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Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets

Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2020 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
of agent categories.  ...  Our generalization refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of external competition and trade reduction.  ...  Future Work The results in this paper can be generalized in several ways. 1. Allow several recipes of procurement-sets. For example, suppose there are three categories: buyer, seller and purchaser.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5571 fatcat:z7uiqar2xnctxhq26lx7e3hhda

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets [article]

Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
2019 arXiv   pre-print
We generalize Segal-Halevi et al. (2016)'s strongly-budget-balanced double-sided auction setting to a multilateral market where each trade set is composed of any number of agent categories.  ...  Our generalization refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of external competition and trade reduction.  ...  The following were added in the present version: • A description and proof of correctness of the externalcompetition auction for general procurement-set recipes (subsections 4.1 and 4.2). • Simulation  ... 
arXiv:1911.08094v2 fatcat:7yvmx7rod5dn3c2s2ygx3se2l4

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh
2003 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '03  
The first auction we present is incentive compatible when each agent desires only a single bundle of goods, the auction correctly knows all agents' bundles of interest, but the monetary valuations are  ...  We introduce extensions to maintain incentive compatibility when the auction does not know the agents' bundles of interest.  ...  We denote by V (S{A }) the sum of valuations of all agents in procurement set S{A }, so V (S{A }) = ∑ i∈S{A } v i .  ... 
doi:10.1145/779928.779937 dblp:conf/sigecom/BabaioffW03 fatcat:th4mutug3ff3jbddhvewutbe4u

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Moshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh
2005 Decision Support Systems  
The first auction we present is incentive compatible when each agent desires only a single bundle of goods, the auction correctly knows all agents' bundles of interest, but the monetary valuations are  ...  We introduce extensions to maintain incentive compatibility when the auction does not know the agents' bundles of interest.  ...  We denote by V (S{A }) the sum of valuations of all agents in procurement set S{A }, so V (S{A }) = ∑ i∈S{A } v i .  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.008 fatcat:sethwb4iizalnapbkcmisj2sje

OFFER: A broker-centered object framework for electronic requisitioning [chapter]

Martin Bichler, Carrie Beam, Arie Segev
1998 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Key functionality of the broker is the ability to search in underlying electronic catalogs and the ability to use auction mechanisms to buy or sell goods.  ...  We propose a CORBA-based object framework called OFFER, focused on electronic procurement and business-to-business commerce.  ...  The software agents can now afford to be "dumb": they need only know the auction rules and submit a bid.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bfb0053408 fatcat:e3x6az63hfapjg2lrzuzppkcsa

The Value of E-Procurement Models in B2B Exchanges — An Australian Experience [chapter]

Douglas Thomson, Mohini Singh
2003 IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology  
to e-procurement.  ...  The values of e-procurement models in B2B exchanges have also been highlighted.  ...  of benefits by reverse auction agent to buyers and suppliers; value proposition for all; trust established by all in the process and in the reverse auction agent.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-35692-1_26 fatcat:fkoyuauwlrholn6az5oa26edpa

Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing

Tuomas Sandholm
2003 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
., rules of an election or auction) so that a desirable system-wide outcome (e.g., president, resource allocation, or task allocation) is chosen even though every agent acts based on self-interest.  ...  For example, the fact that agents have limited computational capabilities to determine their own (and others') preferences ruins the incentive properties of established auction mechanisms, and gives rise  ...  For example, "How much would my procurement cost in this reverse auction increase if I decrease my supply base down to 17 suppliers?"  ... 
dblp:conf/ijcai/Sandholm03 fatcat:dfjyxzzikjbp5puy4ts3qpzevu

Procurement platforms for consumers

Michael Klafft
2008 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
E-procurement platforms have been widely used in business-to-business and business-to-government transactions for many years.  ...  By summarizing recent results from empirical studies and from focus group interviews with platform users, this paper discusses benefits and risks which using e-procurement platforms brings about for the  ...  Ideally, specification agents should be developed for all common procurement categories.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1399589.1399600 fatcat:xiwsxysqirfyfno5sztb53sqy4

Competitive Benchmarking: Lessons Learned from the Trading Agent Competition [chapter]

Wolfgang Ketter
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Additionally, the web has mediated an ever broader range of transactions, urging participants to concurrently trade across multiple markets.  ...  All these have generated the need for technologies that empower prompt investigation of large volumes of data and rapid evaluation of numerous alternative strategies in the face of constantly changing  ...  For further information regarding the different competitions and tournament schedules, please visit the Association for Trading Agents Research website (www.tradingagents.org). 2.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36288-0_2 fatcat:yaxpdddsyjaulm7mdgdeiugquu

Specifying Rules for Electronic Auctions

Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Walsh
2002 The AI Magazine  
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space.  ...  Formal parameters qualifying the performance of core activities enable precise specification of auction rules.  ...  In many B2B procurement auctions, suppliers go through a prequalification process that grants them the authority to participate.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aimag.v23i3.1653 dblp:journals/aim/WurmanWW02 fatcat:ikpjzimymneqrhpyuyrh3srbsu

Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-line Auction Design [chapter]

David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster
1999 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Di erent auction formats prove to be attractive for agent mediated on-line auctions than for traditional o -line auctions.  ...  We compare the usefulness of di erent mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation  ...  There are a number of testbeds for agent mediated electronic trading: Auc-tionBot 21] is a general purpose Internet auction server with an Application Programmable Interface (API) that allows software  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-48835-9_2 fatcat:fbw7clucsbaqxmicx7jnlxlax4

Auctions and Electronic Markets [chapter]

Donna Griffin, Dirk Pesch
2009 Multiagent Systems  
Laffont and Tirole, describes many of the critical issues in procurement negotiations from an economics point of view and also mention the need for a generalization of auction theory to so called "multidimensional  ...  mediated electronic commerce.  ...  An agent can be social in many ways. One is when an agent helps others in solving complex problems.  ... 
doi:10.5772/6611 fatcat:pd3tsrq24reu3cxghqinqmm6uy

Supplier Selection in Virtual Enterprise Model of Manufacturing Supply Network [chapter]

Toshiya Kaihara, Jayeola F. Opadiji
2009 IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology  
The market-based approach to manufacturing supply network planning focuses on the competitive attitudes of various enterprises in the network to generate plans that seek to maximize the throughput of the  ...  We present a formulation of autonomous units of the network as trading agents in a virtual enterprise network interacting to deliver value to market consumers and discuss the effect of internal and external  ...  The direction of future research activities will be towards finding correlations between the supplier selection parameters already defined and the effects of mediations by auctioneers on the network throughput  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04568-4_35 fatcat:sqhx3okqwjerbld3txyut3q6e4

Fencing the Open Fields: Empirical Concerns on Electronic Institutions (Invited Paper) [chapter]

Pablo Noriega
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
More specifically, I will focus on those empirical aspects that are characteristic of electronic institutions rather than those that may be typical of multi-agent systems development in general or other  ...  In this paper I will take the perspective of using a certain type of devices, electronic institutions, to regulate agent interactions.  ...  In the training environment a user may test and tailor his or her buyer agents using data from past auctions or the information that is being generated in current auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/11775331_6 fatcat:rykzecwqi5hpbkisxjn6355ki4

Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and Application to Procurement Auction Design

D. Garg, Y. Narahari
2008 IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering  
This paper also offers a significant application: designing incentive compatible procurement auctions with reserve prices.  ...  The game induced among the agents for these problems is a Bayesian Stackelberg game, which is more general than a Bayesian game.  ...  These are: first-price procurement auction with reserve prices (F-PAR) and second-price procurement auction with reserve prices (S-PAR).  ... 
doi:10.1109/tase.2007.912717 fatcat:chquek2f7fbkdjs234p7kqmhom
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