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Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions

Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Ben Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, Michael Schwarz
2007 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '07  
We consider greedy bidding strategies for a repeated auction on a single keyword, where in each round, each player chooses some optimal bid for the next round, assuming that the other players merely repeat  ...  How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN?  ...  Greedy Bidding Strategies A greedy bidding strategy for a player j is to choose a bid for the next round of a repeated keyword auction round so as to maximize his utility uj, assuming the bids of all other  ... 
doi:10.1145/1250910.1250949 dblp:conf/sigecom/CaryDEGHKMS07 fatcat:gb5tigds2nfgfolpfn7qvlqrxq

Simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
2009 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
Keyword auctions account for an enormous proportion of revenue for the major search engines. Consequently, substantial literature analyzing alternative auction designs has sprouted in recent years.  ...  The first effort presents analysis of the dynamic bidding strategies, while the second effort is performed in a static context, but involves a close analysis of several classes of Bayesian bidding strategies  ...  MOTIVATION Keyword auctions have become one of the primary sources of revenue for the major search engines.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1598780.1598787 fatcat:tplzmipddbbglphfd66eogpvgq

Bidding behaviors for a keyword auction in a sealed-bid environment

Y. Kamijo
2013 Decision Support Systems  
Although much of the literature assumes the dynamic bidding strategy that utilizes the current bids of other advertisers, such information is, in practice, not available for participants in the auction  ...  JEL classification: C72 C91 D44 Keywords: Internet advertisements Keyword auction Sealed-bid environment Dynamic game of incomplete information A keyword auction is conducted by Internet search engines  ...  I am also grateful for the associate editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2013.07.003 fatcat:i5fzpdsfpfd3jagdshu7shwyp4

Budget Optimization for Sponsored Search: Censored Learning in MDPs [article]

Kareem Amin, Michael Kearns, Peter Key, Anton Schwaighofer
2012 arXiv   pre-print
We consider the budget optimization problem faced by an advertiser participating in repeated sponsored search auctions, seeking to maximize the number of clicks attained under that budget.  ...  We validate the performance of this algorithm by comparing it to several others on a large set of search auction data from Microsoft adCenter, demonstrating fast convergence to optimal performance.  ...  For each keyword k, and auction t, let x k,t be the quality-score-adjusted bid for the advertiser that historically won the top slot for that auction, and c k,t indicate whether a click occurred.  ... 
arXiv:1210.4847v1 fatcat:bbdesmqstbbghad2pb3bc4gicy

Optimal keyword auctions for optimal user experiences

Jun Li, De Liu, Shulin Liu
2013 Decision Support Systems  
We show that minimum bids in these scoring auctions may be advertiser-or position-specific and the allocation rule may or may not be greedy.  ...  Our results highlight impact of shadow costs on keyword auction designs and hold implications for search engines, advertisers, and internet users. Published by Elsevier B.V. (D.  ...  bids. 3 Intuition suggests that this weighting scheme, while appropriate for incorporating CTRs in keyword auctions, may not be optimal for shadow costs.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2012.11.002 fatcat:ybe7e34zhrg2pmyyk4cf37b6qe

Algorithmic Methods for Sponsored Search Advertising [article]

Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan
2008 arXiv   pre-print
Such sponsored search relies on market mechanisms to elicit prices for these advertisements, making use of an auction among advertisers who bid in order to have their ads shown for specific keywords.  ...  We present an overview of the current systems for such auctions and also describe the underlying game-theoretic aspects.  ...  We will refer to such an auction as a query auction,Query auction to emphasize that there is an auction for each query rather than for each keyword.  ... 
arXiv:0805.1759v1 fatcat:2jcmu5uq5zghxe7egqeb2ugwby

Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions

Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Michael Zhang, Ruohan Qian, Yan Hong, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang
2020 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We first train a buyer behavior model, with a real bidding data set from a major search engine, that predicts bids given information disclosed by the search engine and the bidders' performance data from  ...  We examine such a social system in the setting of sponsored search auctions and tackle the search engine's dynamic pricing problem by combining the tools from both mechanism design and the AI domain.  ...  We consider auctions of a single keyword, with N bidders competing for K slots. Each bidder i reports a bid b i to the seller. A bid profile is denoted by b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b N ).  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5600 fatcat:rkqbztco3jcupmcpefjkrpy3yu

Reinforcement Mechanism Design, with Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions [article]

Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Michael Zhang, Ruohan Qian, Yan Hong, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We implement our approach within the current sponsored search framework of a major search engine: we first train a buyer behavior model, via a real bidding data set, that accurately predicts bids given  ...  Our simulations demonstrate that our framework outperforms static optimization strategies including the ones that are currently in use, as well as several other dynamic ones.  ...  We consider auctions of a single keyword, where there are N bidders competing for K slots. The seller allocates the slots by an auction, and each bidder i reports a bid b i to the seller.  ... 
arXiv:1711.10279v1 fatcat:yggucdoabnardkh5tiavbkbmuu

Clustering-Based Bidding Languages for Sponsored Search [chapter]

Mohammad Mahdian, Grant Wang
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
bid for a broad-matched keyword.  ...  The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a bidding language for sponsored search auctions based on broad-matching keywords to non-overlapping clusters that greatly simplifies the bidding problem  ...  the resulting mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible in the sense that for each advertiser, it is a dominant strategy to place a bid for each cluster equal to the expected value of a keyword  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04128-0_15 fatcat:ouh3d757xvfvvpcv7r36s7adxu

Bid Optimization in Broad-Match Ad auctions [article]

Eyal Even-dar, Yishay Mansour, Vahab Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Uri Nadav
2009 arXiv   pre-print
results in one bidding for related queries which may yield low or even negative profits.  ...  Our results are the first to address bid optimization under the broad match feature which is common in ad auctions.  ...  The Auction. For every query, the auctioneer should decide the bid of every advertiser. This decision is easy for queries on which the advertiser bids explicitly (as an exact match).  ... 
arXiv:0901.3754v1 fatcat:g6cgezr6tbenfixe2aphhhjshq

Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions

Eyal Even Dar, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Yishay Mansour, Uri Nadav
2009 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web - WWW '09  
results in one bidding for related queries which may yield low or even negative profits.  ...  Our results are the first to address bid optimization under the broad match feature which is common in ad auctions.  ...  The Auction. For every query, the auctioneer should decide the bid of every advertiser. This decision is easy for queries on which the advertiser bids explicitly (as an exact match).  ... 
doi:10.1145/1526709.1526741 dblp:conf/www/Even-DarMMMN09 fatcat:of6kv7bbrva6pl2vhot73t5x64

Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms [article]

Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint.  ...  This unifies numerous recent results on the price of anarchy of simple auctions.  ...  Note that the greedy polymatroid mechanism in this setting is to run independent Generalized First Price auctions for each keyword.  ... 
arXiv:1503.05608v1 fatcat:dgviwbot3bdqrktgjpezasi5ie

Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising Auctions [article]

Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pal, Cliff Stein
2006 arXiv   pre-print
While most variants are NP hard, we show, perhaps surprisingly, that simply randomizing between two uniform strategies that bid equally on all the keywords works well.  ...  ads) for a given budget.  ...  Acknowledgments We thank Rohit Rao, Zoya Svitkina and Adam Wildavsky for helpful discussions.  ... 
arXiv:cs/0612052v1 fatcat:dtmbxpu2i5fnviczug4eme67wy

Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

Chen-Kun Tsung, Hann-Jang Ho, Sing-Ling Lee
2013 Mathematical Problems in Engineering  
The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies.  ...  To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding.  ...  The author would like to thank reviewers for their insightful comments which helped to significantly improve the paper.  ... 
doi:10.1155/2013/206386 fatcat:abak2jde3ncwtmcmpq6lqdcx5q

Bid Increment Adjusting Strategies in English Auction-based Sponsored Search

Chen-Kun Tsung, Hann-Jang Ho, Sing-Ling Lee
2014 Applied Mathematics & Information Sciences  
For all the SEP revenue considerations, the adaptive MIP adjusting strategy is outstanding in popular keywords, and rare keywords for the uniform MIP adjusting strategy.  ...  Our proposed mechanism adopts the minimum increase price (MIP), which is similar to the central price in the English auction, to indicate how much should be raised for the bids with updated prices.  ...  for rare keywords.  ... 
doi:10.12785/amis/080355 fatcat:cral4jwevnczlmtmbt3wm7y4iq
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