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An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol

Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
We develop a new strategy-proof double auction protocol characterized as average-case budget-non-negative.  ...  The existing approach is to give up Pareto efficiency or strategy-proofness by enforcing budget-balance or budget-positive as a hard constraint.  ...  , false-name bids.  ... 
doi:10.1145/544741.544769 dblp:conf/atal/SakuraiY02 fatcat:vijxy4wgtrf3lkgpmefxgadvrm

An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol

Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
We develop a new strategy-proof double auction protocol characterized as average-case budget-non-negative.  ...  The existing approach is to give up Pareto efficiency or strategy-proofness by enforcing budget-balance or budget-positive as a hard constraint.  ...  , false-name bids.  ... 
doi:10.1145/544767.544769 fatcat:indhzxvfybcprcdl2oqzc2p5hq

Designing an auction protocol under asymmetric information on nature's selection

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Shigeo Matsubara
2002 Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02  
In this situation, it is difficult to attain an efficient allocation, since experts have a clear advantage over amateurs and they would not reveal their valuable information without some reward.  ...  In order to design an information revelation mechanism, the Clarke mechanism has been widely used in much literature.  ...  Our mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism and does not have to pay compensation money. This is an advantage of the newly developed mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1145/544757.544759 fatcat:qbf5dcutxbhzvl3cmxbjiz3toa

False-Name-Proof Voting with Costs Over Two Alternatives

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer
2013 Social Science Research Network  
Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results.  ...  A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once.  ...  also implementable by a false-name-proof (direct) mechanism f .  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2320646 fatcat:x3f67ojgizfrzkjiu2twl3pre4

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer
2014 International Journal of Game Theory  
Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results.  ...  A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once.  ...  also implementable by a false-name-proof (direct) mechanism f .  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3 fatcat:63oxi4j4lbfibav2wilwvmsjle

A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without Money for Facility Games [chapter]

Yukun Cheng, Sanming Zhou
2014 Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics  
Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games have been proposed.  ...  The game designer aims at a mechanism that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition  ...  In mechanism design with money, the authority can use money as compensation to the agents in order to ensure strategy-proofness.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-08377-3_13 fatcat:agugocapabhc7dsanmjazjwjfe

False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team [article]

Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo
2011 arXiv   pre-print
Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori  ...  We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by 2^n, which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of Ω(2^n) for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario.  ...  Proof. Because we already proved that AP is false-name-proof, we can without loss of generality identify c e and b e for each element e.  ... 
arXiv:1106.2378v1 fatcat:teafvbocq5frhnczl3bjznprie

Manipulation-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs [article]

Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We study mechanisms for facility location on graphs, which are resistant to manipulations (strategy-proof, abstention-proof, and false-name-proof) by both individuals and coalitions and are efficient (  ...  Our main result, the ZV-line graphs family and the mechanism we present for it, unifies the few current works in the literature of false-name-proof facility location on discrete graphs, including all the  ...  The characterization of manipulation-resistant mechanisms for facility location is highly related to problems in Approximate mechanism design without money [20] .  ... 
arXiv:1804.03759v4 fatcat:t42mxmr3dvhidhrvld63ewgp4q

Page 25 of Practical Magazine Vol. 1, Issue 1 [page]

1873 Practical Magazine  
or false application of such a term as Fire- proof.  ...  uses ; second, drawing and design, being problems applicable to and useful in the various operations of the engineer, mechanic and builder ; third, rules and tables useful in the work- shop; fourth, general  ... 

Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids*1

M YOKOO, Y SAKURAI, S MATSUBARA
2005 Decision Support Systems  
., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids).  ...  If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible.  ...  Incentive compatibility: In a direct revelation mechanism, for each participant, if declaring his/her true evaluation value by using a single identifier (i.e., without using false-name bids) is a dominant  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0167-9236(03)00142-8 fatcat:hn5jbp5rdzc5fahggdpjxxezt4

Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
2005 Decision Support Systems  
., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids).  ...  If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible.  ...  Incentive compatibility: In a direct revelation mechanism, for each participant, if declaring his/her true evaluation value by using a single identifier (i.e., without using false-name bids) is a dominant  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2003.10.009 fatcat:5rbpow3lxrd3do52y6jy5ecwlm

Position Paper on Blockchain Technology: Smart Contract and Applications [chapter]

Weizhi Meng, Jianfeng Wang, Xianmin Wang, Joseph Liu, Zuoxia Yu, Jin Li, Yongjun Zhao, Sherman S. M. Chow
2018 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Finding such a nonce requires a certain amount of work which explains the name proof-of-work.  ...  The consensus mechanism underlying Bitcoin is later known by the name of Nakamoto consensus, attributing to the original Bitcoin proposal of Nakamoto [32] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02744-5_35 fatcat:64pzpp3oszgvzdceuieef55vj4

Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions

Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown
2011 Artificial Intelligence  
We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, false-name-proofness, and the core. 1 Crown (K.  ...  losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders-and that allows bidders to express arbitrary known single-minded preferences.  ...  An auction mechanism is said to be false-name-proof if truth-telling without using false-name bids is a dominant strategy for each bidder. Yokoo et al.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005 fatcat:dukoypiplvg3tapvqtwqk3wwmy

Truthful assignment without money

Shaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh
2010 Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '10  
Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.  ...  For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy [14] to reduce designing a truthful approximate mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism  ...  We introduce this technique for designing truthful mechanisms without money in §4.1, and then use it to design mechanisms without money for knapsack type assignment problems in §4.2- §2.1.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807342.1807394 dblp:conf/sigecom/DughmiG10 fatcat:6f6yadbw4rbpdlg6hi3qd2aon4

Page 33 of Mechanics' Magazine and Journal of the Mechanics' Institute Vol. 7, Issue 1 [page]

1836 Mechanics' Magazine and Journal of the Mechanics' Institute  
I ought to have the power of demanding so much money for permission, but this copy was made not only without my leave, but my name given as the pain- ter.  ...  into execution, and as it is not exactly clear, we are not sure, after all, that we shall not be beaten, though our proofs are ever so good.  ... 
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