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Machine-Checked Proofs for Cryptographic Standards

José Bacelar Almeida, Pierre-Yves Strub, Cécile Baritel-Ruet, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Tiago Oliveira, Alley Stoughton
2019 Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '19  
We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function.  ...  The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.  ...  For the highest level of assurance, security proofs should be machine-checked and establish guarantees for the (machine-readable) algorithmic specifications.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3319535.3363211 dblp:conf/ccs/AlmeidaBBBDGL0S19 fatcat:ywk5fizlmrcoti6g3uhph7s7h4

Indifferentiable Authenticated Encryption [chapter]

Manuel Barbosa, Pooya Farshim
2018 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
On the positive side, we give a provably indifferentiable Feistel-based construction, which reduces the round complexity from at least 6, needed for blockciphers, to only 3 for encryption.  ...  A central property of indifferentiable schemes is that they offer security with respect to a wide class of games.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Phillip Rogaway, Martijn Stam, and Stefano Tessaro for their comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96884-1_7 fatcat:r7x75bhhkbfzvdbwexayieynq4

Cryptographic Primitives that Resist Backdooring and Subversion

Sogol Mazaheri
Cryptosystems are vulnerable to sabotage in their mathematical specifications, standardization of their parameters, and their implementations.  ...  In particular, we tackle the problem of disabling backdoors embedded in the mathematical design of cryptographic primitives as well as re-establishing security in their subverted implementations.  ...  The sponge construction is used in building the SHA-3 hash function which is part of the cryptographic hash function family known as Keccak [BDPVA09] .  ... 
doi:10.25534/tuprints-00014550 fatcat:ybdjvz3u4fenlcpqrs7rugulcu

Future-Proofing Key Exchange Protocols

Jacqueline Brendel
Proofs that validate these security claims do so by reducing the security of the overall scheme to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions.  ...  The common methodological approach underlying all of these formalizations is the provable security paradigm, which has become a standard tool in assessing the security of cryptographic protocols and primitives  ...  For proving that F 3 is ssPRF-ODH secure if G is msPRF-ODH secure, we apply the same proof strategy applied in the proof of Proposition 7.6 for showing snPRF-ODH security of F 2 based on the mnPRF-ODH  ... 
doi:10.25534/tuprints-00009642 fatcat:2edjtbzotbanjblfy4kv5e7rui