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Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting [article]

Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015 arXiv   pre-print
A significant conclusion of our work is that the Possible Winner problem is harder than the Coalitional Manipulation problem since the Coalitional Manipulation problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas  ...  We show however that the Coalitional Manipulation problem which is an important special case of the Possible Winner problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class  ...  A significant conclusion of our work is that, although the Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation problems are both NPC, the Possible Winner problem is harder than the Coalitional Manipulation problem  ... 
arXiv:1405.3865v2 fatcat:ilpnqx6zqjejlcjhkqgua5ihbm

Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting [chapter]

Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We review NP-hard voting problems together with their status in terms of parameterized complexity results.  ...  In addition, we survey standard techniques for achieving fixed-parameter (in)tractability results in voting.  ...  Acknowledgements We are grateful to Britta Dorn, Piotr Faliszewski, Jiong Guo, Matthias Mnich, Jörg Rothe, Ildikó Schlotter, and an anonymous referee for their numerous insightful remarks and their constructive  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30891-8_16 fatcat:ckpwxgvz4bhgrh4hane6ix47ki

Resolving the Complexity of Some Fundamental Problems in Computational Social Choice [article]

Palash Dey
2017 arXiv   pre-print
This thesis is in the area called computational social choice which is an intersection area of algorithms and social choice theory.  ...  Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting.  ...  Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci., 616:111-125, 2016.  ... 
arXiv:1703.08041v1 fatcat:x7ojutm7hzbhxb33zghcrnaqge

Fair Division: The Computer Scientist's Perspective

Toby Walsh
2020 Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
I survey recent progress on a classic and challenging problem in social choice: the fair division of indivisible items.  ...  This has involved bringing to bear tools such as those used in knowledge representation, computational complexity, approximation methods, game theory, online analysis and communication complexity.  ...  Acknowledgements This work was funded in part by the French government under management of Agence Nationale de la Recherche as part of the "Investissements d'avenir" program ANR-19-P3IA-0001 (PRAIRIE 3IA  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2020/680 dblp:conf/ijcai/Lang20 fatcat:ax6vwxbljreffh5tfjromvi52m

Representing and Reasoning with Preferences

Toby Walsh
2007 The AI Magazine  
In fact, under are a wide range of voting rules, where possible some simple assumptions on the voting rule, and necessary winners are polynomial to com- the winner can be determined with a number  ...  In fact, destructive manipulation can itation can stop when the set of possible sometimes be computationally easier. For winners equals the necessary winner.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aimag.v28i4.2068 dblp:journals/aim/Walsh07 fatcat:i2zhiqv26fhzxj627kt4vn57di

Cooperative games and multiagent systems

Stéphane Airiau
2013 Knowledge engineering review (Print)  
In addition, researchers must design protocols that are secure to prevent the possibility of manipulation or infiltration by agents or external forces.  ...  We will also study one special type of TU game that models voting situation, and some extensions of TU games.  ...  An earlier version of this article has been used as lecture notes for the 12th European Agent Systems Summer School held in Saint-Etienne, France.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0269888913000106 fatcat:df6iqtesb5ehdauxctolr64zbq

The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don't the rabble expropriate the rich?

Alex Coram
2008 Public Choice  
This is done by studying what would happen if every possible coalition could form in a wealth distribution game.  ...  This paper argues that this is not necessarily the best way to interpret the problem and attempts to provide an alternative unified political-economic model that is more consistent with standard assumptions  ...  I benefited greatly from discussions in seminars in the Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, the Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Regensburg and the Department of  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9298-6 fatcat:b3a3utzqsfa3dbjnhricd7msme

The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil

Fernanda Brollo, Katja Kaufmann, Eliana La Ferrara
2019 Journal of the European Economic Association  
We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the President is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections.  ...  Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes?  ...  Vote share coalition Vote share of the candidate affiliated with the party of the presidential coalition.  ... 
doi:10.1093/jeea/jvz024 fatcat:a5p5a24wqvcxtcrbcpucogjqqq

The political economy of local government in Croatia: winning coalitions, corruption, and taxes

Vuk Vukovic
2017 Public Sector Economics  
vuk vuković: the political economy of local government in croatia: winning coalitions, corruption, and taxes public sector economics 41 (4) 387-420 (2017) 388 abstract This paper represents the first comprehensive  ...  It follows the logic of the selectorate theory, according to which staying in power for long periods of time depends on creating a small group of loyal but powerful supporters (the winning coalition).  ...  of power between politics and politically-generated winners.  ... 
doi:10.3326/pse.41.4.1 fatcat:66kbbzkmirbiljps3xzxog3u4u

Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy [article]

Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks whether a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding  ...  Considering several fundamental voting rules, our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control, with the number of voters as the parameter, is much more varied than in the setting  ...  Acknowledgments Piotr Faliszewski was supported by DFG project PAWS (NI 369/10) and by AGH University grant (statutory research).  ... 
arXiv:1411.7812v2 fatcat:dmddfzrvj5eqvhvhivp5hddj7m

Candidate selection methods and electoral performance in comparative perspective

Giulia Vicentini
2018 Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica  
Using an original data source and innovative indicators, I assessed the inclusiveness of each NP and the party/candidate's performance in the following general election in order to look for a possible  ...  AbstractThe purpose of the article is try to assess whether inclusive procedures of selection are more likely to appoint a candidate who can be competitive in the general elections compared with less inclusive  ...  The author would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. Financial Support.  ... 
doi:10.1017/ipo.2018.9 fatcat:met2icup3rc67fia6kvwjbjhbe

A Tutorial on Optimization for Multi-Agent Systems

J. Cerquides, A. Farinelli, P. Meseguer, S. D. Ramchurn
2013 Computer journal  
Proceedings of [28] Greco, G., Malizia, E., Palopoli, L., and Scarcello, the 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous F. (2011) On the complexity of core, kernel, and Agents  ...  number of agents and where all agents (agents equal items in the to maximise the sum of the values of the chosen winner determination problem) have to be chosen (not all items coalitions  ... 
doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxt146 fatcat:tvebsldktvb2poo7zbly7doone

The market value of political partisanship: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipal elections

Roberto Basile, Valerio Filoso
2016 Papers in Regional Science  
Using a new dataset on Italian municipal elections and real estate prices, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to detect the causal effect of a change in municipal majorities.  ...  We find no difference between the effects of the policies enacted by left and right-wing parties.  ...  coalitions), along with a corresponding estimated kernel density function.  ... 
doi:10.1111/pirs.12238 fatcat:z7cc33rzojdkvpwnjhzds2m37q

Ghanaian Elections and Conflict Management: Interrogating the Absolute Majority Electoral System

Jasper Ayelazuno (Abembia)
2011 Journal of African Elections  
In Ghana a president is elected by an absolute majority (50% plus one vote) of the total valid votes cast in the whole country.  ...  that, in addition to the 50 per cent-plus-one vote a candidate must win in five regions with a simple majority of valid votes cast.  ...  that their vote will count towards deciding the winner.  ... 
doi:10.20940/jae/2011/v10i2a3 fatcat:ihub7xiqcrev5d7zto4pyygw3y

Cost of ruling as a game of tones. The accumulation of bad news and incumbents' vote loss

2019 European Journal of Political Research  
over a 20-year period in Denmark.  ...  Based on the fact that voters get their information about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of negative news influences incumbent support  ...  Earlier versions have also been presented at the 2016 annual conference of the Comparative Policy Agendas project in Geneva and the APSA 2018 conference in Boston, MA.  ... 
doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12367 fatcat:zm6di5thhze3bc6b2yxtsidx44
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