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Machine-Checked Proofs for Electronic Voting: Privacy and Verifiability for Belenios

Veronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Francois Dupressoir, Bogdan Warinschi
2018 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)  
Together, our results yield the first machine-checked analysis of both ballot privacy and verifiability properties for a deployed electronic voting protocol.  ...  We present a machine-checked security analysis of Belenios -a deployed voting protocol used already in more than 200 elections.  ...  We thank the anonymous reviewers and others involved in the peer-reviewing process for helpful suggestions of improvements to the paper and its presentation.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf.2018.00029 dblp:conf/csfw/CortierDDW18 fatcat:yca5itbsk5conofo547t7nghxy

Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols

Veronique Cortier, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Francois Dupressoir, Benedikt Schmidt, Pierre-Yves Strub, Bogdan Warinschi
2017 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)  
We also thank Matt Fredrikson who has shepherded this paper to its current form, and the anonymous reviewers at IEEE Security & Privacy for their helpful comments.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors thank Gilles Barthe for useful input and discussions and to David Bernhard and David Galindo for their early involvement in this work.  ...  Conclusion and future work We have developed a machine-checked framework for proving ballot privacy of electronic voting systems.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2017.28 dblp:conf/sp/CortierDDSSW17 fatcat:rqw3ts5xrvdt3apptmje7cc4ii

Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System [chapter]

Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Stéphane Glondu
2019 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present the electronic voting protocol Belenios together with its associated voting platform. Belenios guarantees vote privacy and full verifiability, even against a compromised voting server.  ...  While the core of the voting protocol was already described and formally proved secure, we detail here the complete voting system from the setup to the tally and the recovery procedures.  ...  Modern electronic voting systems aim at two main properties: vote privacy (no one should know my vote) and verifiability (it is possible to check that the votes are correctly counted).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14 fatcat:jsxrzsldqjbhfpijjoktszyg3e

Electronic Voting: How Logic Can Help [chapter]

Véronique Cortier
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
After an introduction to electronic voting, we describe the current techniques for e-voting protocols analysis and review the key challenges towards a fully automated verification.  ...  Electronic voting should offer at least the same guarantees than traditional paper-based voting systems.  ...  The underlying voting protocol is developed by Scytl [3, 4] and is designed for both privacy and verifiability: voters are given a receipt that allow them to check that their vote has been counted, under  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08587-6_2 fatcat:nhfqfkkrazbdna5n7g4qi6jhyq

Voting

Véronique Cortier, Joseph Lallemand
2018 Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '18  
Electronic voting typically aims at two main security goals: vote privacy and verifiability.  ...  ; and eligibility verifiability (only legitimate voters may vote).  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank Esfandiar Mohammadi and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions that greatly contributed to clarify the notions presented in the  ... 
doi:10.1145/3243734.3243762 dblp:conf/ccs/CortierL18 fatcat:ci3gckt2ijeu3pkfo6r467f2ua

Towards end-to-end verifiable online voting: adding verifiability to established voting systems [article]

Mohammed Alsadi and Matthew Casey and Constantin Catalin Dragan and Francois Dupressoir and Luke Riley and Muntadher Sallal and Steve Schneider and Helen Treharne and Joe Wadsworth and Phil Wright
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Typically these providers do not offer any way in which a voter can verify their vote, so the providers are trusted with ballot privacy and ensuring correctness.  ...  Despite the desire to offer online voting for political elections, this lack of transparency and verifiability is often seen as a significant barrier to the large-scale adoption of online elections.  ...  Acknowledgements We are grateful to Peter Ryan, Peter Roenne and Marie-Laure Zollinger for discussions on the questionnaire and explanations around Selene, and to Douglas Wikström for help with Verificatum  ... 
arXiv:1912.00288v2 fatcat:2p5oqx3z5jgwhdeu5g6b52krkm

Fixing the Achilles Heel of E-Voting: The Bulletin Board

Lucca Hirschi, Lara Schmid, David Basin
2021 2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)  
Our protocol can replace existing BBs, enabling verifiability under much weaker trust assumptions. Note: For reproducibility, our machine-checked proofs are available at [1] .  ...  To support this, many protocols employ an electronic bulletin board (BB) for publishing data that can be read by participants and used to perform verifiability checks.  ...  Since such proofs are subtle, we formalize our protocol and the FA property as an event-based model and provide a machine-checked proof that the protocol satisfies FA.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf51468.2021.00016 fatcat:vvjnqhvwfraexed7owoso7f5vq

Towards Verifiable Remote Voting with Paper Assurance [article]

Eleanor McMurtry and Xavier Boyen and Chris Culnane and Kristian Gjøsteen and Thomas Haines and Vanessa Teague
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We propose a protocol for verifiable remote voting with paper assurance.  ...  It allows each voter to verify that their vote has been correctly cast, recorded and tallied by the Electoral Commission.  ...  We also thank the anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback and corrections.  ... 
arXiv:2111.04210v2 fatcat:mejg4v6n2fhulhdxwteqri6gta

Dispute Resolution in Voting [article]

David Basin, Sasa Radomirovic, Lara Schmid
2020 arXiv   pre-print
To prove our claims, we combine machine-checked proofs with traditional pen-and-paper proofs.  ...  To demonstrate the utility of our model, we analyze a mixnet-based voting protocol and prove that it satisfies dispute resolution as well as verifiability and receipt-freeness.  ...  In Belenios, the Bulletin Board also performs some checks and computations.  ... 
arXiv:2005.03749v2 fatcat:xp5qkm3rk5apzj7afd7pkgvqwe

Private Votes on Untrusted Platforms: Models, Attacks and Provable Scheme

Sergiu Bursuc, Constantin-Catalin Dragan, Steve Kremer
2019 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)  
We moreover formalize and machine-check the proof in the EasyCrypt theorem prover. 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Setup(1 λ , (nc, I)) BB.(pk, sk) ← KGen(1 λ ) BB.  ...  In particular, the platform used for voting may be corrupted, e.g. infected by malware, and we need to ensure privacy and integrity of votes even in that case.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreements  ... 
doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00050 dblp:conf/eurosp/BursucDK19 fatcat:6vavvy4rgbfenakv6coja4b4ym

Chirotonia: A Scalable and Secure e-Voting Framework based on Blockchains and Linkable Ring Signatures [article]

Antonio Russo, Antonio Fernández Anta, Maria Isabel González Vasco, Simon Pietro Romano
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper we propose a comprehensive and scalable framework to build secure-by-design e-voting systems.  ...  Decentralization, transparency, determinism, and untamperability of votes are granted by dedicated smart contracts on a blockchain, while voter authenticity and anonymity are achieved through (provable  ...  We are grateful to Javier Herranz for fruitful discussions and pointers to relevant literature on ring signature schemes.  ... 
arXiv:2111.02257v1 fatcat:ussmb3rkrbba5byhqg2yr5hzuq

Transparent, Auditable, and Stepwise Verifiable Online E-Voting Enabling an Open and Fair Election

Xukai Zou, Huian Li, Feng Li, Wei Peng, Yan Sui
2017 Cryptography  
conflicts such as anonymity vs. accountability and privacy vs. verifiability.  ...  The new e-voting protocol consists of three original technical contributions-universal verifiable voting vector, forward and backward mutual lock voting, and in-process check and enforcement-that, along  ...  Any voter can check his vote and also visually verify that his vote is indeed counted into the final tally. Furthermore, anyone can verify the vote total for each candidate.  ... 
doi:10.3390/cryptography1020013 fatcat:cpql3kww5jbx3abyi6hudf4rdy

Privacy-Oriented Cryptographic Primitives and Protocols for Electronic Voting [article]

Panagiotis M. Grontas, National Technological University Of Athens
2021
Our overall architecture also provides strong privacy guarantees, since, contrary to the conventional e-voting paradigm, we do not assume that the talliers are trusted for privacy.  ...  We define a security model to capture the guarantees of our primitive and provide an instantiation. We utilize PACBS in a remote electronic voting protocol.  ...  The voting booth remains physical and votes are cast using touch screens or other input devices on DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) machines.  ... 
doi:10.26240/heal.ntua.20947 fatcat:olbut6duufg7hf6zaqa7rhp324

Electt: running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments [article]

Kirill A. Korinsky
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We present a system for running auditable and verifiable elections in untrusted environments. Votes are anonymous since the order of candidates on a ballot sheet is random.  ...  Voters can check their vote. An election is auditable using blockchain log.  ...  For example, Belenios [21] is built upon Helios [22] and is closely related to Benaloh's simple verifiable voting protocol [23] , which itself was partially inspired by the Sako-Kilian mix net [24  ... 
arXiv:2011.10902v2 fatcat:es7aslhgl5epbadvkck7tmxrfe

Transparent and Mutual Restraining Electronic Voting

Huian Li
2019
The new e-voting protocol consists of three original technical contributions -- universal verifiable voting vector, forward and backward mutual lock voting, and in-process check and enforcement -- that  ...  , along with a public real time bulletin board, resolves the apparent conflicts in voting such as anonymity vs. accountability and privacy vs. verifiability.  ...  For simplicity, our proof shown here is just for one incorrect vote.  ... 
doi:10.25394/pgs.7396943.v1 fatcat:wz67w3fn4ffw7ltsk56mvv3pbq
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