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Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling games

Serkan Saritas, Serdar Yuksel, Sinan Gezici
2017 2017 American Control Conference (ACC)  
Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation.  ...  For the dynamic scalar and multidimensional cheap talk, the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is always fully revealing.  ...  CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling games have been analyzed.  ... 
doi:10.23919/acc.2017.7963511 dblp:conf/amcc/SaritasYG17 fatcat:tg6c6wgwqjgdxftlsmtguwfpvu

Dynamic signaling games under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria

Serkan Saritas, Serdar Yuksel, Sinan Gezici
2016 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)  
In this study, dynamic and repeated quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated.  ...  For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we show that fully revealing equilibria cannot exist and the final state equilibria have to be quantized for a large class of source models; whereas, for  ...  Nash Equilibria Analysis of N -stage Dynamic Signaling Games In this section, for the N -stage dynamic signaling game, the optimality of an affine encoder is proved for an affine decoder, and the optimality  ... 
doi:10.1109/isit.2016.7541575 dblp:conf/isit/SaritasYG16 fatcat:ow7ufgoo2nah5a2ffxsb7tp4yu

Dynamic Signaling Games with Quadratic Criteria under Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria [article]

Serkan Sarıtaş and Serdar Yüksel and Sinan Gezici
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of dynamic signaling games under quadratic criteria.  ...  For the multi-stage scalar cheap talk, we show that the final stage equilibrium is always quantized and under further conditions the equilibria for all time stages must be quantized.  ...  Concluding Remarks In this paper, we studied Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for multi-stage quadratic cheap talk and signaling games.  ... 
arXiv:1704.03816v6 fatcat:iuzayma2ajfdthsrgzjogqjpe4

Quadratic Signaling with Prior Mismatch at an Encoder and Decoder: Equilibria, Continuity and Robustness Properties [article]

Ertan Kazıklı, Serkan Sarıtaş, Sinan Gezici, Serdar Yüksel
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Finally, we show existence of fully informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for the cheap talk problem under an absolute continuity condition.  ...  We provide conditions under which there exist informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria with affine policies.  ...  shown that there exist fully informative Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for the dynamic cheap talk (noiseless case) as in the usual team theoretic setup.  ... 
arXiv:2101.00799v2 fatcat:ptx5xczhn5awlkpqrtqixystj4

Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using Signaling Games with Evidence [article]

Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception.  ...  This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game.  ...  In particular, cheap talk signaling games [1] capture the dynamic and information-asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. These games are two-player, dynamic, information asymmetric games.  ... 
arXiv:1707.08035v2 fatcat:iz2oyayoarcmhgjvgn7nruxu7a

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

Serkan Saritas, Serdar Yuksel, Sinan Gezici
2017 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control  
This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions.  ...  We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria.  ...  Multidimensional Cheap Talk: Stackelberg Equilibria The Stackelberg equilibria in the multidimensional cheap talk can be obtained by extending its scalar case; i.e., it is unique and corresponds to a fully  ... 
doi:10.1109/tac.2016.2578843 fatcat:njbym5phtzanjktttxpzlevq7y

Signaling Games in Multiple Dimensions: Geometric Properties of Equilibrium Solutions [article]

Ertan Kazıklı and Sinan Gezici and Serdar Yüksel
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent  ...  We show that the Nash equilibrium solutions lead to structural richness due to the subtle geometric analysis the problem entails, with consequences in both system design, presence of linear Nash equilibria  ...  In [18] , multi-stage cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.  ... 
arXiv:2108.05240v3 fatcat:ijn33hmfhfh2dhc3yhpjej7paa

A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy [article]

Jeffrey Pawlick, Edward Colbert, Quanyan Zhu
2019 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper, we survey 24 articles from 2008-2018 that use game theory to model defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy.  ...  These types are delineated by their information structures, agents, actions, and duration: precisely concepts captured by game theory.  ...  This model is capable of nesting cheap-talk signaling games and games of verifiable disclosure (c.f, [Milgrom 1981]) as special cases.  ... 
arXiv:1712.05441v3 fatcat:baizt74d2fg37flf57u6e6i25q

On the Number of Bins in Equilibria for Signaling Games

Serkan Sarikas, Philippe Furrer, Sinan Gezici, Tamas Linder, Serdar Yuksel
2019 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)  
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions.  ...  For Gaussian sources, it is shown that there exist equilibria with infinitely many bins.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT Some of the results, in particular Prop. 2.1 and Thm. 2.2 build on the project report [25] written by Philippe Furrer, Stephen Kerner and Stanislav Fabricius.  ... 
doi:10.1109/isit.2019.8849498 dblp:conf/isit/SariotakasFGLY19 fatcat:qvs7eembxjghziytyvoeapa2ti

MARKET NICHE, FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT

SUREN BASOV, VLADIMIR SMIRNOV, ANDREW WAIT
2007 Manchester School  
We study a market-entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly).  ...  If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated  ...  For instance, Farrell (1987) considered how cheap talk can facilitate coordination among entrants in a game similar to the one analyzed in this paper.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01006.x fatcat:bz62dhr7rbbllggd4fumso4yxe

A note on pre-play communication

Joel Sobel
2017 Games and Economic Behavior  
Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of "monotonic" strategies. The paper justifies this restriction.  ...  The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate.  ...  Blume (1994) applies persistence to cheap-talk games about private information. n player games in which a nonempty subset of players can burn money (the signalers).  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008 fatcat:c3awwuyhxrevzk4byikkt3gagq

Deception by Design: Evidence-Based Signaling Games for Network Defense [article]

Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We analyze two models: cheap-talk games and an augmented version of those games that we call cheap-talk games with evidence, in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability.  ...  Our first contribution is this new model for deceptive interactions. We show that the model includes traditional signaling games and complete information games as special cases.  ...  Cheap-Talk Signaling Games In this section, we review the concept of signaling games, a class of two-player, dynamic, incomplete information games.  ... 
arXiv:1503.05458v3 fatcat:uc2gkuawbzhi3beyf2jopudrpm

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation [article]

Tao Zhang, Linan Huang, Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We use the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) as the solution concept for the deception games and analyze the strategic equilibrium behaviors for both the deceivers and the deceivees.  ...  capture the information asymmetry, dynamics, and strategic behaviors of deception.  ...  The following assumptions characterizes a cheap-talk signaling game with evidence. The message 𝑚 is payoff-irrelevant in a cheap-talk signaling game.  ... 
arXiv:1902.03925v1 fatcat:setsnhv7ajfxvn6jadqedvfevy

Game theory meets network security and privacy

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Quanyan Zhu, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Bacşar, Jean-Pierre Hubaux
2013 ACM Computing Surveys  
In this survey, we aim to provide a better understanding of the different research approaches for applying game theory to network security.  ...  This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the research contributions that analyze and solve security and privacy problems in computer networks by game-theoretic approaches.  ...  In particular, we show how cheap talk games can help develop cryptographic mediators and how repeated games can help analyze and design incentives for the agents in multi-party computational protocols.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 fatcat:55ixmohvijaelflxqrrbtnvfuu

Leadership, Beliefs and Coordination: An Explorative Discussion

N. J. Foss
2001 Industrial and Corporate Change  
This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies (all choose Risky and all choose Safe).  ...  The real world of managers and leaders is not a world of simple two-strategies, two-players coordination games with costless cheap talk and common knowledge, but rather large-scale games with, imperfect  ... 
doi:10.1093/icc/10.2.357 fatcat:vbo3i72qg5dmhlj5lrvtvdh33u
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