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Guiding a General-Purpose C Verifier to Prove Cryptographic Protocols [article]

François Dupressoir and Andrew D. Gordon and Jan Jürjens and David A. Naumann
2013 arXiv   pre-print
We describe how to verify security properties of C code for cryptographic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography.  ...  We rely on the general-purpose verifier VCC; we guide VCC to prove security simply by writing suitable header files and annotations in implementation files, rather than by changing VCC itself.  ...  Conclusion We describe a method for guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove both memory safety and authentication and weak secrecy properties of security protocols and their implementations.  ... 
arXiv:1312.6532v1 fatcat:fxoqlmwb4ffbxchnizwxi4eyma

Guiding a General-Purpose C Verifier to Prove Cryptographic Protocols

Francois Dupressoir, Andrew D. Gordon, Jan Jurjens, David A. Naumann
2011 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium  
We describe how to verify security properties of C code for cryptographic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography.  ...  We rely on the general-purpose verifier VCC; we guide VCC to prove security simply by writing suitable header files and annotations in implementation files, rather than by changing VCC itself.  ...  CONCLUSION We describe a method for guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove both memory safety and authentication and weak secrecy properties of security protocols and their implementations.  ... 
doi:10.1109/csf.2011.8 dblp:conf/csfw/DupressoirGJN11 fatcat:uwelmvxjbrbijnvshvntenm3wq

Guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove cryptographic protocols

François Dupressoir, Andrew D. Gordon, Jan Jürjens, David A. Naumann, Michael Backes, Steve Zdancewic
2014 Journal of Computer Security  
We describe how to verify security properties of C code for cryptographic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography.  ...  We rely on the general-purpose verifier VCC; we guide VCC to prove security simply by writing suitable header files and annotations in implementation files, rather than by changing VCC itself.  ...  CONCLUSION We describe a method for guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove both memory safety and authentication and weak secrecy properties of security protocols and their implementations.  ... 
doi:10.3233/jcs-140508 fatcat:45u5j7fyqbbannh3ce3tk3ggiq

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models [chapter]

Bruno Blanchet
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s.  ...  Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.  ...  We thank Pierpaolo Degano for helpful comments on a draft of this paper. Sect. 2.2 is updated from [48] . This work was partly supported by the ANR project ProSe (decision ANR-2010-VERS-004-01).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2 fatcat:fc32uobfpfbqboiqtfwj3fokee

Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme [chapter]

Roberto Metere, Changyu Dong
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment  ...  This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and computational binding.  ...  As a result, it is highly desirable to have tools that can formally and automatically verify cryptographic protocols.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65127-9_22 fatcat:lc2ro2rlzvd4jfmek2hdnu5grq

Verifying Cryptographic Code in C: Some Experience and the Csec Challenge [chapter]

Mihhail Aizatulin, François Dupressoir, Andrew D. Gordon, Jan Jürjens
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We illustrate these techniques on C code for a simple two-message protocol.  ...  of cryptographic protocols.  ...  We are grateful to Cas Cremers for helpful discussions about the RPC-enc protocol and for commenting on a draft of this paper. We also thank Patrice Godefroid for discussions and comments on a draft.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_1 fatcat:4xfedw3es5cfvfa635uwya4lr4

Efficiency Evaluation of Cryptographic Protocols for Boardroom Voting

Oksana Kulyk, Stephan Neumann, Jurlind Budurushi, Melanie Volkamer, Rolf Haenni, Reto Koenig, Philemon von Bergen
2015 2015 10th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security  
This holds true also in the context of electronic voting, where cryptographic protocols are used to ensure a diversity of security requirements, e.g. secrecy and integrity of cast votes.  ...  Hence, it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting have been already proposed.  ...  Zero-knowledge proofs The main purpose of zero-knowledge proofs is to prove the validity of statements without revealing anything beyond the validity of the statement.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ares.2015.75 dblp:conf/IEEEares/KulykNBVHKB15 fatcat:ku7l57pbfndqbhsybufypwg5ke

Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey

Matteo Avalle, Alfredo Pironti, Riccardo Sisto
2012 Formal Aspects of Computing  
The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic.  ...  The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approach.  ...  In [DGJN11] , C implementations of security protocols are annotated with semantic information, so that a general purpose C verifier can prove security properties in the Dolev-Yao model.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00165-012-0269-9 fatcat:z7bgh5nnuzh4leo7wgf5rwd5ci

A Formal Treatment of Hardware Wallets [chapter]

Myrto Arapinis, Andriana Gkaniatsou, Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias
2019 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We deduce the wallet's security by proving that it is secure under common cryptographic assumptions, provided that there is no deviation in the protocol execution.  ...  We present a modular treatment of a hardware wallet ecosystem, by realizing the wallet functionality in a hybrid setting defined by a set of protocols.  ...  The hardware protocol π hw , uses a signature scheme Σ ≡ KeyGen, Verify, Sign , a cryptographic hash function H and a pseudorandom key generation function HierarchicalKeyGen(msk, i), in order to derive  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_26 fatcat:fton66gsnnakvewrb7ggyxig6a

TAuth: Verifying Timed Security Protocols [chapter]

Li Li, Jun Sun, Yang Liu, Jin Song Dong
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Verifying timed security protocols is however challenging as both arbitrary attacking behaviors and quantitative timing may lead to undecidability.  ...  In this work, we develop a service framework to support intuitive modeling of the timed protocol, as well as automatic verification with an unbounded number of sessions.  ...  The authors are grateful to Jun Pang, Jingyi Wang and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11737-9_20 fatcat:lfirsqocsnhcjhg7lx4wvmyy6y

Geppetto: Versatile Verifiable Computation

Craig Costello, Cedric Fournet, Jon Howell, Markulf Kohlweiss, Benjamin Kreuter, Michael Naehrig, Bryan Parno, Samee Zahur
2015 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy  
Geppetto is implemented in a full-fledged, scalable compiler and runtime that consume LLVM code generated from a variety of source C programs and cryptographic libraries.  ...  Cloud computing sparked interest in Verifiable Computation protocols, which allow a weak client to securely outsource computations to remote parties.  ...  To support bounded proof bootstrapping, Geppetto includes a QAP-friendly C library for general-purpose cryptographic computations. Such computations arise in many outsourcing applications.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2015.23 dblp:conf/sp/CostelloFHKKNPZ15 fatcat:pjikpgcgpjg5zayhvhrzkmfcjm

Bringing Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge to Practice [chapter]

Endre Bangerter, Stefania Barzan, Stephan Krenn, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider, Joe-Kai Tsay
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
As a result, implementation cycles of ZK-PoK are time-consuming and error-prone, in particular for developers with minor or no cryptographic skills.  ...  To this end we are developing compilers and related tools that support and partially automate the design, implementation, verification and secure implementation of ZK-PoK protocols.  ...  As a result there is no methodological formal way to guide cryptographic protocol designers.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_9 fatcat:xvzpg5firvgkrexr5s65e57cpq

Bringing Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge to Practice [chapter]

Stephan Krenn
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
As a result, implementation cycles of ZK-PoK are time-consuming and error-prone, in particular for developers with minor or no cryptographic skills.  ...  To this end we are developing compilers and related tools that support and partially automate the design, implementation, verification and secure implementation of ZK-PoK protocols.  ...  As a result there is no methodological formal way to guide cryptographic protocol designers.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_10 fatcat:ahte6wocoza77hp4f25z7xjh6e

A Roadmap for High Assurance Cryptography [chapter]

Harry Halpin
2018 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
A new unified API with both formally verified primitives and an easy-to-use interface is needed to replace OpenSSL in future security-critical applications. 1. first defining clear security goals; 2. then  ...  bundling of these cryptographic primitives in a new API that prevents common developer mistakes.  ...  Harry Halpin would like to thank Peter Schwabe for many of the original ideas in this paper and for some of the text itself, while taking sole responsibility for any lack of clarity or problems with this  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-75650-9_6 fatcat:fxwimrpesjddnjfvflveuqbz2q

Verification of STAR-Vote and Evaluation of FDR and ProVerif [chapter]

Murat Moran, Dan S. Wallach
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present the first automated privacy analysis of STAR-Vote, a real world voting system design with sophisticated "end-to-end" cryptography, using FDR and ProVerif.  ...  Despite the complexity of the voting system, we were able to verify that our abstracted formal model of STAR-Vote provides ballot-secrecy using both formal approaches.  ...  We would like to thank Ben Smyth, Olivier Pereira, and Thomas Gibson-Robinson for their helpful technical discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66845-1_28 fatcat:lp7xdzj2ynfu7i2awklf2pzd3q
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