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Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
2011
Theoretical Computer Science
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We study the limitations imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter optimization problems. ...
These results improve the current lower bounds of (1 + √ 5)/2 ≈ 1.618 and (3 + √ 5)/4 ≈ 1.309 due to Mu'alem and Schapira [A. ...
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Yossi Azar for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. ...
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.05.012
fatcat:vnlpw5q43zfondfeb7tkge2qgu
Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
[chapter]
Approximation and Online Algorithms
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In this paper, we focus our attention on studying the boundaries imposed by truthfulness for two non-utilitarian multi-parameter optimization problems. ...
In light of this state of affairs, one of the most natural and intriguing objectives of research is to understand the inherent limitations in the infrastructure of truthful mechanisms for non-utilitarian ...
Furthermore, I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77918-6_2
dblp:conf/waoa/Gamzu07
fatcat:np4w5yrzvfd77nntyun6m7u6he
Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
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This lower bound nearly matches the known 7/4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). ...
We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, Amir Ronen and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. ...
arXiv:1507.08708v3
fatcat:mqrj3zgwnze2tlsuv7mmd5lggi
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
2018
Games and Economic Behavior
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This lower bound nearly matches the known 7 4 (randomized) truthful upper bound for the case of two machines (a non-truthful FPTAS exists). ...
We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan, Chaitanya Swamy, and Amir Ronen for helpful discussions. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001
fatcat:5tlzlmnu5fgx5a6tsh3ubuveym
No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
2018
Games and Economic Behavior
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2017 pre-print arXiv:1712.06709v1 fatcat:pkj6qck6zverthucguekvt65duOther Versions
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial n approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. ...
That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate, where n is the number of agents. ...
Again, we have a multidimensional non-utilitarian (min-max) problem for which the best lower bound is a small constant and the best upper bound is n using VCG mechanisms [19] . ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.003
fatcat:bvu45rtoefcxpmoghlo6qodrru
Cake Cutting Mechanisms
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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For the lower bound, u i ([0, 1]) = 1 for any i, so we can always give the entire cake to one agent. ...
For every agent allocated we thus have at worst 2n queries, and as we allocate n agents the upper bound is O(n 2 ). [EP84] improve on this bound. ...
arXiv:1203.0100v2
fatcat:t5sd5ogd7rhmbdwaqulc4nfwtu
Preface
2011
Theoretical Computer Science
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While, for the case k = 2, this problem is well-understood with respect to * Corresponding editor. ...
Of 56 papers submitted to WAOA 2007, there were 22 accepted for presentation at the workshop, and revised versions of 7 papers appear in this special issue. ...
Finally, the article Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness by Iftah Gamzu presents new approximation results from the area of mechanism design. ...
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.12.050
fatcat:lyktg43elrdyho3uj6xgjm4rei
A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game. ...
potentially untruthful 11:
Table 1 : 1 Average upper bound of untruthful players for (Approximate) RPM n 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 m = 2,
Table 2 : 2 Lower bound of profiles where every player is truthful ...
In addition, we also computed the lower bound on the fraction of preference profiles where truth telling is a Nash equilibrium (Table 2 ). ...
arXiv:2204.04251v1
fatcat:sq4awz4tabcsvalx7vwg5zme4a
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
[chapter]
2008
Encyclopedia of Algorithms
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In addition, for Qjj P w j C j (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of 2 p 3 for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism. ...
We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments. ...
Acknowledgments We thank David Shmoys for several helpful discussions on scheduling, and the anonymous reviewers for many excellent suggestions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_436
fatcat:rd7bsjil45dnnimssdamg5567q
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
2009
Theoretical Computer Science
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Widmayer, A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem, in: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, ACM Press, 2005 ...
We design truthful mechanisms when the agents' type sets are upper-bounded by a finite value. ...
Moreover, we wish to thank Paolo Penna for enlightening discussions and valuable advises. ...
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.024
fatcat:4yykzfmejrbh7lbnkvkyagqapu
Throw One's Cake --- and Have It Too
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such discarding. ...
Tight Lower Bounds for n ≤ 4 For very small values of n, we can show that the upper bound of n 2 on the egalitarian dumping paradox is indeed tight. Theorem 5. ...
The utilitarian (resp. egalitarian) dumping paradox is bounded from above by the utilitarian (resp. egalitarian) Price of Envy-Freeness. Proof. We again prove only for utilitarian welfare. ...
arXiv:1101.4401v3
fatcat:rivsb5d24re3talqfgpja4ddhq
Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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For two projects, we show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism is the optimal among all truthful mechanisms. ...
[arXiv:1905.00457] proposed a class of truthful mechanisms, called moving phantom mechanisms. ...
Our lower bound for any truthful mechanism is just 1/2. ...
arXiv:2203.09971v1
fatcat:slnkpzny65bfznezzoyyq7fnoe
Throw One's Cake — and Eat It Too
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such discarding. ...
Tight Lower Bounds for n ≤ 4 For very small values of n, we can show that the upper bound of n 2 on the egalitarian dumping paradox is indeed tight. Proof. ...
For example, one may try to find the Pareto improvement that achieves the largest gain in utilitarian welfare. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8
fatcat:dfjqazj5z5dptdiovgnpny2fne
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
1999
Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '99
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We present several theorems regarding this problem including an approximation me&anism, lower bounds and a randomized mechanism. ...
We also suggest and motivate extensions to the basic model and prove improved upper bounds in the extended model. Many open problems are suggested as well. ...
Acknowledgments: We thank Dov Monderer, Motty Perry and Ori Regev for helpful discussions at various stages of this work. ...
doi:10.1145/301250.301287
dblp:conf/stoc/NisanR99
fatcat:4khbvbrworgvfjd6li3k3rwi4u
Grounding Non-Theological Morality: The Victorian Secularist Movement, Secular Ethics, and Human Progress
2019
Secularism and Nonreligion
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For Holyoake, "truth is higher than utility, and goes before it" (1905, 31). However, Holyoake declines to elaborate what the criterion for determining this truth might be. ...
After 1852, Comtean positivism was slowly wedded to a native English utilitarianism as a dominant language for radical and heterodox ideas about the non-theological grounds of ethics (Wright 1986 ). ...
doi:10.5334/snr.93
fatcat:4frqxysvprfhnpeacpvsxdlqmm
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