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Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection [article]

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Furthermore, we prove an upper bound of 1/(1+\ln 2) for any incentive compatible and fair selection mechanisms.  ...  In this paper, we study the incentive compatible (IC) selection mechanism to prevent such manipulations.  ...  any incentive compatible selection mechanism is 4/5.  ... 
arXiv:2107.10612v1 fatcat:4sdd2y37mfa4rprp6zckltlwky

Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks and Application to Viral Marketing [article]

Mayur Mohite, Y. Narahari
2011 arXiv   pre-print
In particular, we show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms when the scoring rules are proper and propose a reverse weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appropriate mechanism to use.  ...  In the context of the first model, we present how VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanisms could be used for truthfully eliciting the influence probabilities.  ...  As a marketing strategy, the company can select a small set of influential users to whom it provides the product for free.  ... 
arXiv:1102.0918v2 fatcat:k63nph5mlrdlvcxelbobznozry

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion

Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
2018 Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference on World Wide Web - WWW '18  
We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof) mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in a directed graph (e.g. Twitter's network).  ...  Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms.  ...  for the incentive compatibility).  ... 
doi:10.1145/3178876.3186043 dblp:conf/www/BabichenkoDT18 fatcat:yau2iawl2vhvrdb6p7qor757sa

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion [article]

Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (strategy-proof) mechanism for selecting an influential vertex in a directed graph (e.g. Twitter's network).  ...  Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms.  ...  for the incentive compatibility).  ... 
arXiv:1805.08013v1 fatcat:tjmzctzkvngxdccqtvprj4e6oi

Identifying Influential Users in Unknown Social Networks for Adaptive Incentive Allocation Under Budget Restriction [article]

Shiqing Wu, Weihua Li, Hao Shen, Quan Bai
2021 arXiv   pre-print
To tackle the aforementioned challenges, in this paper, we propose a novel algorithm for exploring influential users in unknown networks, which can estimate the influential relationships among users based  ...  Meanwhile, we design an adaptive incentive allocation approach that determines incentive values based on users' preferences and their influence ability.  ...  It is due to that some influential users select a * and influence their neighbors to select a * in the beginning.  ... 
arXiv:2107.05992v2 fatcat:mxv4qytfzbep3jfsireardojb4

Maximal Information Propagation with Budgets [article]

Haomin Shi and Yao Zhang and Zilin Si and Letong Wang and Dengji Zhao
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We propose a family of mechanisms to achieve the goal, where propagating information to all neighbours is a dominant strategy for all players.  ...  The goal is to design a mechanism to distribute the budget such that all players in the social network are incentivized to propagate information to all their neighbours.  ...  [10] provided provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms of selecting the most influential nodes.  ... 
arXiv:1912.04056v2 fatcat:x6bweismwzcl7fvn3cdvtstf6e

Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design

Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes, Elery Pfeffer, James Zou
2015 Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '15  
An incentive-compatible experiment design is one with an equilibrium where each agent selects its natural action, which is the action that would maximize the performance of the agent if there was no competition  ...  ., the probability that the best agent wins, and show how to improve the power of incentive-compatible designs.  ...  A test set contains the individuals in the population that will be used to assess the performance of the agent in selecting influential seed sets.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2764468.2764525 dblp:conf/sigecom/ToulisPPZ15 fatcat:mleokrcbavhhjc3on6qtn7trka

Integrating ERP into the Organization: Organizational Changes and Side-Effects

Eric Simon, Jean Pierre Noblet
2012 International Business Research  
The question then arises of how the installation of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program may affect these coordination mechanisms.  ...  At the same time, the widespread application of information and communication technologies (ICT) is transforming the manner in which the information required for coordinating the units within an organization  ...  The effect of ERP systems is thus more conspicuous for incentive mechanisms than for reprisal mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.5539/ibr.v5n2p51 fatcat:7vogqzgebzchjbl3ligsrlbq7i

Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue Sharing Contracts

Alexandros Karakostas, Axel Sonntag, Daniel John Zizzo
2013 Social Science Research Network  
We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary incentives.  ...  We conclude that under revenue sharing contracts concerns for fairness can go in hand with the use of monetary incentives.  ...  compatible contracts, and specifically the lowest feasible incentive compatible share of 0.27.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2248927 fatcat:cqh7aokeqncjnazhbmezm3mjpe

An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann
2013 Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics  
This essay provides an introduction to our recent work on robust mechanism design. The objective is to provide an overview of the research agenda and its results.  ...  addition, we provide an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work, and the literature at large, in order to explain * We would like to thank Eric Maskin for  ...  The example points to the fact that interim incentive compatibility can occur for all type spaces, using mechanisms that elicit and respond to the beliefs of the agents, even if ex post incentive compatibility  ... 
doi:10.1561/0700000057 fatcat:qferczhsqvgbhfpkm4eiaycp5e

Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory

Roger B Myerson
2008 The American Economic Review  
Figure 4 shows this incentive-compatible mechanism.  ...  of the incentive-compatible mechanism in Figure 4 .  ... 
doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.586 fatcat:gayaduhikvgavhqo7og5crrvxy

Biological Institutions: The Political Science of Animal Cooperation

Erol Akcay, Joan Roughgarden, James D. Fearon, John A. Ferejohn, Barry R. Weingast
2013 Social Science Research Network  
Institutions frequently enable interacting parties avoid inefficient outcomes and support efficient exchange among agents with conflicting interests.  ...  We illustrate our thesis with examples from cooperative breed and genes as within-body-mechanism-design. Social evolution is one of the most rapidly developing areas in evolutionary biology.  ...  Acknowledgements The meeting this paper was based on was held in May 2009 at Stanford University, and was funded by the Woods Institute for the Environment.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2370952 fatcat:7og6dvrypzhovmuofhd47fvaoi

The communication burden of payment determination

Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Michael Schapira
2013 Games and Economic Behavior  
In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to achieve their goals (implement a social-choice function) in an equilibrium.  ...  While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just for computing the outcome of a certain social-choice function, an additional amount of communication may be required for computing  ...  incentive-compatible mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.007 fatcat:vrugfhnatbfc5cjjmor3nnv7my

Collusion and the Organisation of the Firm

Alfredo Burlando, Alberto Motta
2012 Social Science Research Network  
JEL classification: D82; C72; D23 Keywords: Collusion; Supervision; Mechanism design; Theory of the Firm; Outsourcing * We are especially grateful to Dilip Mookherjee and Antonio Nicolo' for their help  ...  With only two types of agent, the optimal response to collusion is a contract that lets the agent choose between being outside the firm (no monitoring and full claims over production costs) or being in  ...  For example, in the extreme case where the agent and the auditor are infinitely risk averse, the incentive compatibility constraint for the FO contract is given by (14) and, as discussed in section 3.3.2  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2163842 fatcat:dw5ruqyb3ncvllymjr3kpnh7pi

Sales Talk

Frederic Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta
2014 Social Science Research Network  
Ex-ante revenue-maximizing mechanisms are equilibria of this informed seller game and coincide with core mechanisms.  ...  , which is incentive compatible for the buyer and the seller.  ...  type t min , and (ii) for any optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent (in terms of interim payoffs for the buyer and the seller) dominant-strategy incentive compatible  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2465174 fatcat:4lewevnpgzc6tiu5yio7n267uq
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