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Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines
[article]
2011
arXiv
pre-print
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A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2-1/m, where m is the number of machines. ...
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. ...
Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms. ...
arXiv:1107.2957v1
fatcat:43jbkwifdre4thiugrsgkr45iq
Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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envy-free. ...
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. ...
Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_16
fatcat:4wms3bcmafdxbf6tr75t3fafuu
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
[chapter]
2009
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. ...
For the special case of related machines model we show that tight algorithmic bounds can be achieved. ...
I would like to thank anonymous referees, Liad Blumrosen, Federico Echenique, David Kempe, John Ledyard, Debasis Mishra, Mohamed Mostagir, Mahyar Salek and Michael Schapira for helpful discussions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11
fatcat:jqemyi6csjgzvfzsfvftyzc6bm
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
[article]
2009
arXiv
pre-print
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We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. ...
For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O( m), where m is the number of machines. ...
We establish a lower bound of 2 ℓ = log n/(4 log log n) on the makespan of any envy-free allocation for this instance. ...
arXiv:0909.1072v1
fatcat:mmgzfqksxbgtjn4azrsiu5n4ti
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
2012
SIAM journal on computing (Print)
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This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [On multi-dimensional envy-free mechanisms, in ] who introduced the model and gave an upper bound of (m + 1)/2 and a lower bound of 2 − 1/m. ...
For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines. ...
We establish a lower bound of 2 = log n/(4 log log n) on the makespan of any envy-free allocation for this instance. ...
doi:10.1137/100801597
fatcat:2clctcgdgbffhj5jyaenhodoka
Envy-free makespan approximation
2010
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10
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For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines. ...
This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [24] who introduced the model and gave an upper bound of (m+1)/2, and a lower bound of 2−1/m. ...
Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky are partially supported by ISF grant no. 975-06. ...
doi:10.1145/1807342.1807368
dblp:conf/sigecom/CohenFFKO10
fatcat:3sichpvspjcapbrpbtafxv3bce
Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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This lower bound nearly matches the known 7/4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). ...
We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, Amir Ronen and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. ...
arXiv:1507.08708v3
fatcat:mqrj3zgwnze2tlsuv7mmd5lggi
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
2013
Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing - STOC '13
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In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3] . ...
We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. ...
Mu'alem [23] introduced the envy-free scheduling problem for makespan. Cohen et al. ...
doi:10.1145/2488608.2488616
dblp:conf/stoc/ChawlaHMS13
fatcat:idteixyh2vcojjsojhrvyfuif4
Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling
[article]
2013
arXiv
pre-print
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In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [Ashlagi, Dobzinski and Lavi'09]. ...
We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. ...
Related work There is a large body of work on prior-free mechanism design for the makespan objective. ...
arXiv:1305.0597v1
fatcat:yqqlylfujvbd7jw3hkczu3row4
Electronic Markets and Auctions (Dagstuhl Seminar 13461)
2014
Dagstuhl Reports
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The main goal of this seminar was to study topics related to electronic markets and auctions both from the computational perspective and from a game-theoretic and economic one. ...
on algorithmic aspects of mechanism design. ...
A 10.5-approximate truthful mechanism for minimizing makespan on unrelated machines. ...
doi:10.4230/dagrep.3.11.58
dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/MansourMNV13
fatcat:yvkfyeeezrhhnhckygpqseqwx4
Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
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We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors ...
Moreover, to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs and max-min ...
We overview known upper and lower bounds in Section 1.2. The second question pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design is of computational nature. ...
arXiv:1405.5940v1
fatcat:ujk7ymmuebff3ol376ptrgszqm
Bayesian TruthfulMechanismsfor Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion ApproximationAlgorithms
[chapter]
2014
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors ...
Moreover, to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs and max-min ...
We overview known upper and lower bounds in Section 1.2. The second question pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design is of computational nature. ...
doi:10.1137/1.9781611973730.130
dblp:conf/soda/DaskalakisW15
fatcat:h27djcfn7fcabpaqfw4hia24ee
Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free. ...
, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers. ...
-In [8] , Fleischer and Wang consider lower bounds for envy-free and truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization on related machines. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9
fatcat:dluf4ijsu5eqlah7vd52lw3j2e
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
2013
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13
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We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan [2011] to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue. ...
For welfare maximization, we show that this clinching auction is a good approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare for position auction environments. ...
Then,
Fig. 2 . 2 Proofs by picture of the upper and lower bounds on the budget B. ...
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482554
dblp:conf/sigecom/DevanurHH13
fatcat:rzdaozb6wracjcknudrkijkuj4
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan (2011) to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue. ...
The profit maximization question is of interest even without budgets and our mechanism is a 7.5-approximation which improving on the 30.4 bound of Ha and Hartline (2012). ...
Figure 2 : 2 Proofs by picture of the upper and lower bounds on the budget B.
(2012). Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders. ...
arXiv:1212.5766v1
fatcat:mhqfrw5c3fg7hctl42i6zaatci
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