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Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols

Veronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Francois Dupressoir, Benedikt Schmidt, Pierre-Yves Strub, Bogdan Warinschi
2017 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)  
We also thank Matt Fredrikson who has shepherded this paper to its current form, and the anonymous reviewers at IEEE Security & Privacy for their helpful comments.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors thank Gilles Barthe for useful input and discussions and to David Bernhard and David Galindo for their early involvement in this work.  ...  Conclusion and future work We have developed a machine-checked framework for proving ballot privacy of electronic voting systems.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2017.28 dblp:conf/sp/CortierDDSSW17 fatcat:rqw3ts5xrvdt3apptmje7cc4ii

Machine-Checked Proofs for Electronic Voting: Privacy and Verifiability for Belenios

Veronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Francois Dupressoir, Bogdan Warinschi
2018 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)  
Together, our results yield the first machine-checked analysis of both ballot privacy and verifiability properties for a deployed electronic voting protocol.  ...  We present a machine-checked security analysis of Belenios -a deployed voting protocol used already in more than 200 elections.  ...  The authors wish to thank the rest of the EasyCrypt development team, with particular thanks to Benjamin Grégoire and Pierre-Yves Strub, for their continued support of the tool.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf.2018.00029 dblp:conf/csfw/CortierDDW18 fatcat:yca5itbsk5conofo547t7nghxy

A secure approach to election scheme based on Naccache Stern Knapsack Cryptosystem

P.V. Lakshmi, R. Suneetha
2010 International Journal of Computer Applications  
However, there is no scheme to solve the security and privacy problem of the electronic voting machine completely.  ...  Development of a secure electronic voting system based on our proposed software, enhanced the security and privacy for the voters.  ...  Proposed System We propose a new Electronic Voting machine which is secure, easy and ensures correctness.  ... 
doi:10.5120/840-1125 fatcat:bvf4lde5mbgcndslacqev4ttzm

Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System [chapter]

Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Stéphane Glondu
2019 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present the electronic voting protocol Belenios together with its associated voting platform. Belenios guarantees vote privacy and full verifiability, even against a compromised voting server.  ...  While the core of the voting protocol was already described and formally proved secure, we detail here the complete voting system from the setup to the tally and the recovery procedures.  ...  [29, 3] for voting protocols) with a recent attempt of a machine-checked framework [6] using the EasyCrypt tool [6] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14 fatcat:jsxrzsldqjbhfpijjoktszyg3e

Electronic Voting: How Logic Can Help [chapter]

Véronique Cortier
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Electronic voting protocols however significantly increase the difficulty of the analysis task.  ...  In order to achieve this, electronic voting protocols make use of cryptographic primitives, as in the more traditional case of authentication or key exchange protocols.  ...  The underlying voting protocol is developed by Scytl [3, 4] and is designed for both privacy and verifiability: voters are given a receipt that allow them to check that their vote has been counted, under  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08587-6_2 fatcat:nhfqfkkrazbdna5n7g4qi6jhyq

vVote

Chris Culnane, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Vanessa Teague
2015 ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are grateful to the following for contributions and discussions during the formulation of this design: Craig Burton, Matthew Casey, James Heather, Rui Joaquim, Thea Peacock, Olivier  ...  The name "vVote" is a trademark of the Victorian Electoral Commission.  ...  The voter can also check the proof of decryption later on any other machine, including at home, so we are not trusting the polling-place machines for confirmation of ballot construction.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2746338 fatcat:mrh7s2dz3rc3hbpz7rfe4ft4rm

Verifiable Postal Voting [chapter]

Josh Benaloh, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Vanessa Teague
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
A typical voter needs only to perform a simple check that the human-readable printout reflects the intended vote.  ...  We emphasise the ease of the voter's experience, which is not much harder than basic electronic delivery and postal returns.  ...  However, for some ordinary voters in government elections, it could be much easier for a malicious machine to predict that the voter will not check, or to trick them into not checking.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_8 fatcat:n3oev4sibfhohlq3e2bfp6jfcu

Dispute Resolution in Accessible Voting Systems: The Design and Use of Audiotegrity [chapter]

Tyler Kaczmarek, John Wittrock, Richard Carback, Alex Florescu, Jan Rubio, Noel Runyan, Poorvi L. Vora, Filip Zagórski
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
With these in mind, we describe the design and use of Audiotegrity-a cryptographic voting protocol and corresponding voting system with some of the accessibility benefits of fully-electronic voting systems  ...  We are not aware of any other precinct-based end-to-end independently-verifiable election for public office where the protocol enabled participation by voters with visual disabilities.  ...  The channel from voter to voting machine is electronic and there is no record-other than that held by the voting machine-of the voter's command.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_8 fatcat:cyeswgr6qngf3heed7qnyjzimu

Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols [chapter]

Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence.  ...  In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.  ...  We gave a formal definition and showed that it is stronger than standard vote-privacy.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13 fatcat:rsygosflxne6vmukml4us5pamq

Analysis of an Electronic Boardroom Voting System [chapter]

Mathilde Arnaud, Véronique Cortier, Cyrille Wiedling
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study a simple electronic boardroom voting system.  ...  Despite its simplicity (in particular, no use of cryptography), each voter can check that the outcome of the election corresponds to the votes, without having to trust the devices.  ...  Acknowledgment We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their numerous remarks and propositions that helped us to improve the paper.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_7 fatcat:g7cw3oxmvfbzdfmsvpewe3ik2m

True Trustworthy Elections: Remote Electronic Voting Using Trusted Computing [chapter]

Matt Smart, Eike Ritter
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present a new remote, coercion-resistant electronic voting protocol which satisfies a number of properties previously considered contradictory.  ...  We introduce trusted computing as a method of ensuring the trustworthiness of remote voters, and provide an extension to our protocol allowing revocable anonymity, on the grounds of it being a legal requirement  ...  In the field of remote electronic voting (that is, voting from any internetconnected terminal), for example, we might require that a user can only vote from a machine that is running the correct voting  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-23496-5_14 fatcat:ewxew2w5ozcjzizhpg3dnlsi2a

Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus [chapter]

Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes in an election.  ...  We model a known protocol for elections known as FOO 92 in the applied pi calculus, and we formalise three of its expected properties, namely fairness, eligibility, and privacy.  ...  Many thanks to Bruno Blanchet for suggestions about using ProVerif, as well as to Mathieu Baudet and Stéphanie Delaune for interesting discussions and comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31987-0_14 fatcat:hndkcjjwzzbmrc3hxoqmpsjjfy

Electryo, In-person Voting with Transparent Voter Verifiability and Eligibility Verifiability [article]

Peter B. Roenne and Peter Y.A Ryan and Marie-Laure Zollinger
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Selene is an e-voting protocol that allows voters to directly check their individual vote, in cleartext, in the final tally via a tracker system, while providing good coercion mitigation.  ...  The paper record contains an encrypted link to the voter's identity, requiring stronger assumptions on ballot privacy than normal paper voting, but with the benefit of providing good auditability and dispute  ...  Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) for funding, in particular PBR was supported by the FNR INTER-Sequoia project which is joint with the ANR project SEQUOIA  ... 
arXiv:2105.14783v1 fatcat:lltc3nvsyvbqreq66uq4p6uysq

vVote: a Verifiable Voting System [article]

Chris Culnane, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider, Vanessa Teague
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections.  ...  A preliminary version of this paper appeared as the 10th February 2014 version of "Draft Technical Report for VEC vVote System".  ...  Acknowledgements 66 Acknowledgements We are grateful to the following for contributions and discussions during the formulation of this design: Craig Burton, Matthew Casey, James Heather, Rui Joaquim,  ... 
arXiv:1404.6822v4 fatcat:glct5gg5rnhfvfm3o5kppe6gw4

An Overview of End-to-End Verifiable Voting Systems [article]

Syed Taha Ali, Judy Murray
2016 arXiv   pre-print
We trace the evolution of privacy and verifiability properties in the research literature and describe the operations of current state-of-the-art E2E voting systems.  ...  We hope our work serves as a useful resource and assists in the future development of E2E voting.  ...  Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank Peter Hyun-Jeen Lee and Feng Hao for constructive discussions and Siamak F. Shahandashti and Jeremy Clark for helpful comments on the manuscript.  ... 
arXiv:1605.08554v1 fatcat:hou2r6mkbzdphpopzngbzv47za
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