A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Filters
Reason, Reasons and Reasoning
1994
Theory & psychology
An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms. ...
A subjectivist conception of rationality sees its essence in the subjective appeal to reasons. It is argued that neither approach alone is adequate. ...
It is necessary to examine my reasoning and determine whether it conforms to objectively defensible norms of good reasoning. ...
doi:10.1177/0959354394042005
fatcat:3x2xvplwfjecxnxo73e67niope
IS REASONABLE DOUBT REASONABLE?
2003
Legal Theory
It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. ...
They are the ones who have to decide whether a crime was committed and whether the defendant committed it. ...
doi:10.1017/s1352325203000132
fatcat:eiiprnvmkfcnrke3p5agpa33wa
Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?
2008
Social Science Research Network
It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. ...
They are the ones who have to decide whether a crime was committed and whether the defendant committed it. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1152883
fatcat:hsuvazn6sra2zonnazmynauhue
Reasonable reasons for waiting
2003
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Recent decision-making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage's normative sure-thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their ...
Through a series of experiments we establish, first, that many people choose to wait, even when waiting provides no additional information at all. Second, the ...
us access to the students in his class. ...
doi:10.1002/bdm.439
fatcat:3sxhfrwdrvcrtek5vw5w4bae7y
Reasons, Reason, and Context
[chapter]
2016
Weighing Reasons
Language [is] one of the principal instruments or helps of thought; and any imperfection in the instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still more than in almost any other art ...
Mill, Logic A slightly shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in Weighing Reasons (Oxford University 1 Press), eds. Errol Lord and Barry Maguire. ...
Assuming the proponent of this response purports to be using reason(s) in its ordinary normative sense, she's going to be committed to thinking that nearly all of our reasons-claims, including (D1) and ...
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0004
fatcat:wgbedlyjxjbkpixpwdii72hkfe
Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances
2012
Social Science Research Network
It is intuitively possible-and indeed likely-that the reason why the state chose to criminalize some conduct is not the same reason that we think a person is blameworthy for engaging in it. 151 In any ...
It is possible that certain factors may causally affect the degree to which a confession is coerced. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2015925
fatcat:p2opzchq2baupb2hm7mdasiizi
Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?
2013
Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
There is a commonly held view that says that all epistemic reasons are pieces of evidence. 1 This view is mistaken and so Talbot (forthcoming) is right to reject it. 2 Unfortunately, he rejects the view ...
He thinks that there are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief. ...
If it provides us with an absolute reason, it is not weighed against any other epistemic reason. ...
doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20134319
fatcat:fm2kungwkfgsbkml27hsqt477a
Reason, Reasons and Normativity
2008
Social Science Research Network
All normative phenomena are normative in as much as, and because, they provide reasons or are partly constituted by reasons. This makes the concept of a reason key to an understanding of normativity. ...
Believing that, I will here present some thoughts about the connection between reasons and Reason and between Reason and normativity. ...
Such reasons do not explain the hold reasons have on us, as these supporting reasons need as much explanation as the supported reasons. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1008795
fatcat:ujs44zvzzze43atr5eshqm57ny
Faith and Reason
2017
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
This proposal is shown to be rooted in Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, remarks which it is claimed were in turn influenced by John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality ...
According to this proposal, we are neither to think of religious belief as completely immune to rational evaluation nor are we to deny that it involves fundamental commitments which are arational. ...
But is it possible for there to be such divergence in one's basic hinge commitments? For one thing, notice that the über hinge commitment will be a constant in this regard. ...
doi:10.1017/s135824611700025x
fatcat:noy3gykmczax5o43fpo7wqvcvy
Reasoning under uncertainty
2019
Evidence-Based Mental Health
IntroductionIt is difficult to reason correctly when the information available is uncertain. ...
It updates prior beliefs about diagnoses or prognoses in a coherent manner and enables proper consideration of successive pieces of information.DiscussionProbabilistic reasoning is not innate and relies ...
It is possible to use measures of belief such as personal opinion, based on experience, for example, as probabilities in the reasoning. ...
doi:10.1136/ebmental-2018-300074
pmid:30679196
fatcat:s6lmvu3guzhbvidxcibopttgwu
Being Reasonable
2015
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force. ...
the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. ...
Nonetheless it does seem right to say that the standpoint, although not believed by us, is among our commitments, and that it is wrong to do or say anything that publicly commits us to anything incompatible ...
doi:10.1515/slgr-2015-0028
fatcat:o47ebkkggvdrppehitz3f5gsfq
Pritchard's Reasons
2016
Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR)
The reasons that constitute the rational basis for your belief that the page before you is white and covered in black marks entails that it is and includes things that could not have provided rational ...
First, what motivation is there for thinking that this sort of view is preferable to a more traditional internalist view that insists that the rational support for our beliefs is always limited to things ...
Non-skeptical internalism is a muddled mess. Now, this argument is certainly available to Pritchard and he should feel free to use it. It doesn't support epistemological disjunctivism, however. ...
doi:10.5840/jpr201672277
fatcat:ml746vaqqfhczgizqo2ayfvb5m
Reasonable Reasons in Contractualist Moral Argument
2003
Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy
As Scanlon presents it in What We Owe to Each Other, and as I have discussed elsewhere, contractualism is committed to what I call the "individual reasons restriction," and what, roughly, Scanlon has in ...
account is committed to is 19. ...
doi:10.1086/378034
fatcat:vwbnnlroubhghpwwefjsiyqjhy
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC REASON AND RELIGIOUS PUBLIC REASONS
2021
Kriterion
Acknowledgements For comments and suggestions on this work, I am grateful to the members of DesJus at CEBRAP in São Paulo, especially to Nunzio Alì, Júlio Barroso, Tarine Guima, Guilherme de Moraes, Mônica ...
Oliveira, Lucas Petroni, and Laís da Silva. ...
it is possible to assume that citizens will be able to understand and engage with reason a). ...
doi:10.1590/0100-512x2021n14811sr
fatcat:ngilizrstvho3blp5hkbptp3oq
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
2015
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
If it is not always worth wanting to have attitudes for which there is some reason, then we should not expect our ideal selves to want to have such attitudes. 30 ...
Again, it is useful here to contrast the reasoning view with a rival. ...
It is not enough, for instance, to say that reasons are considerations which make some causally possible response good, since perceptual experiences and the rest of it can also be causally possible. ...
doi:10.1111/papq.12135
fatcat:z2wwog4mujgonftfbwotz64vfu
« Previous
Showing results 1 — 15 out of 1,157,603 results