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A Double Auction Framework for Multi-Channel Multi-Winner Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks

Monisha Devi, Nityananda Sarma, Sanjib K. Deka
2021 IEEE Access  
Previously designed double auctions miss out the CR constraints which can further degrade the network performance.  ...  Motivated by the adaptive technology in CR, this paper introduces a sealed-bid double auction mechanism which aims to obtain an effective allocation of the unused radio spectrum.  ...  design spectrum sharing mechanisms for CRN.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3079260 fatcat:53p4jgwep5envowqow77xqop54

Deployment of Auction Theoretic Models for Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks

Monisha Devi, Nityananda Sarma, Sanjib Kr. Deka
2020 Journal of Computer Science  
We go through a detailed study on single-sided auction and double-sided auction which are deployed with different CR network constraints to design the allocation model.  ...  Auction formulation takes the unlicensed users as bidders where they bid for the spectrum holes as the auctioned item.  ...  Another double auction model DOTA in (Wang et al., 2012) designs the auction for both range request and strict request.  ... 
doi:10.3844/jcssp.2020.632.641 fatcat:s42vaf5sbverteps3wkd334gge

Truthful Auction Mechanisms with Performance Guarantee in Secondary Spectrum Markets

He Huang, Yu-e Sun, Xiang-Yang Li, Shigang Chen, Mingjun Xiao, Liusheng Huang
2015 IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing  
Second, our auction mechanisms support both spatial and temporal spectral reuse, which makes the problem more challenging than existing work that deals with only spatial or temporal reuse.  ...  Our goal is to design truthful auction mechanisms that maximize either the overall social efficiency of new users (a.k.a buyers) or the revenue of the spectrum owner (a.k.a seller).  ...  To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful spectrum auction mechanisms with performance guarantee with both spatial and temporal spectrum reuse.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tmc.2014.2343976 fatcat:t72lzjs7jbghtcpamgzxhuklri

STRUCTURE: A Strategyproof Double Auction for Heterogeneous Secondary Spectrum Markets [chapter]

Yu-E Sun, He Huang, Miaomiao Tian, Zehao Sun, Wei Yang, Hansong Guo, Liusheng Huang
2015 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
To achieve the strategyproofness, many existing double spectrum auction mechanisms adopt the bid-independent methods to construct buyer groups, which may cause unfairness for the buyers with high bid values  ...  In this paper, we concentrate on the heterogeneity of spectrum resources and propose a strategyproof double auction mechanism STRUCTURE.  ...  Problem Formulation The target of our work is to design a strategyproof double auction mechanism for heterogeneous channels.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27140-8_30 fatcat:sjincumjnrfubewlsizdoqz5la

Near-Optimal Truthful Auction Mechanisms in Secondary Spectrum Markets [article]

Yu-e Sun, He Huang, Xiang-Yang Li, Zhili Chen, Wei Yang, Hongli Xu, Liusheng Huang
2013 arXiv   pre-print
With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or maximize the revenue of the  ...  In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features.  ...  [6] studied the case that spectrum can be reused both in spatial and in temporal domains, and proposed a truthful double auction mechanism for spectrum.  ... 
arXiv:1305.6390v1 fatcat:tyy55csbjbfthceaam47tpkocq

STAR: Strategy-Proof Double Auctions for Multi-Cloud, Multi-Tenant Bandwidth Reservation

Zhenzhe Zheng, Yang Gui, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen
2015 IEEE transactions on computers  
In this paper, we model the open market as a double-sided auction, and propose the first family of STrategy-proof double Auctions for multi-cloud, multi-tenant bandwidth Reservation (STAR).  ...  STAR contains two auction mechanisms.  ...  Therefore, we need to design new double auction mechanisms for cloud bandwidth reservation.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tc.2014.2346204 fatcat:ynnruemv2vh7nocrp7yzz6xej4

Profit-maximizing virtual machine trading in a federation of selfish clouds

Hongxing Li, Chuan Wu, Zongpeng Li, Francis C. M. Lau
2013 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM  
For VM trading among clouds, we apply a double auctionbased mechanism that is strategyproof, individual rational, and ex-post budget balanced.  ...  Coupling with the auction mechanism is an efficient, dynamic resource trading and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides the true valuations of VMs in the auction, optimally schedules stochastic  ...  double auction mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6566728 dblp:conf/infocom/LiWLL13 fatcat:s4ombu7udzg63mdkvxu5hx4hvy

Multi-Winner Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Single-Sided Auction Theoretic Modelling Approach with Sequential Bidding

Monisha Devi, Nityananda Sarma, Sanjib K. Deka
2021 Electronics  
Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer's revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models.  ...  With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users.  ...  Several double-auction models have also been designed to resolve the channel-allocation problem. A double-auction mechanism that models spectrum reuse as an SINR model was deployed in [32] .  ... 
doi:10.3390/electronics10050602 doaj:c59f12cd250b4b73a339ce8ac7b92397 fatcat:27zlilvedveoxm7btrzvnsv4da

Peer-assisted VoD prefetching in double auction markets

Yuan Feng, Baochun Li, Bo Li
2010 The 18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols  
auctions by bidding for and selling video segments.  ...  With simulations, we show that prefetching strategies based on such double auction markets are decentralized, and are effective in reducing the consumption of server bandwidth as well, as compared to existing  ...  Our objective is to find an economically robust double auction mechanism with high efficiency.  ... 
doi:10.1109/icnp.2010.5762776 dblp:conf/icnp/FengLL10 fatcat:awrorvmzabbgtpaghs7upvjts4

Auction Design through Multi-Agent Learning in Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading [article]

Zibo Zhao, Chen Feng, Andrew L. Lu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
While it is difficult to pick a clear winner, k-double auction (a variant of uniform pricing auction) and McAfee auction (a variant of Vickrey double-auction) appear to perform well in general, with their  ...  Being particularly interested in auction designs, we have applied the framework to four different implementations of repeated double-side auctions to compare their market outcomes.  ...  Input Data 1) Decision epochs and temporal resolution As a starting point, we consider daily auctions with an hourly temporal resolution.  ... 
arXiv:2110.10714v1 fatcat:tapdkv6j4japlcvvdckvphdaq4

Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms

Eric Guerci, Stefano Ivaldi, Silvano Cincotti
2008 Computational Economics  
In particular, with the former algorithm greedy sellers optimizing their instantaneous rewards on a tick by tick basis are simulated, while with the latter inter-temporal optimizing sellers which exhibit  ...  An agent-based modeling approach is adopted to simulate a double-auction power exchange. Two standard pricing rules are considered and compared: "discriminatory" and "uniform".  ...  For each economic scenario, experiments for the two double-auction mechanisms considered have been run.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10614-008-9127-5 fatcat:fnm43nqcnnhurpepccglgkxnv4

Truthful spectrum auctions with approximate revenue

Mahmoud Al-Ayyoub, Himanshu Gupta
2011 2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM  
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to design a polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction mechanism with a performance guarantee on the expected revenue.  ...  In this article, we design a polynomial-time spectrum auction mechanism that is truthful and yields an allocation with O(1)-approximate expected revenue, in the Bayesian setting.  ...  Recently, this work has been extended to consider double auctions [28] . In another work, Wu et al. [27] design a spectrum auction mechanism based on the truthful VCG mechanism [13] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2011.5935115 dblp:conf/infocom/Al-AyyoubG11 fatcat:w5l7dpyy7ncipdnferqbhhg4ji

A Comprehensive Survey on Auction Mechanism Design for Cloud/Edge Resource Management and Pricing

Nafiseh Sharghivand, Farnaz Derakhshan, Nazli Siasi
2021 IEEE Access  
In recent years, auction mechanism design has gained wide attention as a tool for addressing this challenge.  ...  For each aspect, existing studies are summarized along with their saliencies and drawbacks.  ...  [123] propose a combinatorial double auction in which the allocation and payment schemes are designed with respect to group-buying idea.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3110914 fatcat:kxuk4olotfcqhkowkzkqv3ns54

Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids

Linquan Zhang, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu
2014 The 2014 ACM international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems - SIGMETRICS '14  
Both power markets with grid-to-microgrid and microgrid-to-grid energy sales are studied, with an auction designed for each, under the same randomized power auction framework.  ...  It is among the first that addresses the economic challenges arising from such grid integration, and represents the first power auction mechanism design that explicitly handles the Unit Commitment Problem  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Minghua Chen for helping motivate the problem studied, and the anonymous referees and our shepherd, Adam Wierman, for their constructive comments that helped  ... 
doi:10.1145/2591971.2591999 dblp:conf/sigmetrics/ZhangLW14 fatcat:ppek52f3mfbh3ehsbmtngclgb4

Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids

Linquan Zhang, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu
2014 Performance Evaluation Review  
Both power markets with grid-to-microgrid and microgrid-to-grid energy sales are studied, with an auction designed for each, under the same randomized power auction framework.  ...  It is among the first that addresses the economic challenges arising from such grid integration, and represents the first power auction mechanism design that explicitly handles the Unit Commitment Problem  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Minghua Chen for helping motivate the problem studied, and the anonymous referees and our shepherd, Adam Wierman, for their constructive comments that helped  ... 
doi:10.1145/2637364.2591999 fatcat:45xuvw6ntfa6hnmrhu2il7gqhq
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