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Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets [article]

Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
2014 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper, we design a budget-feasible mechanism for large markets that achieves an approximation factor of 1-1/e (i.e. almost 0.63).  ...  In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, ClickWorker, CrowdFlower.  ...  Acknowledgments We acknowledge the comments and ideas of an anonymous reviewer that helped us generalize our impossibility result to the case of bayesian setting.  ... 
arXiv:1405.2452v3 fatcat:w5izej4klrayhlqidtvdlmi2ie

Truthful Mechanism Design for Multiregion Mobile Crowdsensing

Yu Qiao, Jun Wu, Hao Cheng, Zilan Huang, Qiangqiang He, Chongjun Wang
2020 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing  
We design two objectives for the proposed multiregion scenario, namely, weighted mean and maximin.  ...  The proposed mechanisms maximize the utility of services provided by a selected data contributor under both constraints approximately.  ...  Chen et al. designed a stochastic budget-feasible mechanism with a polynomial time approximate ratio and a deterministic budget-feasible mechanism with an exponential time approximate ratio [24] .  ... 
doi:10.1155/2020/8834983 fatcat:pnjpigozh5eondhqftdyyfj6ny

Power of Bonus in Pricing for Crowdsourcing [article]

Suho Shin, Hoyong Choi, Yung Yi, Jungseul Ok
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Such a pricing form is widely adopted in practice for its simplicity, e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk, although additional sophistication to pricing rule can enhance budget efficiency.  ...  We consider a simple form of pricing for a crowdsourcing system, where pricing policy is published a priori, and workers then decide their task acceptance.  ...  Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets. In Proc. of FOCS, 2014. [AKK12] Vineet Abhishek, Ian A Kash, and Peter Key.  ... 
arXiv:1804.03178v4 fatcat:6i4u3lgqonh7bbcvvw2knxhaqu

On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
2017 arXiv   pre-print
As the resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are truthful, budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation to the optimal value.  ...  Previous results on budget-feasible mechanisms have considered mostly monotone valuation functions.  ...  So, it suffices to show that running Var-Greedy-Enum-SM on S outputs a set of value at least (11/e − ) opt(S, B). (A, B).  ... 
arXiv:1704.06901v2 fatcat:y44jddmocvaldewkblmsw24goq

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
2019 arXiv   pre-print
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint.  ...  Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries.  ...  The goal, therefore, is to design budget-feasible mechanisms that (i) elicit truthful reporting of the costs by all agents, and (ii) achieve a good approximation with respect to the optimal value for the  ... 
arXiv:1905.00848v2 fatcat:uixdxcmmj5cfhmzom36e6lggt4

A Budget Feasible Peer Graded Mechanism For IoT-Based Crowdsourcing [article]

Vikash Kumar Singh, Sajal Mukhopadhyay, Fatos Xhafa, Aniruddh Sharma
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of mechanisms for heterogeneous tasks assignment problem in 'crowdsourcing'.  ...  In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism; namely TUBE-TAP for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have the true information about the quality of  ...  We would also like to thank Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) for the funds.  ... 
arXiv:1809.09315v2 fatcat:goihqtodhfb7nkwdoyvnziidqq

On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives [chapter]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
As the resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are truthful, budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation to the optimal value.  ...  Previous results on budget-feasible mechanisms have considered mostly monotone valuation functions.  ...  So, it suffices to show that running Var-Greedy-Enum-SM on S outputs a set of value at least (11/e − ) opt(S, B). (A, B).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1 fatcat:fbafonalp5aerdboj243erfpsa

Crowdsourcing to smartphones

Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xi Fang, Jian Tang
2012 Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking - Mobicom '12  
For the platform-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the platform is the leader while the users are the followers.  ...  To address this issue, we design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing.  ...  When the objective function is submodular, monotone and non-negative, it is known that a greedy algorithm provides a (11/e)-approximation [19] . Without monotonicity, Feige et al.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2348543.2348567 dblp:conf/mobicom/YangXFT12 fatcat:4px3ri7rtffqzdxah5jqo4kd5e

Budget-Feasible Online Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Tasks Truthfully

Dong Zhao, Xiang-Yang Li, Huadong Ma
2016 IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking  
We design two online mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and constant competitiveness under  ...  To achieve good service quality for an MCS application, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation.  ...  It is known that a greedy algorithm provides a (11/e)-approximation solution [27] . The second benchmark is the proportional share mechanism in the offline scenario (Algorithm 3).  ... 
doi:10.1109/tnet.2014.2379281 fatcat:77ivszh335c7fn4glhwsg3b3ki

OMG: How Much Should I Pay Bob in Truthful Online Mobile Crowdsourced Sensing? [article]

Dong Zhao, Xiang-Yang Li, Huadong Ma
2013 arXiv   pre-print
We design two online mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and constant competitiveness under  ...  for maximizing the total value of the services provided by selected users under a budget constraint.  ...  It is known that a greedy algorithm provides a (11/e)-approximation solution [23] . The second benchmark is the proportional share mechanism in the offline scenario (Algorithm 3).  ... 
arXiv:1306.5677v1 fatcat:mvcqqwdi45f4bc732qcagxzx34

Budget-Optimal Task Allocation for Reliable Crowdsourcing Systems [article]

David R. Karger and Sewoong Oh and Devavrat Shah
2013 arXiv   pre-print
Crowdsourcing systems, in which numerous tasks are electronically distributed to numerous "information piece-workers", have emerged as an effective paradigm for human-powered solving of large scale problems  ...  We show that our algorithm, inspired by belief propagation and low-rank matrix approximation, significantly outperforms majority voting and, in fact, is optimal through comparison to an oracle that knows  ...  Crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk 1 market where a "taskmaster" can submit batches of small tasks to be completed for a small fee by any worker choosing to pick them up.  ... 
arXiv:1110.3564v4 fatcat:h3nptybwuvggrhpekfxwohhu4q

Task assignment optimization in knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing

Senjuti Basu Roy, Ioanna Lykourentzou, Saravanan Thirumuruganathan, Sihem Amer-Yahia, Gautam Das
2015 The VLDB journal  
We present SmartCrowd, a framework for optimizing task-assignment in knowledge-intensive crowdsourcing (KI-C).  ...  SmartCrowd distinguishes itself by formulating, for the first time, the problem of worker-to-task assignment in KI-C as an optimization problem, by proposing efficient adaptive algorithms to solve it and  ...  Theorem 7 Offline-CDEX-Deterministic has an approximation factor of (11/e), when Q tj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1..m} and C 2 = 0.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00778-015-0385-2 fatcat:ma2h45gaq5h7bj5r5s2i5yasku

Budget-Optimal Task Allocation for Reliable Crowdsourcing Systems

David R. Karger, Sewoong Oh, Devavrat Shah
2014 Operations Research  
Crowdsourcing systems, in which numerous tasks are electronically distributed to numerous "information piece-workers", have emerged as an effective paradigm for human-powered solving of large scale problems  ...  We show that our algorithm, inspired by belief propagation and low-rank matrix approximation, significantly outperforms majority voting and, in fact, is optimal through comparison to an oracle that knows  ...  (A ij = t i |a i , b j ) = 1/(1+e −a i b j ) , with worker reliability a i and task difficulty b j . This is again a special case of the above Gaussian model if we set β j = 0.  ... 
doi:10.1287/opre.2013.1235 fatcat:ozoasgl7tvfpbfctwpmbjscuhy

Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing

Eric Balkanski, Jason D. Hartline
2016 Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web - WWW '16  
We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer [22] , but in a Bayesian setting.  ...  A main motivating application for this work is crowdsourcing, e.g., on Mechanical Turk, where workers are drawn from a large population and posted pricing is standard.  ...  agent is an 11/e approximation to the optimal ex ante mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2872427.2883032 dblp:conf/www/BalkanskiH16 fatcat:rfha7j734rhwvajavt7zvwpnsi

Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing [article]

Eric Balkanski, Jason D. Hartline
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting.  ...  A main motivating application for this work is the crowdsourcing large projects, e.g., on Mechanical Turk, where workers are drawn from a large population and posted pricing is standard.  ...  to each agent is an 11/e approximation to the optimal ex ante mechanism.  ... 
arXiv:1506.04198v2 fatcat:m2zaxh5vyvhg3fmggb3b4t43ze
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