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Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines [article]

Lisa Fleischer, Zhenghui Wang
2011 arXiv   pre-print
A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2-1/m, where m is the number of machines.  ...  We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents.  ...  Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms.  ... 
arXiv:1107.2957v1 fatcat:43jbkwifdre4thiugrsgkr45iq

Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines [chapter]

Lisa Fleischer, Zhenghui Wang
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
envy-free.  ...  We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents.  ...  Lower Bound on Anonymous Mechanisms In this section, we will prove an approximation lower bound for truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_16 fatcat:4wms3bcmafdxbf6tr75t3fafuu

On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms [chapter]

Ahuva Mu'alem
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices.  ...  For the special case of related machines model we show that tight algorithmic bounds can be achieved.  ...  I would like to thank anonymous referees, Liad Blumrosen, Federico Echenique, David Kempe, John Ledyard, Debasis Mishra, Mohamed Mostagir, Mahyar Salek and Michael Schapira for helpful discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11 fatcat:jqemyi6csjgzvfzsfvftyzc6bm

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation [article]

Edith Cohen and Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat and Haim Kaplan and Svetlana Olonetsky
2009 arXiv   pre-print
We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan.  ...  For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O( m), where m is the number of machines.  ...  We establish a lower bound of 2 ℓ = log n/(4 log log n) on the makespan of any envy-free allocation for this instance.  ... 
arXiv:0909.1072v1 fatcat:mmgzfqksxbgtjn4azrsiu5n4ti

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2012 SIAM journal on computing (Print)  
This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [On multi-dimensional envy-free mechanisms, in ] who introduced the model and gave an upper bound of (m + 1)/2 and a lower bound of 2 − 1/m.  ...  For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines.  ...  We establish a lower bound of 2 = log n/(4 log log n) on the makespan of any envy-free allocation for this instance.  ... 
doi:10.1137/100801597 fatcat:2clctcgdgbffhj5jyaenhodoka

Envy-free makespan approximation

Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2010 Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10  
For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines.  ...  This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [24] who introduced the model and gave an upper bound of (m+1)/2, and a lower bound of 2−1/m.  ...  Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky are partially supported by ISF grant no. 975-06.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807342.1807368 dblp:conf/sigecom/CohenFFKO10 fatcat:3sichpvspjcapbrpbtafxv3bce

Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness [article]

Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
2017 arXiv   pre-print
This lower bound nearly matches the known 7/4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists).  ...  We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems.  ...  Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, Amir Ronen and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions.  ... 
arXiv:1507.08708v3 fatcat:mqrj3zgwnze2tlsuv7mmd5lggi

Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan
2013 Proceedings of the 45th annual ACM symposium on Symposium on theory of computing - STOC '13  
In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3] .  ...  We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan.  ...  Mu'alem [23] introduced the envy-free scheduling problem for makespan. Cohen et al.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2488608.2488616 dblp:conf/stoc/ChawlaHMS13 fatcat:idteixyh2vcojjsojhrvyfuif4

Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling [article]

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan
2013 arXiv   pre-print
In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [Ashlagi, Dobzinski and Lavi'09].  ...  We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan.  ...  Related work There is a large body of work on prior-free mechanism design for the makespan objective.  ... 
arXiv:1305.0597v1 fatcat:yqqlylfujvbd7jw3hkczu3row4

Electronic Markets and Auctions (Dagstuhl Seminar 13461)

Yishay Mansour, Benny Moldovanu, Noam Nisan, Berthold Vöcking, Marc Herbstritt
2014 Dagstuhl Reports  
The main goal of this seminar was to study topics related to electronic markets and auctions both from the computational perspective and from a game-theoretic and economic one.  ...  on algorithmic aspects of mechanism design.  ...  A 10.5-approximate truthful mechanism for minimizing makespan on unrelated machines.  ... 
doi:10.4230/dagrep.3.11.58 dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/MansourMNV13 fatcat:yvkfyeeezrhhnhckygpqseqwx4

Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms [article]

Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014 arXiv   pre-print
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors  ...  Moreover, to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs and max-min  ...  We overview known upper and lower bounds in Section 1.2. The second question pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design is of computational nature.  ... 
arXiv:1405.5940v1 fatcat:ujk7ymmuebff3ol376ptrgszqm

Bayesian TruthfulMechanismsfor Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion ApproximationAlgorithms [chapter]

Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014 Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms  
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors  ...  Moreover, to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs and max-min  ...  We overview known upper and lower bounds in Section 1.2. The second question pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design is of computational nature.  ... 
doi:10.1137/1.9781611973730.130 dblp:conf/soda/DaskalakisW15 fatcat:h27djcfn7fcabpaqfw4hia24ee

Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing [chapter]

Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free.  ...  , truthfulness, envy freeness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers.  ...  -In [8] , Fleischer and Wang consider lower bounds for envy-free and truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization on related machines.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9 fatcat:dluf4ijsu5eqlah7vd52lw3j2e

Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents

Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline
2013 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '13  
We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan [2011] to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue.  ...  For welfare maximization, we show that this clinching auction is a good approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare for position auction environments.  ...  Then, Fig. 2 . 2 Proofs by picture of the upper and lower bounds on the budget B.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2492002.2482554 dblp:conf/sigecom/DevanurHH13 fatcat:rzdaozb6wracjcknudrkijkuj4

Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents [article]

Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline
2012 arXiv   pre-print
We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan (2011) to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue.  ...  The profit maximization question is of interest even without budgets and our mechanism is a 7.5-approximation which improving on the 30.4 bound of Ha and Hartline (2012).  ...  Figure 2 : 2 Proofs by picture of the upper and lower bounds on the budget B. (2012). Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders.  ... 
arXiv:1212.5766v1 fatcat:mhqfrw5c3fg7hctl42i6zaatci
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