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Risk Management Failures
2015
Social Science Research Network
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We present a theory in which deficiencies in risk management arise from a coordination failure. Firms choose privately optimal risk management regimes to be competitive in a market with shortlived trading opportunities but in aggregate can find themselves in a constrained inefficient "race to the bottom," with their best responses to time pressure exhibiting strategic complementarities reminiscent of bank runs. Comparative statics based on global games suggest that greater market access or
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2614468
fatcat:juls3f2zarb7bfs6yo73i3fsxu
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... r search (or trading) technologies may improve certain aspects of liquidity but at the same time generate excessive trading that undermines the allocative function of markets. We identify two sources of market failure operating through opportunity costs and agency rents, and discuss approaches to regulating risk management as a governance problem or as a public goods problem.
Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information
2010
Social Science Research Network
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We extend a standard model of financing under asymmetric information to the case where the investment opportunity is a real option. An initial investment gives access to a public signal that takes the form of a poisson process of unknown parameter. Observing the realization of this process through time generates information on the value of implementing a project, but is costly because it delays cash-flows. The project is owned by a cash-constrained entrepreneur who needs an outside investor to
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1572800
fatcat:gr3h4begojf7tlfe4x7zjfjv64
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... inance the initial investment, as well as a potential future development. An adverse selection problem arises, as the entrepreneur receives some private information about the profitability of the project and enjoys private benefits from the moment where it is fully implemented. This gives him an incentive to hurry implementation by overstating the project prospects. In line with common practices in venture capital, we show that it is optimal to include investment timing in the financial contract ("ex-ante staging") as an instrument to induce information revelation. This creates however a distortion towards late investment. Furthermore the adverse selection problem may lead to a complete market breakdown where the initial investment cannot be financed. We show that cash holdings of the entrepreneur accelerate investment and increase risktaking. We derive empirical predictions about the relationships between pay, performance, investment timing and corporate governance.
Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information
2010
Social Science Research Network
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We extend a standard model of financing under asymmetric information to the case where the investment opportunity is a real option. An initial investment gives access to a public signal that takes the form of a poisson process of unknown parameter. Observing the realization of this process through time generates information on the value of implementing a project, but is costly because it delays cash-flows. The project is owned by a cash-constrained entrepreneur who needs an outside investor to
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1483688
fatcat:vwtjp6dtnzhajlo6bbzxzjj2ua
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... inance the initial investment, as well as a potential future development. An adverse selection problem arises, as the entrepreneur receives some private information about the profitability of the project and enjoys private benefits from the moment where it is fully implemented. This gives him an incentive to hurry implementation by overstating the project prospects. In line with common practices in venture capital, we show that it is optimal to include investment timing in the financial contract ("ex-ante staging") as an instrument to induce information revelation. This creates however a distortion towards late investment. Furthermore the adverse selection problem may lead to a complete market breakdown where the initial investment cannot be financed. We show that cash holdings of the entrepreneur accelerate investment and increase risktaking. We derive empirical predictions about the relationships between pay, performance, investment timing and corporate governance.
Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets
2017
Management science
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742
fatcat:e3dkagrjd5cjvbwcqjxm3bkcnm
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... er, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications.
Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets
2012
Social Science Research Network
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of a second certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers only solicit one
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2178119
fatcat:d62ydsv5nzegpifepnsadljyqa
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... er, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications.
Equilibrium Bitcoin Pricing
2018
Social Science Research Network
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We offer an overlapping generations equilibrium model of cryptocurrency pricing and confront it to new data on bitcoin transactional benefits and costs. The model emphasizes that the fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is the stream of net transactional benefits it will provide, which depend on its future prices. The link between future and present prices implies that returns can exhibit large volatility unrelated to fundamentals. We construct an index measuring the ease with which bitcoins
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3261063
fatcat:htim7a2d2reuxkseg7qpbi3jbq
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... can be used to purchase goods and services, and we also measure costs incurred by bitcoin owners. Consistent with the model, estimated transactional net benefits explain a statistically significant fraction of bitcoin returns. * HEC Paris
Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information
2012
The Review of financial studies
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We extend a standard model of financing under asymmetric information to the case where the investment opportunity is a real option. An initial investment gives access to a public signal that takes the form of a poisson process of unknown parameter. Observing the realization of this process through time generates information on the value of implementing a project, but is costly because it delays cash-flows. The project is owned by a cash-constrained entrepreneur who needs an outside investor to
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs068
fatcat:a5nhxadkgjbs7a442qihlmvhly
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... inance the initial investment, as well as a potential future development. An adverse selection problem arises, as the entrepreneur receives some private information about the profitability of the project and enjoys private benefits from the moment where it is fully implemented. This gives him an incentive to hurry implementation by overstating the project prospects. In line with common practices in venture capital, we show that it is optimal to include investment timing in the financial contract ("ex-ante staging") as an instrument to induce information revelation. This creates however a distortion towards late investment. Furthermore the adverse selection problem may lead to a complete market breakdown where the initial investment cannot be financed. We show that cash holdings of the entrepreneur accelerate investment and increase risktaking. We derive empirical predictions about the relationships between pay, performance, investment timing and corporate governance.
Sex hormone-binding globulin in osteoporosis
2010
Joint Bone Spine
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Titre Sex hormone-binding globulin in osteoporosis URL de la notice
doi:10.1016/j.jbspin.2010.03.011
pmid:20452803
fatcat:xyfapa36cjfo5hiivdbpndkqdu
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
2012
Social Science Research Network
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The paper presents a theory of optimal transparency in the financial system when financial institutions have short-term liabilities and are exposed to rollover risk. Our analysis indicates that transparency enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but may have a destabilizing effect during normal economic times. Thus, the optimal level of transparency is contingent on the state of the economy, with the regulator increasing disclosure in times of crises. Under this policy,
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1973673
fatcat:lgsm4kq5hrh5no7b33ewgoelli
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... ever, an increase in disclosure signals a deterioration of the economy's fundamentals, so the regulator has incentives to withhold information ex-post. In that case, the regulator may have to commit ex-ante to a degree of transparency which trades off the frequency and magnitude of financial crises. The analysis also considers the possibility that financial institutions, in an attempt to deal with rollover risk, either diversify their risks or increase the liquidity of their balance sheets.
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
2012
Social Science Research Network
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The paper presents a theory of optimal transparency in the financial system when financial institutions have short-term liabilities and are exposed to rollover risk. Our analysis indicates that transparency enhances the stability of the financial system during crises but may have a destabilizing effect during normal economic times. Thus, the optimal level of transparency is contingent on the state of the economy, with the regulator increasing disclosure in times of crises. Under this policy,
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2075817
fatcat:5cwec55sonejhfbsepsbfa6ngm
more »
... ever, an increase in disclosure signals a deterioration of the economy's fundamentals, so the regulator has incentives to withhold information ex-post. In that case, the regulator may have to commit ex-ante to a degree of transparency which trades off the frequency and magnitude of financial crises. The analysis also considers the possibility that financial institutions, in an attempt to deal with rollover risk, either diversify their risks or increase the liquidity of their balance sheets.
Impact of preterm birth on parental separation: a French population-based longitudinal study
2017
BMJ Open
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Impact of parental separation or divorce on school performance in preterm children: A population-based study
2018
PLoS ONE
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The objective of this study was to quantify the possible decrease in school performance at five years of age in preterm children associated with parental separation or divorce, and to test whether this effect varies according to the child's age at the time of the separation. This study included 3,308 infants delivered at < 35 weeks of gestation born between 2003 and 2011 who were enrolled in the population-based LIFT cohort and who had an optimal neurodevelopmental outcome at two years of age.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0202080
pmid:30192749
pmcid:PMC6128464
fatcat:r3cfd4jsbrfapcvs67mrhjjzsm
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... hese infants were evaluated by their teachers to assess their abilities and behavior when they had reached five years of age, using the Global School Adaptation (GSA) questionnaire. The mean GSA score was 50.8 points. Parental separations (assessed as parents either living together or living separately) were associated with a decrease in school performance at five years of age, although this was only the case for children who exhibited difficulties at school (3.7 points, p < 0.01). A decrease in school performance only occurred when parental separations took place between 3 and 5 years after the child's birth. Parental separation was associated with a decrease in these children's levels of motivation, autonomy, and manual dexterity. This study indicates that preterm infants of parents who had separated are particularly at risk of a lower scholar performance. OPEN ACCESS Citation: Nusinovici S, Olliac B, Flamant C, Müller J-B, Olivier M, Rouger V, et al. (2018) Impact of parental separation or divorce on school performance in preterm children: A populationbased study. PLoS ONE 13(9): e0202080. https://
Twosided reputation in certification markets Two-sided reputation in certification markets
2013
unpublished
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome adverse selection, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier is hump-shaped in his reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence , reputational concerns may induce the certifier to reduce information quality, thus depressing welfare. The entry of another certifier impacts reputational incentives: when sellers can only solicit one cer-tifier,
fatcat:frl24jkct5fn3oiy4ez7rkp26i
more »
... competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this region expands when sellers can hold multiple certifications.
Massimo Prearo, Le moment politique de l'homosexualité. Mouvements, identités et communautés en France
2014
Lectures
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References Electronic reference Hugo Bouvard , « Massimo Prearo, Le moment politique de l’homosexualité. ...
URL : http://gss.revues.org/2701. 8 Matthieu Lilian, L’espace des mouvements sociaux , Éditions du Croquant, coll. « Sociopo », 2012. ...
doi:10.4000/lectures.15116
fatcat:44yinhesgzgibm63d27ksoniey
Hérodias et l'écriture subversive de Flaubert
2016
Littératures
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Genette, op. cit. , p. 458. 31 Warning se sert de Bouvard et Pécuchet pour montrer la subversion des discours et la satire autour des savoirs. ...
. , p. 458. 5 Hérodias reprend les Évangiles de Matthieu (XIV : 6) et de Marc (VI : 22) qui racontent la décollation de saint Jean-Baptiste. ...
doi:10.4000/litteratures.530
fatcat:izkne4hpazguhn5wsaltulir6a
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