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A Double Auction Framework for Multi-Channel Multi-Winner Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks
2021
IEEE Access
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Previously designed double auctions miss out the CR constraints which can further degrade the network performance. ...
Motivated by the adaptive technology in CR, this paper introduces a sealed-bid double auction mechanism which aims to obtain an effective allocation of the unused radio spectrum. ...
design spectrum sharing mechanisms for CRN. ...
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3079260
fatcat:53p4jgwep5envowqow77xqop54
Deployment of Auction Theoretic Models for Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks
2020
Journal of Computer Science
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We go through a detailed study on single-sided auction and double-sided auction which are deployed with different CR network constraints to design the allocation model. ...
Auction formulation takes the unlicensed users as bidders where they bid for the spectrum holes as the auctioned item. ...
Another double auction model DOTA in (Wang et al., 2012) designs the auction for both range request and strict request. ...
doi:10.3844/jcssp.2020.632.641
fatcat:s42vaf5sbverteps3wkd334gge
Truthful Auction Mechanisms with Performance Guarantee in Secondary Spectrum Markets
2015
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
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Second, our auction mechanisms support both spatial and temporal spectral reuse, which makes the problem more challenging than existing work that deals with only spatial or temporal reuse. ...
Our goal is to design truthful auction mechanisms that maximize either the overall social efficiency of new users (a.k.a buyers) or the revenue of the spectrum owner (a.k.a seller). ...
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful spectrum auction mechanisms with performance guarantee with both spatial and temporal spectrum reuse. ...
doi:10.1109/tmc.2014.2343976
fatcat:t72lzjs7jbghtcpamgzxhuklri
STRUCTURE: A Strategyproof Double Auction for Heterogeneous Secondary Spectrum Markets
[chapter]
2015
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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To achieve the strategyproofness, many existing double spectrum auction mechanisms adopt the bid-independent methods to construct buyer groups, which may cause unfairness for the buyers with high bid values ...
In this paper, we concentrate on the heterogeneity of spectrum resources and propose a strategyproof double auction mechanism STRUCTURE. ...
Problem Formulation The target of our work is to design a strategyproof double auction mechanism for heterogeneous channels. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27140-8_30
fatcat:sjincumjnrfubewlsizdoqz5la
Near-Optimal Truthful Auction Mechanisms in Secondary Spectrum Markets
[article]
2013
arXiv
pre-print
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With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or maximize the revenue of the ...
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. ...
[6] studied the case that spectrum can be reused both in spatial and in temporal domains, and proposed a truthful double auction mechanism for spectrum. ...
arXiv:1305.6390v1
fatcat:tyy55csbjbfthceaam47tpkocq
STAR: Strategy-Proof Double Auctions for Multi-Cloud, Multi-Tenant Bandwidth Reservation
2015
IEEE transactions on computers
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In this paper, we model the open market as a double-sided auction, and propose the first family of STrategy-proof double Auctions for multi-cloud, multi-tenant bandwidth Reservation (STAR). ...
STAR contains two auction mechanisms. ...
Therefore, we need to design new double auction mechanisms for cloud bandwidth reservation. ...
doi:10.1109/tc.2014.2346204
fatcat:ynnruemv2vh7nocrp7yzz6xej4
Profit-maximizing virtual machine trading in a federation of selfish clouds
2013
2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
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For VM trading among clouds, we apply a double auctionbased mechanism that is strategyproof, individual rational, and ex-post budget balanced. ...
Coupling with the auction mechanism is an efficient, dynamic resource trading and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides the true valuations of VMs in the auction, optimally schedules stochastic ...
double auction mechanism. ...
doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6566728
dblp:conf/infocom/LiWLL13
fatcat:s4ombu7udzg63mdkvxu5hx4hvy
Multi-Winner Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Single-Sided Auction Theoretic Modelling Approach with Sequential Bidding
2021
Electronics
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Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer's revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models. ...
With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. ...
Several double-auction models have also been designed to resolve the channel-allocation problem. A double-auction mechanism that models spectrum reuse as an SINR model was deployed in [32] . ...
doi:10.3390/electronics10050602
doaj:c59f12cd250b4b73a339ce8ac7b92397
fatcat:27zlilvedveoxm7btrzvnsv4da
Peer-assisted VoD prefetching in double auction markets
2010
The 18th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
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auctions by bidding for and selling video segments. ...
With simulations, we show that prefetching strategies based on such double auction markets are decentralized, and are effective in reducing the consumption of server bandwidth as well, as compared to existing ...
Our objective is to find an economically robust double auction mechanism with high efficiency. ...
doi:10.1109/icnp.2010.5762776
dblp:conf/icnp/FengLL10
fatcat:awrorvmzabbgtpaghs7upvjts4
Auction Design through Multi-Agent Learning in Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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While it is difficult to pick a clear winner, k-double auction (a variant of uniform pricing auction) and McAfee auction (a variant of Vickrey double-auction) appear to perform well in general, with their ...
Being particularly interested in auction designs, we have applied the framework to four different implementations of repeated double-side auctions to compare their market outcomes. ...
Input Data 1) Decision epochs and temporal resolution As a starting point, we consider daily auctions with an hourly temporal resolution. ...
arXiv:2110.10714v1
fatcat:tapdkv6j4japlcvvdckvphdaq4
Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms
2008
Computational Economics
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In particular, with the former algorithm greedy sellers optimizing their instantaneous rewards on a tick by tick basis are simulated, while with the latter inter-temporal optimizing sellers which exhibit ...
An agent-based modeling approach is adopted to simulate a double-auction power exchange. Two standard pricing rules are considered and compared: "discriminatory" and "uniform". ...
For each economic scenario, experiments for the two double-auction mechanisms considered have been run. ...
doi:10.1007/s10614-008-9127-5
fatcat:fnm43nqcnnhurpepccglgkxnv4
Truthful spectrum auctions with approximate revenue
2011
2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
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To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to design a polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction mechanism with a performance guarantee on the expected revenue. ...
In this article, we design a polynomial-time spectrum auction mechanism that is truthful and yields an allocation with O(1)-approximate expected revenue, in the Bayesian setting. ...
Recently, this work has been extended to consider double auctions [28] . In another work, Wu et al. [27] design a spectrum auction mechanism based on the truthful VCG mechanism [13] . ...
doi:10.1109/infcom.2011.5935115
dblp:conf/infocom/Al-AyyoubG11
fatcat:w5l7dpyy7ncipdnferqbhhg4ji
A Comprehensive Survey on Auction Mechanism Design for Cloud/Edge Resource Management and Pricing
2021
IEEE Access
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In recent years, auction mechanism design has gained wide attention as a tool for addressing this challenge. ...
For each aspect, existing studies are summarized along with their saliencies and drawbacks. ...
[123] propose a combinatorial double auction in which the allocation and payment schemes are designed with respect to group-buying idea. ...
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3110914
fatcat:kxuk4olotfcqhkowkzkqv3ns54
Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids
2014
The 2014 ACM international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems - SIGMETRICS '14
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Both power markets with grid-to-microgrid and microgrid-to-grid energy sales are studied, with an auction designed for each, under the same randomized power auction framework. ...
It is among the first that addresses the economic challenges arising from such grid integration, and represents the first power auction mechanism design that explicitly handles the Unit Commitment Problem ...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Minghua Chen for helping motivate the problem studied, and the anonymous referees and our shepherd, Adam Wierman, for their constructive comments that helped ...
doi:10.1145/2591971.2591999
dblp:conf/sigmetrics/ZhangLW14
fatcat:ppek52f3mfbh3ehsbmtngclgb4
Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids
2014
Performance Evaluation Review
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Both power markets with grid-to-microgrid and microgrid-to-grid energy sales are studied, with an auction designed for each, under the same randomized power auction framework. ...
It is among the first that addresses the economic challenges arising from such grid integration, and represents the first power auction mechanism design that explicitly handles the Unit Commitment Problem ...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Minghua Chen for helping motivate the problem studied, and the anonymous referees and our shepherd, Adam Wierman, for their constructive comments that helped ...
doi:10.1145/2637364.2591999
fatcat:45xuvw6ntfa6hnmrhu2il7gqhq
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