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Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness

Iftah Gamzu
2011 Theoretical Computer Science  
We study the limitations imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter optimization problems.  ...  These results improve the current lower bounds of (1 + √ 5)/2 ≈ 1.618 and (3 + √ 5)/4 ≈ 1.309 due to Mu'alem and Schapira [A.  ...  Acknowledgments I would like to thank Yossi Azar for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.05.012 fatcat:vnlpw5q43zfondfeb7tkge2qgu

Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness [chapter]

Iftah Gamzu
Approximation and Online Algorithms  
In this paper, we focus our attention on studying the boundaries imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter optimization problems.  ...  In light of this state of affairs, one of the most natural and intriguing objectives of research is to understand the inherent limitations in the infrastructure of truthful mechanisms for non-utilitarian  ...  Furthermore, I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77918-6_2 dblp:conf/waoa/Gamzu07 fatcat:np4w5yrzvfd77nntyun6m7u6he

Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness [article]

Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
2017 arXiv   pre-print
This lower bound nearly matches the known 7/4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists).  ...  We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems.  ...  Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, Amir Ronen and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions.  ... 
arXiv:1507.08708v3 fatcat:mqrj3zgwnze2tlsuv7mmd5lggi

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
2018 Games and Economic Behavior  
This lower bound nearly matches the known 7 4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists).  ...  We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems.  ...  Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, and Amir Ronen for helpful discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001 fatcat:5tlzlmnu5fgx5a6tsh3ubuveym

No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems

Stefano Leucci, Akaki Mamageishvili, Paolo Penna
2018 Games and Economic Behavior  
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial n approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible.  ...  That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate, where n is the number of agents.  ...  Again, we have a multidimensional non-utilitarian (min-max) problem for which the best lower bound is a small constant and the best upper bound is n using VCG mechanisms [19] .  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.003 fatcat:bvu45rtoefcxpmoghlo6qodrru

Cake Cutting Mechanisms [article]

Egor Ianovski
2012 arXiv   pre-print
For the lower bound, u i ([0, 1]) = 1 for any i, so we can always give the entire cake to one agent.  ...  For every agent allocated we thus have at worst 2n queries, and as we allocate n agents the upper bound is O(n 2 ). [EP84] improve on this bound.  ... 
arXiv:1203.0100v2 fatcat:t5sd5ogd7rhmbdwaqulc4nfwtu

Preface

Christos Kaklamanis, Martin Skutella
2011 Theoretical Computer Science  
While, for the case k = 2, this problem is well-understood with respect to * Corresponding editor.  ...  Of 56 papers submitted to WAOA 2007, there were 22 accepted for presentation at the workshop, and revised versions of 7 papers appear in this special issue.  ...  Finally, the article Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness by Iftah Gamzu presents new approximation results from the area of mechanism design.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.12.050 fatcat:lyktg43elrdyho3uj6xgjm4rei

A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation [article]

Jian Low, Chen Hajaj, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game.  ...  potentially untruthful 11: Table 1 : 1 Average upper bound of untruthful players for (Approximate) RPM n 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 m = 2, Table 2 : 2 Lower bound of profiles where every player is truthful  ...  In addition, we also computed the lower bound on the fraction of preference profiles where truth telling is a Nash equilibrium (Table 2 ).  ... 
arXiv:2204.04251v1 fatcat:sq4awz4tabcsvalx7vwg5zme4a

Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents [chapter]

Moshe Babaioff
2008 Encyclopedia of Algorithms  
In addition, for Qjj P w j C j (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of 2 p 3 for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism.  ...  We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank David Shmoys for several helpful discussions on scheduling, and the anonymous reviewers for many excellent suggestions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_436 fatcat:rd7bsjil45dnnimssdamg5567q

Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification

Alessandro Ferrante, Gennaro Parlato, Francesco Sorrentino, Carmine Ventre
2009 Theoretical Computer Science  
Widmayer, A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem, in: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, ACM Press, 2005  ...  We design truthful mechanisms when the agents' type sets are upper-bounded by a finite value.  ...  Moreover, we wish to thank Paolo Penna for enlightening discussions and valuable advises.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.024 fatcat:4yykzfmejrbh7lbnkvkyagqapu

Throw One's Cake --- and Have It Too [article]

Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
2012 arXiv   pre-print
We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such discarding.  ...  Tight Lower Bounds for n ≤ 4 For very small values of n, we can show that the upper bound of n 2 on the egalitarian dumping paradox is indeed tight. Theorem 5.  ...  The utilitarian (resp. egalitarian) dumping paradox is bounded from above by the utilitarian (resp. egalitarian) Price of Envy-Freeness. Proof. We again prove only for utilitarian welfare.  ... 
arXiv:1101.4401v3 fatcat:rivsb5d24re3talqfgpja4ddhq

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees [article]

Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, Nicos Protopapas
2022 arXiv   pre-print
For two projects, we show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism is the optimal among all truthful mechanisms.  ...  [arXiv:1905.00457] proposed a class of truthful mechanisms, called moving phantom mechanisms.  ...  Our lower bound for any truthful mechanism is just 1/2.  ... 
arXiv:2203.09971v1 fatcat:slnkpzny65bfznezzoyyq7fnoe

Throw One's Cake — and Eat It Too [chapter]

Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such discarding.  ...  Tight Lower Bounds for n ≤ 4 For very small values of n, we can show that the upper bound of n 2 on the egalitarian dumping paradox is indeed tight. Proof.  ...  For example, one may try to find the Pareto improvement that achieves the largest gain in utilitarian welfare.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8 fatcat:dfjqazj5z5dptdiovgnpny2fne

Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)

Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen
1999 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '99  
We present several theorems regarding this problem including an approximation me&anism, lower bounds and a randomized mechanism.  ...  We also suggest and motivate extensions to the basic model and prove improved upper bounds in the extended model. Many open problems are suggested as well.  ...  Acknowledgments: We thank Dov Monderer, Motty Perry and Ori Regev for helpful discussions at various stages of this work.  ... 
doi:10.1145/301250.301287 dblp:conf/stoc/NisanR99 fatcat:4khbvbrworgvfjd6li3k3rwi4u

Grounding Non-Theological Morality: The Victorian Secularist Movement, Secular Ethics, and Human Progress

Patrick John Corbeil
2019 Secularism and Nonreligion  
For Holyoake, "truth is higher than utility, and goes before it" (1905, 31). However, Holyoake declines to elaborate what the criterion for determining this truth might be.  ...  After 1852, Comtean positivism was slowly wedded to a native English utilitarianism as a dominant language for radical and heterodox ideas about the non-theological grounds of ethics (Wright 1986 ).  ... 
doi:10.5334/snr.93 fatcat:4frqxysvprfhnpeacpvsxdlqmm
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