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Learning to Bid Optimally and Efficiently in Adversarial First-price Auctions [article]

Yanjun Han, Zhengyuan Zhou, Aaron Flores, Erik Ordentlich, Tsachy Weissman
2020 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper, we take an online learning angle and address the fundamental problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions, where both the bidder's private valuations and other bidders' bids  ...  This shift has brought forth important challenges for a bidder: how should one bid in a first-price auction, where unlike in second-price auctions, it is no longer optimal to bid one's private value truthfully  ...  First, we study the problem of learning to adaptively bid in adversarial repeated first-price auctions, and show that an O( √ T ) regret is achievable when competing with the set of all Lipschitz bidding  ... 
arXiv:2007.04568v1 fatcat:5labkofmyfhyfa55ksgces33yy

Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design

Miroslav Dudik, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
2017 2017 IEEE 58th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)  
We consider the design of computationally efficient online learning algorithms in an adversarial setting in which the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle.  ...  We give oracle-efficient learning results for: (1) VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves in singleparameter settings, (2) envy-free item-pricing auctions in multiitem settings, and (3) the level auctions  ...  functions, and its generalizations to submodular objective functions [12] , adversarial contextual learning [15] , and learning in simultaneous second-price auctions [3] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2017.55 dblp:conf/focs/DudikHLSSV17 fatcat:or7smiwcsrbbxlhy3frfsleppm

Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design [article]

Miroslav Dudík, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We consider the design of computationally efficient online learning algorithms in an adversarial setting in which the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle.  ...  We give oracle-efficient learning results for: (1) VCG auctions with bidder-specific reserves in single-parameter settings, (2) envy-free item pricing in multi-item auctions, and (3) s-level auctions of  ...  functions, and its generalizations to submodular objective functions Hazan and Kale (2012) , adversarial contextual learning Syrgkanis et al. (2016a) , and learning in simultaneous second-price auctions  ... 
arXiv:1611.01688v3 fatcat:ww4exxvxg5cejnqsyxtxmkwdr4

Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy [article]

Constantinos Daskalakis, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2016 arXiv   pre-print
To answer this question, we propose a novel concept of learning in auctions, termed "no-envy learning."  ...  This notion is founded upon Walrasian equilibrium, and we show that it is both efficiently implementable and results in approximately optimal welfare, even when the bidders have fractionally subadditive  ...  Application: Simultaneous First Price Auctions. In a simultaneous first price auction at each item the bidder pays his own bid conditional on winning, rather than the second highest bid.  ... 
arXiv:1511.01411v6 fatcat:i3sb2c5xl5fo5nsmjb7zc7hrxa

Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence [article]

Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
2022 arXiv   pre-print
This result is robust to the correlation structure between agent valuations and holds for any core auction, a broad class of auctions that includes first-price, second-price, and generalized second-price  ...  Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms, adaptively learning to shade bids in order to match a specified spend target.  ...  Acknowledgments This work was initiated while the first two named authors were interns at Microsoft Research. JG is supported in part by NSF Award CCF-1408673 and AFOSR Award FA9550-19-1-0183.  ... 
arXiv:2205.08674v1 fatcat:vvyynebzrnewlotfjefzxitkja

Adaptive limited-supply online auctions

Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
2004 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '04  
We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically.  ...  Finally, we present some strategyproof competitive algorithms for the case in which adversary uses a distribution known to the mechanism.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank Jason D. Hartline, Anna Karlin, and Ron Lavi for fruitful discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/988772.988784 dblp:conf/sigecom/HajiaghayiKP04 fatcat:x6hmwwzm2zce7epguwfmvfcp3m

Game Theory Meets Computational Learning Theory (Dagstuhl Seminar 17251)

Paul W. Goldberg, Yishay Mansour, Paul Dütting, Marc Herbstritt
2017 Dagstuhl Reports  
While there have been many Dagstuhl seminars on various aspects of Algorithmic Game Theory, this was the first one to focus on the emerging field of its intersection with computational learning theory.  ...  This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 17251 "Game Theory Meets Computational Learning Theory".  ...  Best-Response Dynamics in Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding Thomas In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once.  ... 
doi:10.4230/dagrep.7.6.68 dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/GoldbergMD17 fatcat:ca4mfrf3qbdbhhbo7rvc53myti

Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction without Third-party Servers [chapter]

Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The GVA can handle combinatorial auctions and has good theoretical characteristics such as incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency.  ...  In this protocol, the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.  ...  Sakurai and Miyazaki proposed a sealed-bid auction in which a bid is represented by the bidder's undeniable signature of his bidding price [28] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_17 fatcat:ffsax7zjxbevzbthdigd2l7qli

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions [article]

Yanjun Han, Zhengyuan Zhou, Tsachy Weissman
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize  ...  In this paper, by exploiting the structural properties of first-price auctions, we develop the first learning algorithm that achieves O(√(T)log^2.5 T) regret bound, which is minimax optimal up to log factors  ...  The authors would also like to thank Erik Ordentlich, Caio Waisman, and Harikesh S. Nair for many helpful discussions on the problem setup.  ... 
arXiv:2003.09795v5 fatcat:aui6nuctendd3iczla4yp3r3pi

Secure multi-agent dynamic programming based on homomorphic encryption and its application to combinatorial auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
We discuss the application of this protocol to various types of combinatorial auctions, i.e., multiunit auctions, linear-good auctions, and general combinatorial auctions.  ...  ., an auctioneer cannot be fully trusted in a combinatorial auction.  ...  For example, in a standard first-price sealed-bid auction [12] , where the highest bidder wins and pays his/her own price, the auctioneer might collude with a particular participant and reveal information  ... 
doi:10.1145/544767.544770 fatcat:7qpjhmkrdzbe7fq5sghdetf4um

Secure multi-agent dynamic programming based on homomorphic encryption and its application to combinatorial auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
We discuss the application of this protocol to various types of combinatorial auctions, i.e., multiunit auctions, linear-good auctions, and general combinatorial auctions.  ...  ., an auctioneer cannot be fully trusted in a combinatorial auction.  ...  For example, in a standard first-price sealed-bid auction [12] , where the highest bidder wins and pays his/her own price, the auctioneer might collude with a particular participant and reveal information  ... 
doi:10.1145/544741.544770 dblp:conf/atal/YokooS02 fatcat:aeprokfyazcanihnev52okloqy

On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions [chapter]

Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals; in this sense, our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design  ...  This model bears a lot of similarities to the secretary model: the adversary picks the values of the elements, which are then presented in (uniformly) random order, and we are called to design an algorithm  ...  Acknowledgements We would like to thank Alkmini Sgouritsa for pointing out an error in a previous version of this paper, and an anonymous reviewer who suggested the constant upper bound on the competitive  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_27 fatcat:qdieotluwrbgnffya4qfmixcte

On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions

Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos
2013 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals; in this sense, our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design  ...  This model bears a lot of similarities to the secretary model: the adversary picks the values of the elements, which are then presented in (uniformly) random order, and we are called to design an algorithm  ...  Acknowledgements We would like to thank Alkmini Sgouritsa for pointing out an error in a previous version of this paper, and an anonymous reviewer who suggested the constant upper bound on the competitive  ... 
doi:10.1145/2465769.2465775 fatcat:hlox5dn6zjedxfvbakqmkkahjq

Differential Privacy in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Comprehensive Survey [article]

Muneeb Ul Hassan, Mubashir Husain Rehmani, Maaz Rehan, Jinjun Chen
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Various capabilities of CR nodes depend upon efficient and continuous reporting of data with each other and centralized base stations, which in turn can cause leakage in privacy.  ...  In order to preserve this privacy leakage, various privacy preserving strategies have been developed by researchers, and according to us differential privacy is the most significant among them.  ...  To overcome this, researchers integrated sealed bid auctions in CRN, but modern machine learning based attacks have caused privacy leakage even in sealed bid auctions.  ... 
arXiv:2111.02011v2 fatcat:a5hique4fvfxrclslvpgda5jyy

Online Learning of Optimal Bidding Strategy in Repeated Multi-Commodity Auctions [article]

Sevi Baltaoglu, Lang Tong, Qing Zhao
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We study the online learning problem of a bidder who participates in repeated auctions.  ...  Empirical results show that DPDS consistently outperforms benchmark heuristic methods that are derived from machine learning and online learning approaches.  ...  This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Award 1549989 and by the Army Research Laboratory Network Science CTA under Cooperative Agreement W911NF-09-2-0053.  ... 
arXiv:1703.02567v5 fatcat:jb7wwbg2ezhcjkvzj4dujch3j4
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