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Two Dimensional Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem [chapter]

Ruben Hoeksma, Marc Uetz
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
The main steps are a compactification of an exponential size linear program, and a combinatorial algorithm to decompose feasible interim schedules.  ...  While the problem can be efficiently solved when jobs have single dimensional private data, we here address the problem with two dimensional private data.  ...  unit private value auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36694-9_21 fatcat:dw7ccvphibco3mympqapt3njwi

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science  
arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's single-dimensional result [24] to this setting.  ...  Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design. With the above motivation in mind, we formally state the revenue optimization problem we solve.  ...  The goal is for the seller to design an auction for the buyers to play that will maximize her revenue.  ... 
doi:10.1109/focs.2012.88 dblp:conf/focs/CaiDW12 fatcat:mdxeoszeafauliub3urfmgcmzu

Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman
2003 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention.  ...  To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies.  ...  Wurman and Wellman describe a combinatorial auction for their framework.  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.1213 fatcat:55ojinyusjakbonakdyt6zd2zq

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values [article]

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of interdependent values  ...  In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large even in single-item settings.  ...  The discussion above motivates the design of the mechanism we propose, which is a simultaneous second-price item auction with respect to the privatized valuations (see Fig. 1 ).  ... 
arXiv:2011.00498v2 fatcat:ott2ezx5qfbddpx33zhzmbsq74

Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and the max aggregator

Joel Uckelman, Ulle Endriss
2010 Artificial Intelligence  
Weighted propositional formulas can be used to model preferences over combinatorial domains: each formula represents a goal we would like to see satisfied, the weight of a formula represents the importance  ...  The satisfaction relation | for models and formulas is defined in the usual way for propositional logic: We give names to some types of propositional formulas: 2 The XOR we refer to here is logical XOR  ...  Bidding languages-cardinal preference representation languages designed for expressing the values of bundles of goodsare a popular topic in the combinatorial auctions literature.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.003 fatcat:wsgi5ozkxnc6zhoesoyu6jjzxq

Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions [article]

Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions.  ...  We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods.  ...  The proof of Theorem 4 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings  ... 
arXiv:1404.2329v4 fatcat:s55nsrmpcjfihp4jfaf2larjei

Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias
2018 SIAM journal on computing (Print)  
We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions.  ...  We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA), which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods.  ...  The proof of Theorem 4 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings  ... 
doi:10.1137/16m1072218 fatcat:35hlf6juybc5hhjwr5ucl35vk4

Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions

Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias
2014 Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation - EC '14  
We develop a general duality-theory framework for revenue maximization in additive Bayesian auctions.  ...  We propose a deterministic selling mechanism called Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA) which we prove to be exactly optimal for up to 6 items, and conjecture its optimality for any number of goods.  ...  The proof of Theorem 11 is done via a combinatorial detour to a discrete version of the problem, which is interesting in its own right and highlights the connection of the dual program with bipartite matchings  ... 
doi:10.1145/2600057.2602883 dblp:conf/sigecom/GiannakopoulosK14 fatcat:fxejqarzz5g6rbhpoyeg5nv2sy

Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems

Ravindran Kannan, Marek Karpinski
2004 Oberwolfach Reports  
combinatorial and algebraic paradigms in designing efficient approximation algorithms.  ...  Auctions Without Randomized Rounding. 2 Oberwolfach Report 28/2004 The meeting was held in very informal and stimulating atmosphere.  ...  In particular, (0, 1)-PIPs correspond to the weighted set packing problem with multiple elements, the algorithmic problem underlying single-minded combinatorial auctions.  ... 
doi:10.4171/owr/2004/28 fatcat:fwbs36pgpjev5gk6cfeb7ylukm

STRATUM: A METHODOLOGY FOR DESIGNING HEURISTIC AGENT NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES

Iyad Rahwan, Liz Sonenberg, Nicholas R. Jennings, Peter McBurney
2007 Applied Artificial Intelligence  
In complex domains, there is no single, obvious optimal strategy. This has le4d to much work on designing heuristic strategies, where agent designers usually rely on intuition and experience.  ...  In this paper, we introduce STRATUM, a methodology for designing strategies for negotiating agents.  ...  sealed-bid, single-round auction may only choose the content.  ... 
doi:10.1080/08839510701408971 fatcat:vuo75qtrhzgo3jnwl4t5gg43va

Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers)

Tim Roughgarden
2016 Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science  
The course begins in Lectures 1-3 with the simple case of one-way communication protocols -where only a single message is sent -and their relevance to algorithm design.  ...  Preface The best algorithm designers prove both possibility and impossibility results -both upper and lower bounds.  ...  Designing good combinatorial auctions requires careful attention to "incentive issues," making the auctions as robust as possible to strategic behavior by the (self-interested) participants.  ... 
doi:10.1561/0400000076 fatcat:yy7hcyheorerbbbnjq2mkta4ha

Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers) [article]

Tim Roughgarden
2015 arXiv   pre-print
This document collects the lecture notes from my course "Communication Complexity (for Algorithm Designers)," taught at Stanford in the winter quarter of 2015.  ...  Designing good combinatorial auctions requires careful attention to "incentive issues," making the auctions as robust as possible to strategic behavior by the (self-interested) participants.  ...  The main motivation for this problem is combinatorial auctions. Already in the domain of government spectrum auctions, dozens of such auctions have raised hundreds of billions of dollars of revenue.  ... 
arXiv:1509.06257v1 fatcat:lgm6hgohzvayfig5bbv4rbzjdi

Hyper-T-width and hyper-D-width: Stable connectivity measures for hypergraphs

MohammadAli Safari
2012 Theoretical Computer Science  
After studying some of their properties and, in particular, proposing an algorithm for computing nearly optimal hyper-T-decomposition when hyper-T-width is constant, we introduce some applications of hyper-D-width  ...  One concurrent such example is a setting in combinatorial auctions (called single-minded) in which each player i has a set W i of goods and he either wants nothing or all goods in S i and a sample work  ...  Proof.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2012.09.010 fatcat:yznimwxwfbh65ioezdoazbzwpy

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF CONNING IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

K. Vela Velupillai
2007 Journal of economic surveys (Print)  
Of course it is the Walrasian Auctioneer that I am re-naming the Walrasian Demon.  ...  mind.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00511.x fatcat:y6ifx2fagbdt7eiux6kke45psy

Greedy Strategies and Larger Islands of Tractability for Conjunctive Queries and Constraint Satisfaction Problems [article]

Gianluigi Greco, Francesco Scarcello
2016 arXiv   pre-print
However, these powerful strategies do not correspond in general to valid decompositions.  ...  Moreover, despite their non-monotonicity, such strategies always induce valid decomposition trees, which can be computed efficiently based on them.  ...  Moreover, structural methods find applications in game theory and combinatorial auctions, as well as in other fields (see [32] for more information and references on these applications, with a focus  ... 
arXiv:1603.09617v2 fatcat:d2ai5ymeovaajh2wfeaj6bwfwa
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