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Formalizing Cost Fairness for Two-Party Exchange Protocols using Game Theory and Applications to Blockchain (Extended Version) [article]

Matthias Lohr
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We address this issue by defining cost fairness, which can be used to assess two-party exchange protocols including implied transaction cost.  ...  We show that in an environment with non-negligible transaction cost where one party has to initialize the exchange protocol and the other party can leave the exchange at any time cost fairness cannot be  ...  To this end, we use game theory as a formal framework and apply our model to blockchain-based exchange protocols. A.  ... 
arXiv:2203.05925v2 fatcat:6avzxarcubbivjrojchuxnri4e

Interlude: Balancing Chaos And Harmony For Fair and Fast Blockchains [article]

Anurag Jain and Sujit Gujar and Kannan Srinathan
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We propose a scalable blockchain protocol, Interlude, which comes with the typical security guarantees while focusing on game-theoretic soundness and network fairness.  ...  mine and gives the honest parties in the network time to synchronize.  ...  Hence, the blockchain protocol must be fair to the participants. Researchers have shown that many widely used blockchain protocols are not fair to parties.  ... 
arXiv:2209.10125v1 fatcat:epd44j2airbhto47eb4o2lga2m

Survey on Blockchain based Smart Contracts: Technical Aspects and Future Research

Tharaka Mawanane Hewa, Yining Hu, Madhusanka Liyanage, Salil Kanhare, Mika Ylianttila
2021 IEEE Access  
A plethora of research is in progress to investigate the opportunities for the applicability of smart contracts and blockchain technologies to various industries.  ...  The use cases of blockchain based smart contracts range from industrial applications such as cryptocurrency systems towards logistics, agriculture, real estate, energy trading and so forth.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work has been performed under 5GEAR Menot CWC-NS (Grane No:2430299111) and the framework of 6Genesis Flagship (Grant No: 318927) .  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3068178 fatcat:moz4rhuua5erbgen72iltcnjn4

Rethinking Blockchain Security: Position Paper

Vincent Chia, Pieter Hartel, Qingze Hum, Sebastian Ma, Georgios Piliouras, Daniel Reijsbergen, Mark Van Staalduinen, Pawel Szalachowski
2018 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData)  
Apart from OPSEC-related incidents, we find that the nature of many incidents is specific to blockchain technology. Two categories stand out: smart contracts, and techno-economic protocol incentives.  ...  For protocols, we propose the PRESTO framework that allows us to compare different protocols within a five-dimensional framework.  ...  The first two of these incidents involve 'traditional' OPSEC -trust, key, and information management issues that are no different for a cryptocurrency exchange than for a bank.  ... 
doi:10.1109/cybermatics_2018.2018.00222 dblp:conf/ithings/ChiaHHMPRSS18 fatcat:osem3ob2jvbdhn6vl6kldpvium

Rethinking Blockchain Security: Position Paper [article]

Vincent Chia, Pieter Hartel, Qingze Hum, Sebastian Ma, Georgios Piliouras, Daniel Reijsbergen, Mark van Staalduinen, Pawel Szalachowski
2019 arXiv   pre-print
Apart from OPSEC-related incidents, we find that the nature of many incidents is specific to blockchain technology. Two categories stand out: smart contracts, and techno-economic protocol incentives.  ...  For protocols, we propose the PRESTO framework that allows us to compare different protocols within a five-dimensional framework.  ...  The first two of these incidents involve 'traditional' OPSEC -trust, key, and information management issues that are no different for a cryptocurrency exchange than for a bank.  ... 
arXiv:1806.04358v2 fatcat:jebues6rdfg2fdz26s6haolfgm

Raziel: Private and Verifiable Smart Contracts on Blockchains [article]

David Cerezo Sánchez
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Raziel combines secure multi-party computation and proof-carrying code to provide privacy, correctness and verifiability guarantees for smart contracts on blockchains.  ...  Additionally, we show how to use Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Proofs (i.e., Proof-Carrying Code certificates) to prove the validity of smart contracts to third parties before their execution without revealing  ...  Acknowledgments I would like to thank David Evans and Jonathan Katz for helpful comments on the paper.  ... 
arXiv:1807.09484v2 fatcat:ksncs6sm4bclfkhw6vhmfeqbdu

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Shard-Based Permissionless Blockchains [article]

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Murtuza Jadliwala, Anindya Maiti, Mahdi Fooladgar
2018 arXiv   pre-print
Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins.  ...  In this paper, we address this research gap by analyzing the behavior of processors using a game-theoretic model, where each processor aims at maximizing its reward at a minimum cost of participating in  ...  In non-cooperative game theory, Prisoner's dilemma or PD, discovered by Flood and Dresher in 1950 and later formalized by Tucker [15] , is a classical 2-player game which shows why two rational individuals  ... 
arXiv:1809.07307v2 fatcat:2fjybtrm3rb3rafygtrv5bfj64

JugglingSwap: Scriptless Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps [article]

Omer Shlomovits, Oded Leiba
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Exchange services today are still dominated by central parties which require custody of funds. This trust imposes costs and security risks as frequent breaches testify.  ...  The fair exchange is achieved by a gradual release of secrets.  ...  Focusing on blockchains, fair exchange is a precursor for escrow protocols with cryptocurrencies [25] , markets, auctions, games [32] and atomic cross-chain swaps (ACCS).  ... 
arXiv:2007.14423v1 fatcat:drzezviozvh63bxwheq5qrnu5e

A comprehensive survey on smart contract construction and execution: paradigms, tools, and systems [article]

Bin Hu, Zongyang Zhang, Jianwei Liu, Yizhong Liu, Jiayuan Yin, Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin
2021 Patterns   accepted
Smart contracts are regarded as one of the most promising and appealing notions in blockchain technology.  ...  Various schemes and tools have been proposed to facilitate the construction and execution of secure smart contracts.  ...  [64] propose an ideal model in Bitcoin and provide a security analysis using game theory.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.patter.2020.100179 pmid:33659907 pmcid:PMC7892363 arXiv:2008.13413v2 fatcat:2k4v2olwobe2vnajvpw5qd2p3e

SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies

Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A. Kroll, Edward W. Felten
2015 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy  
Finally we provide new insights on what we term disintermediation protocols, which absolve the need for trusted intermediaries in an interesting set of applications.  ...  Within two years of its quiet launch in 2009, Bitcoin grew to comprise billions of dollars of economic value despite only cursory analysis of the system's design.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the following colleagues for feedback on drafts of this paper: Sergio Demian Lerner  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2015.14 dblp:conf/sp/BonneauMCNKF15 fatcat:ziajrymw3bdd7houz56culqkoi

Robonomics: The Study of Robot-Human Peer-to-Peer Financial Transactions and Agreements [article]

Irvin Steve Cardenas, Jong-Hoon Kim
2019 arXiv   pre-print
But, beyond its use case in cryptocurrencies, and in network coordination and automation, blockchain technology may have serious sociotechnical implications in the future co-existence of robots and humans  ...  The concept of a blockchain has given way to the development of cryptocurrencies, enabled smart contracts, and unlocked a plethora of other disruptive technologies.  ...  If low-latency and low-cost transactions are possible, a blockchain may also be used for "on-chain" communication and signaling.  ... 
arXiv:1908.07393v1 fatcat:g2ple3xenbdf5pgucwuttmrlcu

Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Exchange Marketplaces [article]

Kavya Govindarajan, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy, Praveen Jayachandran, Chester Rebeiro
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Decentralized exchange markets leveraging blockchain have been proposed recently to provide open and equal access to traders, improve transparency and reduce systemic risk of centralized exchanges.  ...  front-running resilience and market fairness.  ...  For the semi-honest protocol, to combine the fully private order book in our system with we use the replicated-ring-party mode for 3 parties and shamir- futures contracts and margin buying supported by  ... 
arXiv:2111.15259v2 fatcat:hl2dyln5l5cmjjlae4kxmqlzy4

Regulation Through Code as a Safeguard for Implementing Smart Contracts in No-Trust Environments

Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva, Maria Joss Schmidt-Kessen
2017 Social Science Research Network  
Secondly, we argue that there is a good reason to prefer public blockchains over permissioned blockchains for contracting, namely their capacity to create trust in otherwise no-trust contracting environments  ...  In contrast to critics, we argue that compared to traditional contract law, smart contracts potentially offer a superior solution for facilitating trade.  ...  Blockchain-based applications direct us to thinking of the integrity of data and the ability to monitor and control the use of our data as further guarantees for reliability of the technology.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3100181 fatcat:bo7c7jvmrrao5gtzpndnuwskbi

ZebraLancer: Decentralized Crowdsourcing of Human Knowledge atop Open Blockchain [article]

Yuan Lu, Qiang Tang, Guiling Wang
2020 arXiv   pre-print
The experiment results show the applicability of our protocol atop the existing real-world blockchain.  ...  Finally, we implement our protocol for a common image annotation task and deploy it in a test net of Ethereum.  ...  For example, our design realizes the fair exchange without leaking data to a third-party information arbiter.  ... 
arXiv:1803.01256v5 fatcat:fgynlvgvxvca3agaoqa42m6azm

Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps

Maurice Herlihy
2018 Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - PODC '18  
An atomic cross-chain swap is a distributed coordination task where multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains, for example, trading bitcoin for ether.  ...  An atomic swap protocol guarantees (1) if all parties conform to the protocol, then all swaps take place, (2) if some coalition deviates from the protocol, then no conforming party ends up worse off, and  ...  There is open-source code [6, 9, 21] for two-party cross-chain swap protocols between selected currencies, and proposals for applications using swaps [27] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/3212734.3212736 fatcat:v5z6pedpvvgcpo6s47l5bmmpw4
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