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On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
[chapter]
2010
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We study for the first time taxation for networks with atomic users which have unsplittable traffic demands and are heterogeneous, i.e., have different sensitivities to taxes. ...
The issue of designing optimal tax vectors for selfish routing games has been studied extensively in the literature. ...
Karakostas and S. Kolliopoulos thank Ioannis Caragiannis for introducing them to the problem and for valuable discussions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_15
fatcat:4wxvp3rh2rfztctnwosrx4pm6y
Selfish routing and wavelength assignment strategies with advance reservation in inter-domain optical networks
2012
Computer Communications
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We showed how and under which conditions such approach can give rise to a stable state with satisfactory solutions and analyzed its performance and convergence features. ...
On this concept, we developed a selfish adaptive RWA model supporting advance reservation in large-scale optical wavelength-routed networks and developed a distributed algorithm to compute approximate ...
In particular, results presented in [27] suggest that for strictly increasing and differentiable linear latency functions, imposing properly chosen taxes on a selfish routing game not only yields to ...
doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2011.10.010
fatcat:rcxlygpifjhgbb4yrxqbiw6zba
Upper Bounds on Inefficiency of Taxed Stackelberg Network with Cross- Nested Logit Assignment
2014
Open Cybernetics and Systemics Journal
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This paper initially explores it in a taxed stochastic traffic network whose equilibrium flow pattern is deduced by a cross-nested Logit (CNL) flow assignment model, and a centrally controlling Stackelberg ...
stochastic user equilibrium (CNL-SUE) model is established and first used to obtain upper bounds on Stackelberg network inefficiency. ...
INTRODUCTION How is the efficiency loss of users' selfish route choice behaviors affected by traffic assignment model, stochastic factor in traveler route selection, routing strategies, and tax schemes ...
doi:10.2174/1874110x014080101091
fatcat:wwsxkn3uozgghnynszg3skbhla
Coordination mechanisms for congestion games
2004
ACM SIGACT News
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Typical examples include the selfish task allocation problem-in which users have tasks to schedule on machimes and compete for the execution time-and the selfish routing problem-in which selfish traffic ...
Coordination mechanisms for selfish routing The above ideas can be naturally extended to the selfish routing problem whose price of anarchy study was initiated by Roughgarden and Tardos [28] . ...
doi:10.1145/1054916.1054933
fatcat:ehonaytd4rdglkzq4qromhj36m
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
2007
ACM Transactions on Algorithms
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user wants to route a piece of unsplittable traffic using one of m links of different speeds so to minimize his/her own latency. ...
private piece of information he/she holds (e.g., how much traffic he/she needs to transmit). ...
In Section 5.1 we consider a version of the game where selfish agents own also the machines and in Section 5.2 we consider the problem of routing selfish unsplittable traffic on arbitrary networks. ...
doi:10.1145/1290672.1290689
fatcat:4jj25ujcunhsrnt6tawizjdxou
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
2012
ACM Transactions on Algorithms
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and future traffic; the bandwidth assigned on the virtual paths can be viewed as centrally controlled traffic, while the individual users of the network (who may come and go) may be treated as selfish ...
so as to influence the flow of selfish users; and (b) network tolls, where tolls are imposed on the edges to modify the latencies of the edges, and thereby influence the induced Nash equilibrium. ...
In particular, the results in Section 3.1 were obtained in collaboration with her, and I thank her for allowing me to include these results. ...
doi:10.1145/2344422.2344426
fatcat:xywd6d7zlbdkpc7mgcoztieawm
Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
2008
Internet Mathematics
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We investigate the existence of optimal tolls for atomic symmetric network congestion games with unsplittable traffic and arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions. ...
We show how to compute in linear time a set of cost-balancing tolls for the optimal solution such that the total amount of tolls paid by any player in any pure Nash equilibrium of the modified game does ...
Deng and F. C. Graham, pp. 179-190, Berlin, Springer, 2007. ...
doi:10.1080/15427951.2008.10129175
fatcat:qhvay7qi45hcbasgf3bzoksczm
Coordination mechanisms
2009
Theoretical Computer Science
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We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and noncolluding agents. ...
We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games. ...
In an attempt to reduce total delay at Nash equilibrium in the selfish routing problem, [2, 3] analyzes the problem of assigning taxes on network edges. ...
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.005
fatcat:trpp2kb3jzex3pikstvhna7qr4
Coordination Mechanisms
[chapter]
2004
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and noncolluding agents. ...
We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games. ...
In an attempt to reduce total delay at Nash equilibrium in the selfish routing problem, [2, 3] analyzes the problem of assigning taxes on network edges. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31
fatcat:h4ovmqoo5nf5bj5fielifq72ai
Computing Optimal Tolls with Arc Restrictions and Heterogeneous Players
2014
Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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For example, by using marginal cost tolls we lose the ability to control which arcs of the network are tolled and by how much. ...
routing games. ...
In urban road traffic, for example, selfish route choices lead to unnecessary traffic jams, thereby causing environmental pollution, waste of natural resources, time and money. ...
doi:10.4230/lipics.stacs.2014.433
dblp:conf/stacs/JelinekKS14
fatcat:jikljxe2hje23bmjly7rjjd44i
Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications
[chapter]
Handbook of Applied Algorithms
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Tax Mechanisms How much can taxes improve the performance of a selfish system? ...
This gives rise to a very interesting model with user-specific payoff functions, where each user uses its distinct probability distribution to take decisions as to how to route its traffic. ...
doi:10.1002/9780470175668.ch10
fatcat:yu3yphb7nfd73kmmaxoa7fvwqy
Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
[chapter]
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We investigate the existence of optimal tolls for atomic symmetric network congestion games with unsplittable traffic and arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions. ...
We show how to compute in linear time a set of cost-balancing tolls for the optimal solution such that the total amount of tolls paid by any player in any pure Nash equilibrium of the modified game does ...
Deng and F. C. Graham, pp. 179-190, Berlin, Springer, 2007. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_19
dblp:conf/wine/FotakisS07
fatcat:dac2msokrredtp23eywpcbnfxm
A Study of Problems Modelled as Network Equilibrium Flows
2021
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First, it investigates methods and models for nonatomic selfish routing and then develops algorithms for solving atomic selfish routing games. ...
The connection between the atomic selfish routing problem, mixed-integer linear programming and the multicommodity flow problem is explored when constrained by unsplittable flows or flows that are restricted ...
I would also like to thank Stuart for the seemingly endless supply of coffee and chats. ...
doi:10.48773/975xv
fatcat:dfmnjx3dxrcojjtogvciy6fz4m
Congestion Games: Stochastic Extensions and Techniques for Reducing the Price of Anarchy
[article]
2015
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problem related to selfish routing. ...
As for atomic CGs with unsplittable traffic, the existence and efficient computation of optimal taxes has been studied in the setting of homogeneous players. ...
Thus, we obtain, with high probability, a subnetwork H (i,j) of G (i,j) and a flow g (i,j) that routes as much flow as f (i,j) on all edges of E (i,j) s ∪ E (i,j) t , and satisfies the conclusion of Lemma ...
doi:10.26240/heal.ntua.1619
fatcat:pwqd6gherrawxcdmity72cq7xe
Designing mechanisms for good equilibria
[article]
2014
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In this dissertation, we analyze how central authorities can have impact on the efficiency of equilibria and how players can reach an equilibrium state in the absence of a central authority. ...
Third, we study the convergence of no-regret learners in atomic splittable routing games. ...
In such routing games, each self-interested end user routes a prescribed amount of traffic from its source to its sink in a network with the goal to minimize her own cost. ...
doi:10.14279/depositonce-4086
fatcat:6prhscqmoza6jas7ejbarnsumq