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Two Dimensional Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem
[chapter]
2013
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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The main steps are a compactification of an exponential size linear program, and a combinatorial algorithm to decompose feasible interim schedules. ...
While the problem can be efficiently solved when jobs have single dimensional private data, we here address the problem with two dimensional private data. ...
unit private value auctions. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36694-9_21
fatcat:dw7ccvphibco3mympqapt3njwi
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
2012
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's single-dimensional result [24] to this setting. ...
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design. With the above motivation in mind, we formally state the revenue optimization problem we solve. ...
The goal is for the seller to design an auction for the buyers to play that will maximize her revenue. ...
doi:10.1109/focs.2012.88
dblp:conf/focs/CaiDW12
fatcat:mdxeoszeafauliub3urfmgcmzu
Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis
2003
The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. ...
To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies. ...
Wurman and Wellman describe a combinatorial auction for their framework. ...
doi:10.1613/jair.1213
fatcat:55ojinyusjakbonakdyt6zd2zq
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of interdependent values ...
In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large even in single-item settings. ...
The discussion above motivates the design of the mechanism we propose, which is a simultaneous second-price item auction with respect to the privatized valuations (see Fig. 1 ). ...
arXiv:2011.00498v2
fatcat:ott2ezx5qfbddpx33zhzmbsq74
Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and the max aggregator
2010
Artificial Intelligence
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Weighted propositional formulas can be used to model preferences over combinatorial domains: each formula represents a goal we would like to see satisfied, the weight of a formula represents the importance ...
The satisfaction relation | for models and formulas is defined in the usual way for propositional logic: We give names to some types of propositional formulas: 2 The XOR we refer to here is logical XOR ...
Bidding languages-cardinal preference representation languages designed for expressing the values of bundles of goodsare a popular topic in the combinatorial auctions literature. ...
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.003
fatcat:wsgi5ozkxnc6zhoesoyu6jjzxq
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
[article]
2018
arXiv
pre-print
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We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. ...
We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods. ...
The proof of Theorem 4 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings ...
arXiv:1404.2329v4
fatcat:s55nsrmpcjfihp4jfaf2larjei
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
2018
SIAM journal on computing (Print)
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We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. ...
We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods. ...
The proof of Theorem 4 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings ...
doi:10.1137/16m1072218
fatcat:35hlf6juybc5hhjwr5ucl35vk4
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
2014
Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation - EC '14
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We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions. ...
We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA) which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods. ...
The proof of Theorem 11 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings ...
doi:10.1145/2600057.2602883
dblp:conf/sigecom/GiannakopoulosK14
fatcat:fxejqarzz5g6rbhpoyeg5nv2sy
Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems
2004
Oberwolfach Reports
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combinatorial and algebraic paradigms in designing efficient approximation algorithms. ...
Auctions Without Randomized Rounding. 2 Oberwolfach Report 28/2004 The meeting was held in very informal and stimulating atmosphere. ...
In particular, (0, 1)-PIPs correspond to the weighted set packing problem with multiple elements, the algorithmic problem underlying single-minded combinatorial auctions. ...
doi:10.4171/owr/2004/28
fatcat:fwbs36pgpjev5gk6cfeb7ylukm
STRATUM: A METHODOLOGY FOR DESIGNING HEURISTIC AGENT NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
2007
Applied Artificial Intelligence
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In complex domains, there is no single, obvious optimal strategy. This has le4d to much work on designing heuristic strategies, where agent designers usually rely on intuition and experience. ...
In this paper, we introduce STRATUM, a methodology for designing strategies for negotiating agents. ...
sealed-bid, single-round auction may only choose the content. ...
doi:10.1080/08839510701408971
fatcat:vuo75qtrhzgo3jnwl4t5gg43va
Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers)
2016
Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science
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The course begins in Lectures 1-3 with the simple case of one-way communication protocols -where only a single message is sent -and their relevance to algorithm design. ...
Preface The best algorithm designers prove both possibility and impossibility results -both upper and lower bounds. ...
Designing good combinatorial auctions requires careful attention to "incentive issues," making the auctions as robust as possible to strategic behavior by the (self-interested) participants. ...
doi:10.1561/0400000076
fatcat:yy7hcyheorerbbbnjq2mkta4ha
Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers)
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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This document collects the lecture notes from my course "Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers)," taught at Stanford in the winter quarter of 2015. ...
Designing good combinatorial auctions requires careful attention to "incentive issues," making the auctions as robust as possible to strategic behavior by the (self-interested) participants. ...
The main motivation for this problem is combinatorial auctions. Already in the domain of government spectrum auctions, dozens of such auctions have raised hundreds of billions of dollars of revenue. ...
arXiv:1509.06257v1
fatcat:lgm6hgohzvayfig5bbv4rbzjdi
Hyper-T-width and hyper-D-width: Stable connectivity measures for hypergraphs
2012
Theoretical Computer Science
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After studying some of their properties and, in particular, proposing an algorithm for computing nearly optimal hyper-T-decomposition when hyper-T-width is constant, we introduce some applications of hyper-D-width ...
One concurrent such example is a setting in combinatorial auctions (called single-minded) in which each player i has a set W i of goods and he either wants nothing or all goods in S i and a sample work ...
Proof. ...
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2012.09.010
fatcat:yznimwxwfbh65ioezdoazbzwpy
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF CONNING IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
2007
Journal of economic surveys (Print)
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Of course it is the Walrasian Auctioneer that I am re-naming the Walrasian Demon. ...
mind. ...
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00511.x
fatcat:y6ifx2fagbdt7eiux6kke45psy
Greedy Strategies and Larger Islands of Tractability for Conjunctive Queries and Constraint Satisfaction Problems
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
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However, these powerful strategies do not correspond in general to valid decompositions. ...
Moreover, despite their non-monotonicity, such strategies always induce valid decomposition trees, which can be computed efficiently based on them. ...
Moreover, structural methods find applications in game theory and combinatorial auctions, as well as in other fields (see [32] for more information and references on these applications, with a focus ...
arXiv:1603.09617v2
fatcat:d2ai5ymeovaajh2wfeaj6bwfwa
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