm rational cooperation.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15763-9_41 fatcat:zsmy27tzhfeurig3346xmhwf5q

A cheat-proof game-theoretic framework for cooperative peer-to-peer video streaming

Yang Gao, Yan Chen, K. J. Ray Liu
2012 2012 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP)  
Then, a cheat-proof strategy is proposed to enforce rational group peers to achieve the optimal social welfare cooperatively.  ...  In this work, we first formulate the interactions among group peers as a cooperative P2P streaming game, which takes into account the unique characteristics of video.  ...  In this work, we propose a cheat-proof game-theoretic framework for the cooperative P2P streaming problem, which can enforce rational group peers acting cooperatively to achieve the system-wide optimal  ... 
doi:10.1109/icassp.2012.6288373 dblp:conf/icassp/0006CL12 fatcat:jrotsjtth5bu3pd5i23kuq5bia

Time and the Prisoner's Dilemma [article]

Yishay Mor, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2007 arXiv   pre-print
This modification enriches the game and suggests dominance of cooperative strategies.  ...  We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational ability is sufficient to enable cooperative behavior.  ...  In this paper we show that once these limitations are incorporated into the interaction, cooperative behavior becomes possible and reasonable. The idea of bounding agents' rationality is not new.  ... 
arXiv:cs/0701139v1 fatcat:mmrnw7lfffhcpb7jq2nw6ibqnm

Learning by (limited) forward looking players

Friederike Mengel
2014 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
In particular we ...nd that also Non-Nash outcomes can be sustained almost all the time whenever they are individually rational and satisfy an e¢ ciency condition.  ...  Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in ...nitely repeated games.  ...  Proof. Appendix. The Claim states that the probability to observe cooperation within a given T period game is non-increasing in t.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.08.001 fatcat:jigrth622bgivhknpfo6j424uu

Disadvantageous semicollusion

Chaim Fershtman, Neil Gandal
1994 International Journal of Industrial Organization  
Thus the overall evaluation of product market collusion must take into account its effect on the interaction in the other dimensions.  ...  This paper demonstrates that collusion in the product market may yield lower overall profits because it intensifies competition in the other dimensions of the interaction.  ...  Thus the binding constraints for both the cooperative and non-cooperative settings are i>9/8 and 1A>1/2zA. Proof.  ... 
doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90010-8 fatcat:pe7ji62zezejxmml4xvinnlrtm

Deals Among Rational Agents [chapter]

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Michael R. Genesereth
1988 Readings in Distributed Artificial Intelligence  
A formal framework is presented that models communication and promises in multi-agent interactions.  ...  Using a deal-making mechanism, agents are able to coordinate and cooperate more easily than in the communication-free model.  ...  Acknowledgement The authors wish to thank Matt Ginsberg, who has played an invaluable role in the development of our ideas on cooperation among rational agents.  ... 
doi:10.1016/b978-0-934613-63-7.50027-9 fatcat:7gubh523anhvfm5qbbb2gksgfy

A Reputation Scheme for a Blockchain-based Network Cooperative Defense

Andreas Gruhler, Bruno Rodrigues, Burkhard Stiller
2019 IFIP/IEEE Symposium on Integrated Network Management  
However, participants in these systems lack incentives for cooperation and reputation.  ...  A cooperative, multi-domain DDoS mitigation system provides defense services on top of an existing, distributed infrastructure.  ...  ., cooperative entities) strategies over 10 days of simulation, showing that non-rational customers had reputations points diminished over time in contrast to rational/satisfied customers.  ... 
dblp:conf/im/GruhlerRS19 fatcat:7khuse6eunex3cevqo4hjz2ppe

Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers [article]

Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, Shikha Singh
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Rational interactive proofs (RIP), introduced by Azar and Micali (2012), are an interactive-proof system with payments, in which the prover is rational rather than untrustworthy---he may lie, but only  ...  In this paper, we introduce multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP). Here, a verifier cross-checks the provers' answers with each other and pays them according to the messages exchanged.  ...  Cooperative Multi-Prover Rational Proofs.  ... 
arXiv:1504.08361v5 fatcat:h2c46fhv2vhojbpzgium6lvwtu

Social Division with Endogenous Hierarchy

James P. Choy
2017 Economic Journal  
People who are observed to interact with members of different groups are believed to be less trustworthy by members of their own group.  ...  Certain kinds of interaction are more likely to take place within a group than across groups. I model a reputation effect that enforces these divisions.  ...  Third, caste members follow the rules about non-interaction with other castes in part to preserve their reputations with members of their own castes.  ... 
doi:10.1111/ecoj.12508 fatcat:xfvz3n6h2rctxhlxr57lmdtaiu

On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations

Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
1997 Artificial Intelligence  
This framework comes in several forms; in our setting agents interact with each other through a random process, and accumulate information about the system.  ...  We show a class of games in which HCR guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally acceptable social convention.  ...  In order to make this agent cooperative the process will end with the following procedure: the non-cooperative agent will meet a cooperative agent until it will become non-cooperative as well, and then  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(97)00028-3 fatcat:qaeaowqakjhe3ioxf64wn5wgly

DE-RSTC: A rational secure two-party computation protocol based on direction entropy [article]

Yuling Chen and Juan Ma and Xianmin Wang and Xinyu Zhang and Huiyu Zhou
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Rational secure multi-party computation (RSMC) means two or more rational parties to complete a function on private inputs.  ...  Specifically, when parties choose a cooperation strategy, the direction vector is positive, and the information transmitted is positive, conversely, it is negative information.  ...  Proof of fairness Theorem 5. The rational and secure two-party computation protocol based on direction entropy is fair. Proof.  ... 
arXiv:2110.09160v2 fatcat:jz2rkyp2pndlzdha2g2bprj6qa
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