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One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

M. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker
2009 International Journal of Game Theory  
One-way monotonicity fails for every Condorcet extension; in this respect, and in others, it resembles Moulin's participation property, although the two properties are independent.  ...  Two-way monotonicity is a very strong property, equivalent, over any domain, to strategy proofness. It thus cannot be satisfied by any "reasonable" resolute voting rule over the full domain.  ...  Surprisingly, the answer is yes -but a satisfactory explanation requires a rather detailed examination of monotonicity properties for irresolute rules and their relationships to tiebreaking agendas.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0170-9 fatcat:4jf36wvj4ffjfbofdc3uxaxrsy

Ontology Merging as Social Choice [chapter]

Daniele Porello, Ulle Endriss
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We propose to treat ontology merging as a problem of social choice, i.e., as a problem of aggregating the input of a set of individuals into an adequate collective decision, and we show how to apply the  ...  methodology of social choice theory in this new domain.  ...  We would like to thank the participants of the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC for their feedback on an early incarnation of this work, particularly Umberto Grandi, Szymon Klarman and Eric  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4_12 fatcat:pfrgsvuhhrcolcye3edkov3j44

Properties of multiwinner voting rules

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko
2017 Social Choice and Welfare  
rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations.  ...  We then formulate a number of desirable properties of committee selection rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.  ...  We would like to thank the reviewers for an extremely useful set of comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1026-z pmid:32226187 pmcid:PMC7089675 fatcat:3f46lstik5dynio6pnxa7tcasu

Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings

Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Andrew Mackenzie, Ari Morse, Nikhil Srivastava, William S. Zwicker
2012 Mathematical Social Sciences  
, and responsiveness for a voting rule?  ...  We discuss some novel properties exhibited by these rules, as well as a broader question suggested by our investigations -What are the critical relationships among resistance to manipulation, decisiveness  ...  The matter of how best to adapt Definition 3.4 to the irresolute realm is a subtle one however.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.003 fatcat:d4xegosvvzbzdez6d77l6x4agm

Lecture Notes on Voting Theory [article]

Davide Grossi
2021 arXiv   pre-print
These lecture notes have been developed for the course Computational Social Choice of the Artificial Intelligence MSc programme at the University of Groningen.  ...  They cover mathematical and algorithmic aspects of voting theory.  ...  report their genuine individual preferences: the voting rule can access truthful information and thus establish an appropriate social choice, according to the specific logic driving the rule.  ... 
arXiv:2105.00216v1 fatcat:erkauic6bzg35d2kw7rrj5bfae

Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules [article]

Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski and Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We then formulate a number of desirable properties of multiwinner rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.  ...  The goal of this paper is to propose and study properties of multiwinner voting rules which can be consider as generalisations of single-winner scoring voting rules.  ...  Piotr Faliszewski was supported in part by NCN grants 2012/06/M/ST1/00358 and 2011/03/B/ST6/01393, and by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (under AGH University Grant 11.11.230.015 (  ... 
arXiv:1506.02891v1 fatcat:dfe4ft6nd5ajvilqpxbmgcxoiu

Positional scoring-based allocation of indivisible goods

Dorothea Baumeister, Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Jörg Rothe, Abdallah Saffidine
2016 Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems  
After defining this family of rules, and focusing on some key examples, we investigate some of the social-choice-theoretic properties of this family of rules, such as various kinds of monotonicity, and  ...  The rule associated with s and maps a profile to (one of) the allocation(s) maximizing social welfare.  ...  Acknowledgements We are grateful to the anonymous ECAI'14 and COMSOC'14 reviewers for their helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10458-016-9340-x fatcat:7kmpkceja5f5tfkwreymayw7gy

Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences [article]

Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
2022 arXiv   pre-print
The goal of this book is to present fundamental concepts and results for ABC voting and to discuss the recent advances in computational social choice.  ...  While multi-winner voting has been originally a topic studied by economists and political scientists, a significant share of recent progress has occurred in the field of computational social choice.  ...  Acknowledgments First and foremost, we would like to thank Piotr Faliszewski for extensive feedback and discussions that significantly improved this book.  ... 
arXiv:2007.01795v4 fatcat:pef6zcg3fnalln55b3ixlbasl4

Ontology merging as social choice: judgment aggregation under the open world assumption

D. Porello, U. Endriss
2012 Journal of Logic and Computation  
We propose to view ontology merging as a problem of social choice, i.e., as a problem of aggregating the input of a set of individuals into an adequate collective decision.  ...  As a first step in this direction, we formulate several desirable properties for ontology aggregators, we identify the incompatibility of some of these properties, and we define and analyse several simple  ...  We also thank the participants of the Computational Social Choice Seminar at the ILLC for their feedback on an early incarnation of this work, particularly Umberto Grandi, Szymon Klarman and Eric Pacuit  ... 
doi:10.1093/logcom/exs056 fatcat:xynziqze7jh6rakj2r4vsnvndy

Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist
2016 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
In this paper, we demonstrate that these computer-aided techniques can also be applied to improve our understanding of strategyproof irresolute social choice functions.  ...  A promising direction in computational social choice is to address research problems using computer-aided proving techniques.  ...  (Paris, 2014), the 5th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (Pittsburgh, 2014), and the Dagstuhl Seminar on Computational Social Choice: Theory and Applications (Dagstuhl, 2015).  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.4959 fatcat:hxokiycad5dhzgvo44fezwv2ye

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy [article]

Piotr Faliszewski and Piotr Skowron and Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature.  ...  We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.  ...  Typically, social-choice theorists study normative properties of various multiwinner rules, computer scientists investigate feasibility of computing the election results, and researchers working within  ... 
arXiv:1802.06483v1 fatcat:h4pqniog55hzvgxwofqz7h4liy

Approval with Runoff [article]

Théo Delemazure, Jérôme Lang, Jean-François Laslier, Remzi Sanver
2022 arXiv   pre-print
With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the finalists. We leverage known approval-based committee rules and study the obtained runoff rules from an axiomatic point of view.  ...  Then we analyze the outcome of these rules on single-peaked profiles, and on real data.  ...  But the social choice literature has pointed out that plurality with runoff suffers from so many drawbacks that we may wonder why it is used at all: it is highly sensitive to cloning, fails monotonicity  ... 
arXiv:2203.02343v1 fatcat:g6lr4cjgmvbpfcxl2vbfws34pe

Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters
2017 Mathematical Social Sciences  
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions.  ...  A seminal result in social choice theory by Moulin [28] has shown that Condorcetconsistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters.  ...  Part of this work was conducted while Dominik Peters visited TUM, supported by the COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.003 fatcat:vd7wnehlkrd73jikkoxudg7kfe

Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving [article]

Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters
2016 arXiv   pre-print
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions.  ...  A seminal result in social choice theory by Moulin (1998) has shown that Condorcet-consistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters.  ...  Part of this work was conducted while Dominik Peters visited TUM, supported by the COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.  ... 
arXiv:1602.08063v1 fatcat:wei2xrwswvcb5gehxif7phk6be

Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers [article]

Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both "spoiler effects" and "strong no show paradoxes."  ...  Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods that significantly narrow the choice of winners in the presence of majority cycles while also satisfying independence of clones.  ...  and Democracy at UC Berkeley, and students in the Spring 2020 seminar on Preference and Judgment Aggregation at the  ... 
arXiv:2004.02350v8 fatcat:asiqqglk3fabfl4z5yabigtbmu
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