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Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling games
2017
2017 American Control Conference (ACC)
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Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. ...
For the dynamic scalar and multidimensional cheap talk, the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is always fully revealing. ...
CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling games have been analyzed. ...
doi:10.23919/acc.2017.7963511
dblp:conf/amcc/SaritasYG17
fatcat:tg6c6wgwqjgdxftlsmtguwfpvu
Dynamic signaling games under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
2016
2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
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In this study, dynamic and repeated quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated. ...
For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we show that fully revealing equilibria cannot exist and the final state equilibria have to be quantized for a large class of source models; whereas, for ...
Nash Equilibria Analysis of N -stage Dynamic Signaling Games In this section, for the N -stage dynamic signaling game, the optimality of an affine encoder is proved for an affine decoder, and the optimality ...
doi:10.1109/isit.2016.7541575
dblp:conf/isit/SaritasYG16
fatcat:ow7ufgoo2nah5a2ffxsb7tp4yu
Dynamic Signaling Games with Quadratic Criteria under Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of dynamic signaling games under quadratic criteria. ...
For the multi-stage scalar cheap talk, we show that the final stage equilibrium is always quantized and under further conditions the equilibria for all time stages must be quantized. ...
Concluding Remarks In this paper, we studied Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for multi-stage quadratic cheap talk and signaling games. ...
arXiv:1704.03816v6
fatcat:iuzayma2ajfdthsrgzjogqjpe4
Quadratic Signaling with Prior Mismatch at an Encoder and Decoder: Equilibria, Continuity and Robustness Properties
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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Finally, we show existence of fully informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for the cheap talk problem under an absolute continuity condition. ...
We provide conditions under which there exist informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria with affine policies. ...
shown that there exist fully informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for the dynamic cheap talk (noiseless case) as in the usual team theoretic setup. ...
arXiv:2101.00799v2
fatcat:ptx5xczhn5awlkpqrtqixystj4
Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using Signaling Games with Evidence
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. ...
This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. ...
In particular, cheap talk signaling games [1] capture the dynamic and information-asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. These games are two-player, dynamic, information asymmetric games. ...
arXiv:1707.08035v2
fatcat:iz2oyayoarcmhgjvgn7nruxu7a
Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
2017
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. ...
We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. ...
Multidimensional Cheap Talk: Stackelberg Equilibria The Stackelberg equilibria in the multidimensional cheap talk can be obtained by extending its scalar case; i.e., it is unique and corresponds to a fully ...
doi:10.1109/tac.2016.2578843
fatcat:njbym5phtzanjktttxpzlevq7y
Signaling Games in Multiple Dimensions: Geometric Properties of Equilibrium Solutions
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent ...
We show that the Nash equilibrium solutions lead to structural richness due to the subtle geometric analysis the problem entails, with consequences in both system design, presence of linear Nash equilibria ...
In [18] , multi-stage cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. ...
arXiv:2108.05240v3
fatcat:ijn33hmfhfh2dhc3yhpjej7paa
A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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2019 pre-print arXiv:1712.05441v2 fatcat:f2xnslepuvbvlb42eakgant4vmOther Versions
In this paper, we survey 24 articles from 2008-2018 that use game theory to model defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy. ...
These types are delineated by their information structures, agents, actions, and duration: precisely concepts captured by game theory. ...
This model is capable of nesting cheap-talk signaling games and games of verifiable disclosure (c.f, [Milgrom 1981]) as special cases. ...
arXiv:1712.05441v3
fatcat:baizt74d2fg37flf57u6e6i25q
On the Number of Bins in Equilibria for Signaling Games
2019
2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
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We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. ...
For Gaussian sources, it is shown that there exist equilibria with infinitely many bins. ...
ACKNOWLEDGMENT Some of the results, in particular Prop. 2.1 and Thm. 2.2 build on the project report [25] written by Philippe Furrer, Stephen Kerner and Stanislav Fabricius. ...
doi:10.1109/isit.2019.8849498
dblp:conf/isit/SariotakasFGLY19
fatcat:qvs7eembxjghziytyvoeapa2ti
MARKET NICHE, FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT
2007
Manchester School
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We study a market-entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly). ...
If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated ...
For instance, Farrell (1987) considered how cheap talk can facilitate coordination among entrants in a game similar to the one analyzed in this paper. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01006.x
fatcat:bz62dhr7rbbllggd4fumso4yxe
A note on pre-play communication
2017
Games and Economic Behavior
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Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of "monotonic" strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. ...
The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate. ...
Blume (1994) applies persistence to cheap-talk games about private information. n player games in which a nonempty subset of players can burn money (the signalers). ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008
fatcat:c3awwuyhxrevzk4byikkt3gagq
Deception by Design: Evidence-Based Signaling Games for Network Defense
[article]
2015
arXiv
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We analyze two models: cheap-talk games and an augmented version of those games that we call cheap-talk games with evidence, in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability. ...
Our first contribution is this new model for deceptive interactions. We show that the model includes traditional signaling games and complete information games as special cases. ...
Cheap-Talk Signaling Games In this section, we review the concept of signaling games, a class of two-player, dynamic, incomplete information games. ...
arXiv:1503.05458v3
fatcat:uc2gkuawbzhi3beyf2jopudrpm
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
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We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees. ...
capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception. ...
The following assumptions characterizes a cheap-talk signaling game with evidence. The message 𝑚 is payoff-irrelevant in a cheap-talk signaling game. ...
arXiv:1902.03925v1
fatcat:setsnhv7ajfxvn6jadqedvfevy
Game theory meets network security and privacy
2013
ACM Computing Surveys
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In this survey, we aim to provide a better understanding of the different research approaches for applying game theory to network security. ...
This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the research contributions that analyze and solve security and privacy problems in computer networks by game-theoretic approaches. ...
In particular, we show how cheap talk games can help develop cryptographic mediators and how repeated games can help analyze and design incentives for the agents in multi-party computational protocols. ...
doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742
fatcat:55ixmohvijaelflxqrrbtnvfuu
Leadership, Beliefs and Coordination: An Explorative Discussion
2001
Industrial and Corporate Change
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This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies (all choose Risky and all choose Safe). ...
The real world of managers and leaders is not a world of simple two-strategies, two-players coordination games with costless cheap talk and common knowledge, but rather large-scale games with, imperfect ...
doi:10.1093/icc/10.2.357
fatcat:vbo3i72qg5dmhlj5lrvtvdh33u
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