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Inefficiency of Equilibria in Query Auctions with Continuous Valuations

Elena Grigorieva, Rudolf Muller, Dries Vermeulen, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
2009 Social Science Research Network  
In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate  ...  We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite  ...  The playing field Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations 11 We provide a complete description of the game tree.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1440144 fatcat:c2fxybzlarevzd3lkpqwrfd3h4

Inefficiency of Equilibria in Query Auctions with Continuous Valuations

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller, Dries Vermeulen
2006 Social Science Research Network  
In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate  ...  We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite  ...  The playing field Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations 11 We provide a complete description of the game tree.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.910511 fatcat:db6ntoymlrb5tjxdwlj4dvj3lu

Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency [chapter]

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction in undominated strategies.  ...  We characterize a class of undominated pure Nash equilibria and quantify the social inefficiency of pure and (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria by means of bounds on the Price of Anarchy.  ...  Bresky showed in [3] existence of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in the independent private values model (with continuous valuation distributions) for several multi-unit auctions, including all three standard  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_20 fatcat:fis6lv24vvdavmvf7v7r6jegka

Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis
2014 Theory of Computing Systems  
In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction in undominated strategies.  ...  We characterize a class of undominated pure Nash equilibria and quantify the social inefficiency of pure and (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria by means of bounds on the Price of Anarchy.  ...  Bresky showed in [3] existence of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in the independent private values model (with continuous valuation distributions) for several multi-unit auctions, including all three standard  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00224-014-9537-9 fatcat:a56ah3ekj5ftxoepk56ygcsn44

Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen
2011 Journal of Mathematical Economics  
As we like to keep mechanism and strategies separate, but stay consistent with their notation, we opt to not make use of either of the terms communication protocol or binary dynamic mechanism. 0304-4068  ...  game induced by their notion of communication protocol.  ...  The authors thank Matt Embrey and an anonymous referee of their paper for very constructive comments that helped to improve the paper considerably.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.002 fatcat:tubgkqlambhhld5l5a65kxrq44

On the Inefficiency of the Uniform Price Auction [article]

Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis
2013 arXiv   pre-print
In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction for bidders with (symmetric) submodular valuation functions, over the number of units that they win.  ...  We investigate pure Nash equilibria of the auction in undominated strategies; we produce a characterization of these equilibria that allows us to prove that a fraction 1-1/e of the optimum social welfare  ...  Bresky showed in [3] existence of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in the independent private values model (with continuous valuation distributions) for a large class of multi-unit auctions, including all  ... 
arXiv:1211.1860v4 fatcat:z7mmkg3xhze57ojdovzce2ikme

Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects

Patrick Maillé, Evangelos Markakis, Maurizio Naldi, George D. Stamoulis, Bruno Tuffin
2012 Electronic Commerce Research  
The idea behind sponsored search is that, for queries with commercial interest (e.g., "digital camera"), Google, Yahoo!  ...  We mainly focus on game theoretic and mechanism design aspects of these auctions, and we analyze the issues associated with each of the three participating entities, i.e., the search engine, the advertisers  ...  Acknowledgements This work has been partly funded by the Euro-NF Network of Excellence, through the specific research project AMESA.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10660-012-9094-8 fatcat:wcbacvez4fb63gzlet44gf5udm

Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions [article]

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos
2014 arXiv   pre-print
It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise.  ...  The traditional Bayesian game models uncertainty in the valuations (types) of the participants.  ...  We still think of the irrational advertisers as being true players in the GSP auction, with valuations and quality scores.  ... 
arXiv:1201.6429v2 fatcat:j7xz3tyfajeebcbm6jxs6bgor4

Optimal Bidding Strategies and Equilibria in Dynamic Auctions with Budget Constraints

Ramakrishna Gummadi, Peter Key, Alexandre Proutiere
2012 Social Science Research Network  
Finally, we proved the existence of Mean Field Equilibria for both the repeated second price and GSP auctions with a large number of bidders. if all the advertisers bid optimally?  ...  A motivating example is that of sponsored search auctions, where advertisers bid in a sequence of generalized second price (GSP) auctions.  ...  There is also an intermediary step between the query and the auction: advertisers bid on a keywords, and the keywords in the query trigger the choice of advertisers that match the query.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2066175 fatcat:yudkyhi2l5heni7xacfuranspy

On revenue in the generalized second price auction

Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Eva Tardos
2012 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web - WWW '12  
Most previous work of GSP focuses on envy free equilibria of the full information version of this game. Envy-free equilibria are known to obtain at least the revenue of the VCG auction.  ...  Here we consider revenue in equilibria that are not envyfree, and also consider revenue in the Bayesian version of the game.  ...  The primary focus of this paper is to study the revenue of the GSP auction, in relation to VCG, over the set of all Nash equilibria (including inefficient ones).  ... 
doi:10.1145/2187836.2187886 dblp:conf/www/LucierLT12 fatcat:jz3orwkbjzb3ra2erwqvmhd7z4

Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures [article]

Tim Roughgarden
2019 arXiv   pre-print
It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity  ...  theory in game theory and economics.  ...  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in m) strategies per player, the worst-case POA of -approximate Nash equilibria with bidder valuations in V is at least α.  ... 
arXiv:1801.00734v2 fatcat:r6sz7jskqjbs7gxof52fbjikom

Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria of GSP Keyword Auction

Linjing Li, Daniel Zeng, Huimin Zhao
2012 Journal of the AIS  
Our analysis shows that the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a GSP auction can be partitioned into separate convex polyhedra based on the order of bids if the valuations of all advertisers are  ...  In this paper, we strive to bridge this gap by proposing a framework for studying pure-strategy Nash equilibria in GSP auctions.  ...  It is obvious that only the Nash equilibria in ℰ 0 are efficient and all others are inefficient. Li et al. / PSNE of GSP Auction Figure 1.  ... 
doi:10.17705/1jais.00286 fatcat:ibwlhotoh5ftzgzkbafq7cqufe

Barriers to Near-Optimal Equilibria

Tim Roughgarden
2014 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science  
auctions with "black-box" bidder valuations; and welfaremaximization in combinatorial auctions with succinctly described valuations.  ...  Theorem VI.1 Let Π(n, m, V) be a welfare-maximization problem with maximum valuation V max and M a V maxbounded mechanism onto Π(n, m, V) such that, in every game M(v) induced by M, the POA of V max -MNE  ...  of p(n, m) −1 V max -MNE in S1A's with valuation profiles in V.  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2014.16 dblp:conf/focs/Roughgarden14 fatcat:zcksbe4eejcm7cx5dzxvdllc2i

GSP auctions with correlated types

Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme
2011 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11  
We study the performance of this auction in the Bayesian setting for players with correlated types.  ...  Using our techniques, we obtain the same bound on the performance of GSP at coarse correlated equilibria, which captures (for example) a repeated-auction setting in which agents apply regret-minimizing  ...  of the present paper), showing bounds of 2.310 for correlated equilibria in the Full Information setting and 3.037 for Bayes-Nash equilibria with independent types.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1993574.1993587 dblp:conf/sigecom/LucierL11 fatcat:rttzubicdremnjkemqul5orliq

Efficiency with linear prices

Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Georg Ziegler
2010 Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10  
We also provide a theoretical analysis on the worst case efficiency of the CC auction, which highlights problems in the valuations, in which the CC is very inefficient.  ...  We provide an extension of the CC auction, the CC+ auction, and show that it actually leads to efficient outcomes in an ex-post equilibrium for general valuations with only linear ask prices.  ...  Unfortunately, Walrasian equilibria with linear prices are only possible for restricted valuations.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807342.1807388 dblp:conf/sigecom/BichlerSZ10 fatcat:7lcbubbwuvdlzkxukfxcn2ugyq
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