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CacheShield: Protecting Legacy Processes Against Cache Attacks [article]

Samira Briongos, Gorka Irazoqui, Pedro Malagón, Thomas Eisenbarth
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Cache attacks pose a threat to any code whose execution flow or memory accesses depend on sensitive information. Especially in public clouds, where caches are shared across several tenants, cache attacks remain an unsolved problem. Cache attacks rely on evictions by the spy process, which alter the execution behavior of the victim process. We show that hardware performance events of cryptographic routines reveal the presence of cache attacks. Based on this observation, we propose CacheShield, a
more » ... tool to protect legacy code by monitoring its execution and detecting the presence of cache attacks, thus providing the opportunity to take preventative measures. CacheShield can be run by users and does not require alteration of the OS or hypervisor, while previously proposed software-based countermeasures require cooperation from the hypervisor. Unlike methods that try to detect malicious processes, our approach is lean, as only a fraction of the system needs to be monitored. It also integrates well into today's cloud infrastructure, as concerned users can opt to use CacheShield without support from the cloud service provider. Our results show that CacheShield detects cache attacks fast, with high reliability, and with few false positives, even in the presence of strong noise.
arXiv:1709.01795v1 fatcat:myvn7mddonawrietaovilf3ivi

AutoLock: Why Cache Attacks on ARM Are Harder Than You Think [article]

Marc Green, Leandro Rodrigues-Lima, Andreas Zankl, Gorka Irazoqui, Johann Heyszl, Thomas Eisenbarth
2017 arXiv   pre-print
Attack on AES Irazoqui et al. [20] propose an attack on table based implementations of AES using Flush+Reload.  ...  Irazoqui et al. [20] state that the attack works equally well with all cache lines carrying lookup table entries.  ... 
arXiv:1703.09763v1 fatcat:daykpvsb2jh4znhcex35i6mucq

CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies the Power of Cache Attacks [chapter]

Ahmad Moghimi, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a trusted execution environment within the processor. SGX relies on the hardware, and claims runtime protection even if the OS and other software components are malicious. However, SGX disregards side-channel attacks. We introduce a powerful cache side-channel
more » ... ack that provides system adversaries a high resolution channel. Our attack tool named CacheZoom is able to virtually track all memory accesses of SGX enclaves with high spatial and temporal precision. As proof of concept, we demonstrate AES key recovery attacks on commonly used implementations including those that were believed to be resistant in previous scenarios. Our results show that SGX cannot protect critical data sensitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is possible in a practical environment. In contrast to previous works which require hundreds of measurements, this is the first cache side-channel attack on a real system that can recover AES keys with a minimal number of measurements. We can successfully recover AES keys from T- Table based implementations with as few as ten measurements.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_4 fatcat:xfy45opwize3jmdwuox5ydcy6i

Know Thy Neighbor: Crypto Library Detection in Cloud

Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan IncI, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2015 Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies  
Irazoqui et al. [31] managed to recover an AES encryption key in a real cloud scenario without the necessity of blocking the AES execution (c.f. [28] ). Lastly, Zhang et al.  ... 
doi:10.1515/popets-2015-0003 dblp:journals/popets/IrazoquiIES15 fatcat:yjao6hhjj5fpvkq2bnomv3utua

CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks [article]

Ahmad Moghimi and Gorka Irazoqui and Thomas Eisenbarth
2017 arXiv   pre-print
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a trusted execution environment within the processor. SGX relies on the hardware, and claims runtime protection even if the OS and other software components are malicious. However, SGX disregards side-channel attacks. We introduce a powerful cache side-channel
more » ... ack that provides system adversaries a high resolution channel. Our attack tool named CacheZoom is able to virtually track all memory accesses of SGX enclaves with high spatial and temporal precision. As proof of concept, we demonstrate AES key recovery attacks on commonly used implementations including those that were believed to be resistant in previous scenarios. Our results show that SGX cannot protect critical data sensitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is possible in a practical environment. In contrast to previous works which require hundreds of measurements, this is the first cache side-channel attack on a real system that can recover AES keys with a minimal number of measurements. We can successfully recover AES keys from T-Table based implementations with as few as ten measurements.
arXiv:1703.06986v2 fatcat:23wprfbd7rezbis4w5q5ifzfiq

Cross Processor Cache Attacks

Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2016 Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '16  
In order to overcome this issue, Liu et al. and Irazoqui et al.  ...  Shortly later Irazoqui et al. [26] presented a new attack on the AES cipher across VMs, again using the Flush and Reload spy process.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2897845.2897867 dblp:conf/ccs/IrazoquiES16 fatcat:yqzpwbhur5di3nysudfeko2sfm

Cache Attacks Enable Bulk Key Recovery on the Cloud [chapter]

Mehmet Sinan İnci, Berk Gulmezoglu, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Cloud services keep gaining popularity despite the security concerns. While non-sensitive data is easily trusted to cloud, security critical data and applications are not. The main concern with the cloud is the shared resources like the CPU, memory and even the network adapter that provide subtle side-channels to malicious parties. We argue that these side-channels indeed leak fine grained, sensitive information and enable key recovery attacks on the cloud. Even further, as a quick scan in one
more » ... f the Amazon EC2 regions shows, high percentage -55%-of users run outdated, leakage prone libraries leaving them vulnerable to mass surveillance. The most commonly exploited leakage in the shared resource systems stem from the cache and the memory. High resolution and the stability of these channels allow the attacker to extract fine grained information. In this work, we employ the Prime and Probe attack to retrieve an RSA secret key from a co-located instance. To speed up the attack, we reverse engineer the cache slice selection algorithm for the Intel Xeon E5-2670 v2 that is used in our cloud instances. Finally we employ noise reduction to deduce the RSA private key from the monitored traces. By processing the noisy data we obtain the complete 2048-bit RSA key used during the decryption.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_18 fatcat:63urkzupung5dphpk42keyh4rm

Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES [chapter]

Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Recently, Irazoqui et al. [15] used Bernstein's attack to partially recover an AES key from a cross-VM attack running in XEN and VMware.  ...  Finally in 2014 Irazoqui et al. [15] implemented Bernstein's attack for the first time in a virtualized environment where Xen and VMware VMMs with cross-VM setting were used.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15 fatcat:jm3idb5umffg3a4dolgpy6louy

Lucky 13 Strikes Back

Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2015 Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '15  
This approach was later followed by Yarom et al. and Irazoqui et al. to recover RSA and AES keys respectively, even in cloud environments [41, 21] .  ...  Recently the powerful Flush+Reload attack was used by Yarom et.al in cloud-like environments such as VMware ESXI and KVM to extract RSA [41, 10] and ECDSA keys, while Irazoqui et al. used the same detection  ... 
doi:10.1145/2714576.2714625 dblp:conf/ccs/ApececheaIES15 fatcat:wdfl4jazofas7j5vp2chs7jjcq

Systematic Reverse Engineering of Cache Slice Selection in Intel Processors

Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2015 2015 Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design  
[12] or Irazoqui et al. [20] who recover RSA, ECDSA and AES keys respectively.  ...  In consequence, one can use this information to perform LLC prime probing attacks, as demonstrated by Hund et al., Irazoqui et al. and Lei et al.  ... 
doi:10.1109/dsd.2015.56 dblp:conf/dsd/IrazoquiES15 fatcat:x26edorci5e6fiymtkceb4a7fa

A Faster and More Realistic Flush+Reload Attack on AES [chapter]

Berk Gülmezoğlu, Mehmet Sinan İnci, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2015 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Later in 2014, Irazoqui et al.  ...  Finally, Irazoqui et al. [14, 15] recovered AES keys in virtualized environments with Bernstein's attack and the Flush+Reload technique.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_8 fatcat:tcjwe5sjhrcn7m425wwoqj6kgy

Did we learn from LLC Side Channel Attacks? A Cache Leakage Detection Tool for Crypto Libraries [article]

Gorka Irazoqui, Kai Cong, Xiaofei Guo, Hareesh Khattri, Arun Kanuparthi, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2017 arXiv   pre-print
[16] and Irazoqui et al. [17] , and has been successfully applied in commercial IaaS clouds [18] , as Javascript executions [3] and as smartphone applications [4] .  ... 
arXiv:1709.01552v1 fatcat:taa6yk3vffdqpibhgzavx2iseq

S$A: A Shared Cache Attack That Works across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing -- and Its Application to AES

Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
2015 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy  
[8] in ARM processors and then by Irazoqui et al. in VMware or Xen [11] .  ...  Later Irazoqui et al. [10] used the same technique to recover AES keys across VMware VMs.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2015.42 dblp:conf/sp/ApececheaES15 fatcat:yvu2nrgolfbcnb6hdjzl2ksteu

Reverse Engineering Intel Last-Level Cache Complex Addressing Using Performance Counters [chapter]

Clémentine Maurice, Nicolas Le Scouarnec, Christoph Neumann, Olivier Heen, Aurélien Francillon
2015 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Acknowledgments We would like to thank Mark Seaborn, Mate Soos, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth and our anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.  ...  Simultaneously to our work, Irazoqui et al. [14] , Liu et al. [20] , and Oren et al. [24] have extended the Prime+Probe attack to the LLC.  ...  Concurrently to our work, Irazoqui et al. [15] worked on automating this reverse engineering, and evaluated their work on several processors. However, their method is similar to Hund et al.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-26362-5_3 fatcat:kv2l42zecreyjkuyqpw75xlzk4

Guest Editorial: Hardware/Software Cross-Layer Technologies for Trustworthy and Secure Computing

Shiyan Hu, Yier Jin, Kenneth Heffner, Mark Tehranipoor
2016 IEEE Transactions on Multi-Scale Computing Systems  
The paper titled "Cross-VM Cache Attacks on AES" by Berk Gulmezoglu, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar applies cache side-channel attacks on a popular OpenSSL implementation  ... 
doi:10.1109/tmscs.2016.2609298 fatcat:n26k4fu7dbcihf7fkcxeta2ka4
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