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ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó
<span title="2018-01-23">2018</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ysqkp2ncejg6neq2feqk4b3lma" style="color: black;">International Economic Review</a> </i> &nbsp;
We also provide a converse of this main ...nding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.  ...  We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference pro...les.  ...  characterization of strategy-proof SCFs on restricted domains.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12266">doi:10.1111/iere.12266</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/qrmn6va3yzalnfaj6xbsnpbwfu">fatcat:qrmn6va3yzalnfaj6xbsnpbwfu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190414181911/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/141512986.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b5/da/b5dad01dcefc8afd0da20ba54eb08da09557bd8d.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12266"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Page 4388 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 95g [page]

<span title="">1995</span> <i title="American Mathematical Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/pub_mathematical-reviews" style="color: black;">Mathematical Reviews </a> </i> &nbsp;
slightly generalized notion of single-peakedness that is used in our characterization for the case m = 1.  ...  Our first results characterize the complete class, after an appropriate extension of the single-peakedness condition.  ... 
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Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices [article]

Ernesto Savaglio, Stefano Vannucci
<span title="2014-06-15">2014</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of single peaked total preorders if and  ...  Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed.  ...  of them under other notions of single peakedness.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.5120v1">arXiv:1406.5120v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/xle5pmuw5fhxpo5vxzpwmfnhlm">fatcat:xle5pmuw5fhxpo5vxzpwmfnhlm</a> </span>
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Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule

Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando Tohmé
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/camnssxuprevbc2yeve4w3dtku" style="color: black;">Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of single-crossing preferences.  ...  In particular, this is true for the median choice rule, which is found to be strategy-proof and group-strategic-proof over the full set of alternatives and over every possible policy agenda.  ...  The most important one that we have left for a future work is to fully characterize the family of strategy-proof social choice functions over single-crossing preferences.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0098-y">doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0098-y</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zr7sc5zuobflrkzfjz4sw3472e">fatcat:zr7sc5zuobflrkzfjz4sw3472e</a> </span>
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Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
<span title="2008-08-05">2008</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/camnssxuprevbc2yeve4w3dtku" style="color: black;">Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is equivalent to convexity of the range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules.  ...  his preferences in such a way that the lower contour set of the initial outcome under initial preferences is a subset of the lower contour set of the initial outcome under new preferences.  ...  As we have seen, non-bossiness turns out to be crucial in the characterization of strategy-proof rules with convex range for single-peakedness.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0323-y">doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0323-y</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/vzidpcdcvbf4jdet5q7ihhvyne">fatcat:vzidpcdcvbf4jdet5q7ihhvyne</a> </span>
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Strategy Proofness and Unanimity in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Doghmi, Abdelmonaim Tlidi
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences.  ...  We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it  ...  Notice that this result remains true for the domain of single-peakedness which is a particular case of the large domain of single-plateauedness.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688465">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2688465</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/g6fnle3u7zgi3iknh5bdh2jeeu">fatcat:g6fnle3u7zgi3iknh5bdh2jeeu</a> </span>
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A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems

Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa
<span title="2021-05-28">2021</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/6o2bji43pvdfhcvolnx2ug235e" style="color: black;">International Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
K E Y W O R D S efficiency, individual rationality, single-peakedness, slot allocation problem, strategy-proofness, Vickrey rule JEL CLASSIFICATION C78, D44, D71 | INTRODUCTION We study the slot allocation  ...  In the queueing setting, 1 Chun et al. (2014) characterize the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms in terms of queue efficiency, strategy-proofness, and egalitarian equivalence.  ...  Youngsub Chun is supported by a National Research Foundation of Korea grant funded by the Korean government (NRF-2016S1A3A2924944).  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12306">doi:10.1111/ijet.12306</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/67st4rcaojh6nniowqez3byccq">fatcat:67st4rcaojh6nniowqez3byccq</a> </span>
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The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization

Clemens Puppe
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sj24t22gfnfprddmjorsfd6flq" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models of political economy and elsewhere.  ...  The main result has a number of corollaries, among them a dual characterization of the single-dipped domain; it also implies that a single-crossing ('order-restricted') domain can be minimally rich only  ...  In a recent paper, Chatterji et al. [2016] have characterized a weaker notion of single-peakedness ('single-peakedness with respect to a tree') using strategy-proofness and other conditions imposed on  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.003">doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.003</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/rzojubcos5c45abbtcbeo4mftq">fatcat:rzojubcos5c45abbtcbeo4mftq</a> </span>
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Manipulation and Single-Peakedness: A General Result

Elizabeth Maggie Penn, John W. Patty, Sean Gailmard
<span title="2011-02-01">2011</span> <i title="Wiley"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/dmjjagmgurhdzk7vshg553xakq" style="color: black;">American Journal of Political Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial.  ...  This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space.  ...  These results highlight the fact that on the single-peaked domain we consider, the typical equivalence between coalitional strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness does not hold.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00502.x">doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00502.x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/gpdjtja7t5ezbjjepxuztzp23i">fatcat:gpdjtja7t5ezbjjepxuztzp23i</a> </span>
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A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling

Ping Zhan
<span title="2019-10-10">2019</span> <i title="Springer Science and Business Media LLC"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2zozqedzyrg2bmn5ala6o7d5se" style="color: black;">Mathematical Methods of Operations Research</a> </i> &nbsp;
The underlying basic structure of tiling type and properties of single-peaked domains provided here give a good visualization and make further developments on single-peakedness more easy.  ...  Single-peakedness was introduced by Black (J Political Econ 56: [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34] 1948) as a sufficient condition to overcome Condorcet paradox.  ...  Beside of majority acyclic properties, strategy-proofness is another main subject of single-peakedness, as shown in papers early (Moulin 1980) and recently (Achuthankutty and Roy 2018; Bade 2019; Moulin  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7">doi:10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/k4gkrm7vrvg4tlldggxbcjd74i">fatcat:k4gkrm7vrvg4tlldggxbcjd74i</a> </span>
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The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
<span title="2011-03-25">2011</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/3feqa5u7yrh5rgwqppk4uvs2x4" style="color: black;">SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association</a> </i> &nbsp;
We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints  ...  The work of G. 123 of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share.  ...  Manjunath (2010) first shows that, under different fairness properties, strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible and second, he characterizes axiomatically different rules that solve the rationing  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6">doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0055-6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/pfmruzxmsbca3bnmeej6cow33a">fatcat:pfmruzxmsbca3bnmeej6cow33a</a> </span>
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Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Response to Aldred

JOHN S. DRYZEK, CHRISTIAN LIST
<span title="">2004</span> <i title="Cambridge University Press (CUP)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/o5x7s5pnmra5lkbj5d4e7iyg24" style="color: black;">British Journal of Political Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
Here the arguments in our paper regarding a relaxation of strategy-proofness may apply.  ...  The hypothesis that -under suitable conditions -group deliberation induces single-peakedness in individual preferences is an empirical hypothesis.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123404230265">doi:10.1017/s0007123404230265</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/nv4ll2puibbkrgdobo6pm2nwxy">fatcat:nv4ll2puibbkrgdobo6pm2nwxy</a> </span>
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Page 2371 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2000c [page]

<span title="">2000</span> <i title="American Mathematical Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/pub_mathematical-reviews" style="color: black;">Mathematical Reviews </a> </i> &nbsp;
Summary: “We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof.  ...  Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.” Fouad T.  ... 
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Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls

Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, Iain McLean
<span title="">2013</span> <i title="University of Chicago Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/spg6vtno5bgijhyp3tqvs42vhu" style="color: black;">Journal of Politics</a> </i> &nbsp;
Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls Condorcet's and similar paradoxes of social choice have long been seen as serious problems  ...  We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness.  ...  , Arrow 1951 /1963 , and as famously shown by Moulin (1980) , median voting schemes on domains of single-peaked preferences are strategy-proof, meaning that truthful expression of preferences is a dominant  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381612000886">doi:10.1017/s0022381612000886</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/w7dk7vmecrhxpfzcuj7uuekltu">fatcat:w7dk7vmecrhxpfzcuj7uuekltu</a> </span>
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HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE: SOURCES AND MEASURES

ERNST EBERLEIN, DILIP B. MADAN
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/doejbucwjnbrnoymh5dx2orhjy" style="color: black;">International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance</a> </i> &nbsp;
Stress is measured by positive expectation under a concave distortion of the return distribution accessed.  ...  It is shown that the skewness, peakedness and tailweightedness of the standardized investment return signi...cantly a¤ects the Sharpe ratios required to reach a target gamma level.  ...  The collection of all limit laws were characterized by Lévy (1937) and Khintchine (1938) .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219024909005282">doi:10.1142/s0219024909005282</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/7fj2ov7skja5hgm7ahskh7rxf4">fatcat:7fj2ov7skja5hgm7ahskh7rxf4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110428112515/http://www.stochastik.uni-freiburg.de:80/~eberlein/papers/RRtoRSR5.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/33/22/3322d2396d47d76419dceae89587d2ab8a14a940.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219024909005282"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> worldscientific.com </button> </a>
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