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Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers [article]

Daniel Schmand, Marc Schröder, Alexander Skopalik
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages.  ...  In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users.  ...  We study the problem by means of a two-stage game, which we call a network investment game.  ... 
arXiv:1904.10417v1 fatcat:teunzsonlfbrrfysyzdreicqge

Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers

Daniel Schmand, Marc Schröder, Alexander Skopalik, Michael Wagner
2019 International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming  
We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages.  ...  ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design; Theory of computation → Network games  ...  I C A L P 2 0 1 9 151:12 Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers We show that for network investment games with a single provider a monopoly equilibrium exists if and only if α > 1.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.icalp.2019.151 dblp:conf/icalp/Schmand0S19 fatcat:yunk7mbkozc45fsrihro6sjwva

Competition between Wireless Service Providers Sharing a Radio Resource [chapter]

Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin, Jean-Marc Vigne
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation  ...  We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist.  ...  with transportation networks [2] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_28 fatcat:fuqw2viw6bbk5d7fhgqirvbt6q

Technological investment games among wireless telecommunications service providers

Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin, Jean-Marc Vigne
2011 International Journal of Network Management  
The lowest level of game, that is the competition among users looking for the network with the best combination of price and QoS, is analyzed in Section 3; the equilibrium is characterized, and existence  ...  With the development of new technologies in a competitive context, infrastructure investment and licence purchase as well as existing technology maintenance are crucial questions for current and emerging  ...  . ∎ In general, the Wardrop equilibrium is not unique, as illustrated by the following example. 1 2 ] is a solution to system (3) , i.e., a Wardrop equilibrium. D(p) = [2 −p] + .  ... 
doi:10.1002/nem.776 fatcat:gxotmjtul5cmplzldval3raygi

Eliciting Coordination with Rebates

Patrick Maille, Nicolas E. Stier-Moses
2009 Social Science Research Network  
A new Wardrop equilibrium arises when participants selfishly select one of the modes of transportation with the lowest updated costs.  ...  T his article considers a mechanism based on rebates that aims at reducing congestion in urban networks.  ...  We consider the framework of network games, originally introduced by Wardrop (1952) and first analyzed formally by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) .  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.992641 fatcat:k27tlljwfrgsrit43oodm642mq

Network Games: Theory, Models, and Dynamics

Ishai Menache, Asuman Ozdaglar
2011 Synthesis Lectures on Communication Networks  
If player 1 invests, then they will engage in a Cournot game with c 1 = 0 and c 2 = 2. Otherwise, they will engage in a Cournot game with c 1 = c 2 = 2.  ...  Our next example considers a duopoly investment game, in which there are two players in the market (see Figure 2 .2). Player 1 can choose to invest or not invest.  ...  Motivated by these issues, we suggest the following research directions: Analyzing games by their relation to games with structure.  ... 
doi:10.2200/s00330ed1v01y201101cnt009 fatcat:ij7x6c5kpnarxf7vyyxmcmt5x4

Eliciting Coordination with Rebates

Patrick Maillé, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
2009 Transportation Science  
A new Wardrop equilibrium arises when participants selfishly select one of the modes of transportation with the lowest updated costs.  ...  This article considers a mechanism based on rebates that aims at reducing congestion in urban networks.  ...  We consider the framework of network games, originally introduced by Wardrop (1952) and first analyzed formally by Beckmann et al. (1956) .  ... 
doi:10.1287/trsc.1090.0287 fatcat:olv2f7pjavd2fc4be4fdmgxouu

Competition in Prices and Service Level Guarantees

Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub
2007 Social Science Research Network  
We then compare the SLG game with the BE game; equilibria for the BE is characterized in a previous paper.  ...  Using these results we show that in the case of constant returns to investment, while the NE price for the SLG game is perfectly competitive, firms obtain positive markups in the unique NE for the BE game  ...  Acknowledgments We are grateful for helpful conversations with Gad Allon, Awi Federgruen, Sunil Kumar, Nolan  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1021449 fatcat:bfclx63qmbanfca6qogha5l5wm

Incentivizing efficient load repartition in heterogeneous wireless networks with selfish delay-sensitive users

Vladimir Fux, Patrick Maille
2013 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM 2013)  
In this paper we apply that idea to a system where several networks with a common coverage area coexist.  ...  Almost all modern mobile devices are equipped with a number of various wireless interfaces simultaneously, so that each user is free to select between several types of wireless networks.  ...  Then the flows at a Wardrop equilibrium have the form stated in the following proposition.  ... 
doi:10.1109/cnsm.2013.6727852 dblp:conf/cnsm/FuxM13 fatcat:t77mxbxq3ffs3nxvoi5on5splu

Game Theoretical Analysis of a Multi-MNO MVNO Business Model in 5G Networks

Erwin Sacoto Cabrera, Luis Guijarro, Patrick Maillé
2020 Electronics  
markets supported by 5G networks.  ...  decision and the MNO network capacities decision.  ...  The behaviour of the users is modelled using the Wardrop Equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.3390/electronics9060933 fatcat:n35x55aq6rghnj3mhv4ah74kke

N-player Bertrand-Cournot games in queues: Existence of equilibrium

Parijat Dube, Rahul Jain
2008 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing  
We intend to extend this to queues with multiple classes of service as a framework to study differentiated services in networks. I. INTRODUCTION We consider a simple queueing game model.  ...  We obtain conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game. We then consider the case where the providers invest in capacity and set price simultaneously.  ...  More recently, [11] considered the Bertrand game between multiple network service providers.  ... 
doi:10.1109/allerton.2008.4797598 fatcat:vfqu2fxclnbsrcp2357pecossi

Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks

Erwin J. Sacoto-Cabrera, Angel Sanchis-Cano, Luis Guijarro, José Ramón Vidal, Vicent Pla
2018 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing  
5G networks will make network sharing agreements between mobile operators technically possible.  ...  We conclude that the network operator is worse off under any circumstances under a pooling agreement, while a lump sum payment may leave the network operator better off under a priority sharing agreement  ...  with =0.5 Π *  +Π *  with =0.8 Π *  +Π *  with =1 We can conclude that network sharing is incentive compatible under the following conditions: first, that a priority sharing agreement is reached  ... 
doi:10.1155/2018/4308913 fatcat:oafxbje5yzfbtk2inpogygccqy

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

José Correa, Cristóbal Guzmán, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova, Marc Schröder
2021 Operations Research  
Regulating Network Pricing Games by Using Price Caps  ...  Johari et al. (2010) study an extension of network pricing games in which operators compete in prices and investments.  ...  Regulated Network Pricing Game and Nash Equilibria. The regulated network pricing game we consider is the following.  ... 
doi:10.1287/opre.2020.2067 fatcat:qjid7jwttjgfhk33p4ekeydkm4

Complexity and Approximation of the Continuous Network Design Problem [article]

Martin Gairing and Tobias Harks and Max Klimm
2013 arXiv   pre-print
The goal is to find an optimal investment in edge capacities so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost of the induced Wardrop equilibrium and the investment cost.  ...  We close this gap showing that CNDP is strongly NP-complete and APX-hard, both on directed and undirected networks and even for instances with affine latencies.  ...  so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost of the induced Wardrop equilibrium and the investment cost.  ... 
arXiv:1307.4258v2 fatcat:dujsh76jv5bapg7rsazmbpeijq

Competition among Telecommunication Providers [chapter]

Patrick Maillé, Peter Reichl, Bruno Tuffin
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We analyze in this section game-theoretic models of competition between telecommunication networks providers in various contexts.  ...  This analysis helps to define and understand the operators' pricing and technology investments as well as the most efficient market rules by a regulator.  ...  The resulting equilibrium is called a Wardrop equilibrium [16] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30382-1_23 fatcat:2ckqmptgabbhvgm6ulru2on6qa
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