554 Hits in 4.0 sec

A survey: Reward distribution mechanisms and withholding attacks in Bitcoin pool mining

Saide Zhu, Wei Li, Hong Li, Chunqiang Hu, Zhipeng Cai
2018 Mathematical Foundations of Computing  
As a result, miners tend to join a large open pool to get a more stable reward. Nowadays, mining pools take up over 98% of Bitcoins total computation power.  ...  The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize recent research in Bitcoin pool mining system.  ...  Thus, with such design, the expected reward of each share can be kept stable in mining pools, indicating that geometric mechanism can achieve incentive compatibility.  ... 
doi:10.3934/mfc.2018020 fatcat:f47cjlby4zgsdp5i2r3v6226am

Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable [article]

Ittay Eyal, Emin Gun Sirer
2013 arXiv   pre-print
We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources.  ...  At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners.  ...  Schneider, Eva Tardos, and Dror Kronstein for their valuable advice on drafts of this paper.  ... 
arXiv:1311.0243v5 fatcat:hkihtmpbhvao7ozcl7avn5cfpm

Majority is not enough

Ittay Eyal, Emin Gün Sirer
2018 Communications of the ACM  
We show that the Bitcoin mining protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share.  ...  We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects Bitcoin in the general case. It prohibits selfish mining by pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources.  ...  Schneider, Eva Tardos, and Dror Kronstein for their valuable advice on drafts of this paper, as well as our shepherd Rainer Böhme for his guidance.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3212998 fatcat:eg46vydolbf75ktpkcu32oapby

Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable [chapter]

Ittay Eyal, Emin Gün Sirer
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources.  ...  At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners.  ...  This paper showed that Bitcoin's mining algorithm is not incentive compatible. The Bitcoin ecosystem is open to manipulation, and potential takeover, by miners seeking to maximize their rewards.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_28 fatcat:eiqkd4vyyzfqjit7ewagt4kc4u

Socially Optimal Mining Pools [article]

Ben A. Fisch, Rafael Pass, Abhi Shelat
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Currently a dozen of different pooling strategies (i.e., methods for distributing the rewards) are in use for Bitcoin mining.  ...  Mining for Bitcoins is a high-risk high-reward activity. Miners, seeking to reduce their variance and earn steadier rewards, collaborate in pooling strategies where they jointly mine for Bitcoins.  ...  Incentive compatibility The question of incentive compatibility in mining pools has been addressed to some degree in several other works [Ros11, LBS + 15, SBBR16, LJG15, Eya15], but in general remains  ... 
arXiv:1703.03846v1 fatcat:trzvvbajnvfknlcx52mbdvmszy

Incentive Compatibility of Pay Per Last N Shares in Bitcoin Mining Pools [chapter]

Yevhen Zolotavkin, Julian García, Carsten Rudolph
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Pay per last N shares (PPLNS) is a popular pool mining reward mechanism on a number of cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin.  ...  We derive conditions for incentive compatible rewards, showing that the power of the most powerful miner determines whether incentives are compatible or not.  ...  The analysis of incentive compatibility and related strategic models provide an opportunity to better understand reward functions in the Blockchain.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_2 fatcat:j6js4fuc2zafvcntg6nycrhp7e

Measurement and Analysis of the Bitcoin Networks: A View from Mining Pools [article]

Canhui Wang, Xiaowen Chu, Qin Yang
2019 arXiv   pre-print
Specifically, our measurements show the following. 1) A few mining pools entities continuously control most of the computing resources of the Bitcoin network. 2) Mining pools are caught in a prisoner's  ...  Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available, little is known about the details of mining pool behaviors (e.g., empty blocks, mining revenue and transaction collection strategies  ...  Schrijvers et al., [4] introduced a game theoretic model for reward functions within a single Bitcoin mining pool and showed that PPLNS, a popular reward function, is incentive compatible in a more general  ... 
arXiv:1902.07549v2 fatcat:gis74clzzje6pga34ge3tkhdne

Rational Protocols and Attacks in Blockchain System

Tao Li, Yuling Chen, Yanli Wang, Yilei Wang, Minghao Zhao, Haojia Zhu, Youliang Tian, Xiaomei Yu, Yixian Yang
2020 Security and Communication Networks  
As is well known, blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin, whose initial motivation is derived from economic incentives.  ...  In this paper, we highlight the combination of game theory and blockchain, including rational smart contracts, game theoretic attacks, and rational mining strategies.  ...  Proportional reward function, denoted as R prop, refers to the allocation of rewards according to the computing power of each miner, which is an earlier allocation strategy for the mine pool.  ... 
doi:10.1155/2020/8839047 fatcat:pjtlnwxh3baq7pu667g22b2bdu

Game-Theoretical Analysis of Mining Strategy for Bitcoin-NG Blockchain Protocol [article]

Taotao Wang, Xiaoqian Bai, Hao Wang, Soung Chang Liew, Shengli Zhang
2020 arXiv   pre-print
However, this design of the incentive mechanism ignores the joint effect of transaction fees, mint coins and mining duration lengths on the expected mining reward.  ...  Therefore, we conclude that the Bitcoin-NG blockchain protocol is vulnerable to advanced mining attack. We discuss how to reduce the negative impact of advanced mining for Bitcoin-NG.  ...  Fig. 3 (a) presents the reward functions for the case of K i−1 ∈ B honest ; and Fig. 3 (b) presents the reward function for the case of K i ∈ B attacker .  ... 
arXiv:1911.00900v3 fatcat:x5ktxfequfdqzf3r756t4oqn2a

The Pure Price of Anarchy of Pool Block Withholding Attacks in Bitcoin Mining

Colleen Alkalay-Houlihan, Nisarg Shah
We study the game induced by one such attack – the pool block withholding attack – in which mining pools (groups of miners) attack other mining pools.  ...  We focus on the case of two pools attacking each other, with potentially other mining power in the system.We show that this game always admits a pure Nash equilibrium, and its pure price of anarchy, which  ...  They proved or disproved incentive compatibility of common pool reward functions, and designed a new incentive compatible reward function, aptly named "the IC reward function."  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011724 fatcat:y72fe3uwq5c5zmstabdawwmtsy

Decentralization is Vulnerable under the Gap Game

Yiran Liu, Junming Ke, Qiuliang Xu, Han Jiang, Hao Wang
2019 IEEE Access  
Miners receive two types of revenue: block rewards and transaction fees, in which the reward of block drops off as time goes on.  ...  Carlsten et al. defined a mining gap and then Tsabary et al. analyzed the gap game exploring how mining gaps form. In this paper, we analyze the other implications of the gap game.  ...  Meni [18] describe the various reward systems used to calculate rewards of participants in Bitcoin mining pools. III.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2019.2927257 fatcat:d6gzha7om5frldmxnnxaiyt42y

The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems [article]

George Yuan
2020 arXiv   pre-print
In order to do so, we first give an outline how the general existence of consensus equilibria for Mining Pool Games is formulated, and then used to explain the stable for Gap Games for Bitcoin in the sense  ...  by taking into the account of three types of different factors which are expenses, reward mechanism and mining power for the work on blockschain by applying the key consensus called Proof of Work due  ...  compatibility for Bitcoin mining pool, the interested readers are referred to Schrijvers et al  ... 
arXiv:2003.05067v2 fatcat:igibb34dnncjbobm2bt3dhd7hu

On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining

Loi Luu, Ratul Saha, Inian Parameshwaran, Prateek Saxena, Aquinas Hobor
2015 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium  
As a result, a part of the Bitcoin network is incentivized to waste resource competing for higher selfish reward.  ...  We formally model this game and show its utility in analyzing the security of pool protocols that dictate how financial rewards are shared among the members of a pool.  ...  All opinions expressed in this work are solely those of the authors.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf.2015.34 dblp:conf/csfw/LuuSPSH15 fatcat:qca3uu7xozfn7njbtxu5ivshfq

SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies

Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A. Kroll, Edward W. Felten
2015 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy  
Within two years of its quiet launch in 2009, Bitcoin grew to comprise billions of dollars of economic value despite only cursory analysis of the system's design.  ...  We survey anonymity issues in Bitcoin and provide an evaluation framework for analyzing a variety of privacy-enhancing proposals.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the following colleagues for feedback on drafts of this paper: Sergio Demian Lerner  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2015.14 dblp:conf/sp/BonneauMCNKF15 fatcat:ziajrymw3bdd7houz56culqkoi

How Can Incentive Mechanisms and Blockchain Benefit with Each Other? A Survey

Rong Han, Zheng Yan, Xueqin Liang, Laurence T. Yang
2022 ACM Computing Surveys  
On one hand, we provide a taxonomy of the incentive mechanisms of blockchain systems according to blockchain versions, incentive forms and incentive goals.  ...  To this end, we propose evaluation requirements in terms of the properties and costs of incentive mechanisms.  ...  By designing suitable utility functions for mining pools with diferent strategies, we can regulate the Nash equilibrium of this game to an expected state where all mining pools behave honestly without  ... 
doi:10.1145/3539604 fatcat:yteydignqvggnn6bwqxeqaxm3q
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 554 results