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Reason, Reasons and Reasoning

David Moshman
1994 Theory & psychology  
An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms.  ...  A subjectivist conception of rationality sees its essence in the subjective appeal to reasons. It is argued that neither approach alone is adequate.  ...  It is necessary to examine my reasoning and determine whether it conforms to objectively defensible norms of good reasoning.  ... 
doi:10.1177/0959354394042005 fatcat:3x2xvplwfjecxnxo73e67niope


Larry Laudan
2003 Legal Theory  
It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  ...  They are the ones who have to decide whether a crime was committed and whether the defendant committed it.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s1352325203000132 fatcat:eiiprnvmkfcnrke3p5agpa33wa

Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?

Larry Laudan
2008 Social Science Research Network  
It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  ...  They are the ones who have to decide whether a crime was committed and whether the defendant committed it.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1152883 fatcat:hsuvazn6sra2zonnazmynauhue

Reasonable reasons for waiting

Orit E. Tykocinski, Bradley J. Ruffle
2003 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making  
Recent decision-making research claims to establish that, in violation of Savage's normative sure-thing principle, individuals often wait to acquire noninstrumental information and subsequently base their  ...  Through a series of experiments we establish, first, that many people choose to wait, even when waiting provides no additional information at all. Second, the  ...  us access to the students in his class.  ... 
doi:10.1002/bdm.439 fatcat:3sxhfrwdrvcrtek5vw5w4bae7y

Reasons, Reason, and Context [chapter]

Daniel Fogal
2016 Weighing Reasons  
Language [is] one of the principal instruments or helps of thought; and any imperfection in the instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still more than in almost any other art  ...  Mill, Logic A slightly shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in Weighing Reasons (Oxford University 1 Press), eds. Errol Lord and Barry Maguire.  ...  Assuming the proponent of this response purports to be using reason(s) in its ordinary normative sense, she's going to be committed to thinking that nearly all of our reasons-claims, including (D1) and  ... 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0004 fatcat:wgbedlyjxjbkpixpwdii72hkfe

Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances

Christopher M. Jackson
2012 Social Science Research Network  
It is intuitively possible-and indeed likely-that the reason why the state chose to criminalize some conduct is not the same reason that we think a person is blameworthy for engaging in it. 151 In any  ...  It is possible that certain factors may causally affect the degree to which a confession is coerced.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2015925 fatcat:p2opzchq2baupb2hm7mdasiizi

Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?

Clayton Littlejohn
2013 Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology  
There is a commonly held view that says that all epistemic reasons are pieces of evidence. 1 This view is mistaken and so Talbot (forthcoming) is right to reject it. 2 Unfortunately, he rejects the view  ...  He thinks that there are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief.  ...  If it provides us with an absolute reason, it is not weighed against any other epistemic reason.  ... 
doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20134319 fatcat:fm2kungwkfgsbkml27hsqt477a

Reason, Reasons and Normativity

Joseph Raz
2008 Social Science Research Network  
All normative phenomena are normative in as much as, and because, they provide reasons or are partly constituted by reasons. This makes the concept of a reason key to an understanding of normativity.  ...  Believing that, I will here present some thoughts about the connection between reasons and Reason and between Reason and normativity.  ...  Such reasons do not explain the hold reasons have on us, as these supporting reasons need as much explanation as the supported reasons.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1008795 fatcat:ujs44zvzzze43atr5eshqm57ny

Faith and Reason

Duncan Pritchard
2017 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement  
This proposal is shown to be rooted in Wittgenstein's remarks on hinge commitments in On Certainty, remarks which it is claimed were in turn influenced by John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality  ...  According to this proposal, we are neither to think of religious belief as completely immune to rational evaluation nor are we to deny that it involves fundamental commitments which are arational.  ...  But is it possible for there to be such divergence in one's basic hinge commitments? For one thing, notice that the über hinge commitment will be a constant in this regard.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s135824611700025x fatcat:noy3gykmczax5o43fpo7wqvcvy

Reasoning under uncertainty

Colin Aitken, Dimitris Mavridis
2019 Evidence-Based Mental Health  
IntroductionIt is difficult to reason correctly when the information available is uncertain.  ...  It updates prior beliefs about diagnoses or prognoses in a coherent manner and enables proper consideration of successive pieces of information.DiscussionProbabilistic reasoning is not innate and relies  ...  It is possible to use measures of belief such as personal opinion, based on experience, for example, as probabilities in the reasoning.  ... 
doi:10.1136/ebmental-2018-300074 pmid:30679196 fatcat:s6lmvu3guzhbvidxcibopttgwu

Being Reasonable

David Botting
2015 Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric  
Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force.  ...  the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction.  ...  Nonetheless it does seem right to say that the standpoint, although not believed by us, is among our commitments, and that it is wrong to do or say anything that publicly commits us to anything incompatible  ... 
doi:10.1515/slgr-2015-0028 fatcat:o47ebkkggvdrppehitz3f5gsfq

Pritchard's Reasons

Clayton Littlejohn
2016 Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR)  
The reasons that constitute the rational basis for your belief that the page before you is white and covered in black marks entails that it is and includes things that could not have provided rational  ...  First, what motivation is there for thinking that this sort of view is preferable to a more traditional internalist view that insists that the rational support for our beliefs is always limited to things  ...  Non-skeptical internalism is a muddled mess. Now, this argument is certainly available to Pritchard and he should feel free to use it. It doesn't support epistemological disjunctivism, however.  ... 
doi:10.5840/jpr201672277 fatcat:ml746vaqqfhczgizqo2ayfvb5m

Reasonable Reasons in Contractualist Moral Argument

Rahul Kumar
2003 Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy  
As Scanlon presents it in What We Owe to Each Other, and as I have discussed elsewhere, contractualism is committed to what I call the "individual reasons restriction," and what, roughly, Scanlon has in  ...  account is committed to is 19.  ... 
doi:10.1086/378034 fatcat:vwbnnlroubhghpwwefjsiyqjhy


Sebastián Rudas
2021 Kriterion  
Acknowledgements For comments and suggestions on this work, I am grateful to the members of DesJus at CEBRAP in São Paulo, especially to Nunzio Alì, Júlio Barroso, Tarine Guima, Guilherme de Moraes, Mônica  ...  Oliveira, Lucas Petroni, and Laís da Silva.  ...  it is possible to assume that citizens will be able to understand and engage with reason a).  ... 
doi:10.1590/0100-512x2021n14811sr fatcat:ngilizrstvho3blp5hkbptp3oq

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning

Jonathan Way
2015 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly  
If it is not always worth wanting to have attitudes for which there is some reason, then we should not expect our ideal selves to want to have such attitudes. 30  ...  Again, it is useful here to contrast the reasoning view with a rival.  ...  It is not enough, for instance, to say that reasons are considerations which make some causally possible response good, since perceptual experiences and the rest of it can also be causally possible.  ... 
doi:10.1111/papq.12135 fatcat:z2wwog4mujgonftfbwotz64vfu
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