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Multi-partite Quantum Entanglement versus Randomization: Fair and Unbiased Leader Election in Networks [article]

Sudebkumar Prasant Pal, Sudhir Kumar Singh, Somesh Kumar
2003 arXiv   pre-print
We define two new related complexity classes motivated by the our leader election problem and discuss a few open questions.  ...  random bit generators.  ...  Fairness is ensured by giving agents equal opportunity in voting for determination of the leader.  ... 
arXiv:quant-ph/0306195v1 fatcat:jvtcdhox3bb5ppow7wcufvixdm

Winning the Caucus Race: Continuous Leader Election via Public Randomness [article]

Sarah Azouvi, Patrick McCorry, Sarah Meiklejohn
2018 arXiv   pre-print
While leader election is a well studied problem, the rise of distributed ledgers (i.e., blockchains) has led to a new perspective on how to perform large-scale leader elections via solving a computationally  ...  Consensus protocols inherently rely on the notion of leader election, in which one or a subset of participants are temporarily elected to authorize and announce the network's latest state.  ...  In the case where no participant is elected leader after some delay, then we consider that participants update their random value by R rnd ← H(R rnd ) until a leader is elected.  ... 
arXiv:1801.07965v3 fatcat:kymahz6kt5ce7i2hyj66oqigtu

Page 16 of Current Vol. , Issue 220 [page]

1980 Current  
It will enable the parties as institutions to help voters recognize the connections between the votes they cast for candidates and the policies carried out by their elected officials.  ...  But it would work only if the endorsement were seen by the majority of voters as a choice based on fairness and discus- sion rather than simply a backroom parcelling out of rewards.  ... 

The Social Preferences of Democratically Elected Decision Makers and the Conflict between Wealth Generation and Distribution

Alexia Gaudeul, Claudia Keser
2017 Social Science Research Network  
This explains why overall surplus generated by elected deciders was not significantly higher than surplus generated by non-elected deciders: democratic leaders are more reluctant to sacrifice equality  ...  One of them is that it is difficult to compare leaders of groups that elect their leaders with leaders of groups whose leaders gain their position in other ways.  ...  (In treatment "Random") (b) by a vote of all participants? (In treatments "Vote" and "Vote + Rank") (c) by their performance in the mathematical test? (In treatment "Rank") After learning payoffs:  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3078121 fatcat:2m33yxt66var7oi2jmhl7hbvd4

AVR_Experiment_Supplemental_APR_2019_03_28_anon – Supplemental material for Framing Automatic Voter Registration: Partisanship and Public Understanding of Automatic Voter Registration

Christopher B. Mann, Paul Gronke, Natalie Adona
2020 Figshare  
Supplemental material, AVR_Experiment_Supplemental_APR_2019_03_28_anon for Framing Automatic Voter Registration: Partisanship and Public Understanding of Automatic Voter Registration by Christopher B.  ...  XXX337 the fairness and legitimacy of elections? [fairness] XXX338 problems in running elections?  ...  o See the appendix for full treatment text Manipulation check o None Randomization o Random assignment generated by YouGov survey platform software Balance o All "checks" after receiving data  ... 
doi:10.25384/sage.12349523.v1 fatcat:lpclvolsavd57eprnc5p47z54e

Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties

Pierre F. Landry, Deborah Davis, Shiru Wang
2010 Comparative Political Studies  
competition is structured to the benefit of party members, the perception of competition as choice between candidates is sufficient to engage voters and increase their perception that the electoral process is fair  ...  Village elections in China present scholars with the case of a single-party regime that allows voters to reject candidates regularly.  ...  Y * Fair = b'X 1 + u 1 (where Y Fair = 1 if Y * Fair > 0, 0 otherwise) Y * Vote = d 2 Y Vote + b'X 2 + u 2 (where Y Vote = 1 if Y * Fair > 0, 0 otherwise) This specification closely resembles Maddala's  ... 
doi:10.1177/0010414009359392 fatcat:4d5rmgq5ynbs3hpm5hf66id2xu

A Mechanism Design-Based Multi-Leader Election Scheme for Intrusion Detection in MANET

Noman Mohammed, Hadi Otrok, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi, Prabir Bhattacharya
2008 2008 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference  
More specifically, we design a scheme for electing cluster leaders that have the following two advantages: First, the collection of elected leaders is the optimal in the sense that the overall resource  ...  However, without incentives for serving others, a node may behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resource and avoiding being elected. We present a solution based on mechanism design theory.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT This material is based upon work supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada under Discovery Grant.  ... 
doi:10.1109/wcnc.2008.493 dblp:conf/wcnc/MohammedOWDB08 fatcat:4gpzn4rm75fbbe7mrqgcx73dcm

Mechanism Design-Based Secure Leader Election Model for Intrusion Detection in MANET

Noman Mohammed, Hadi Otrok, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi, Prabir Bhattacharya
2011 IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing  
First, without incentives for serving others, a node might behave selfishly by lying about its remaining resources and avoiding being elected.  ...  We address these issues in two possible application settings, namely, Cluster Dependent Leader Election (CDLE) and Cluster Independent Leader Election (CILE).  ...  Hello, used by every node to initiate the election process; Begin-Election, used to announce the cost of a node; Vote, sent by every node to elect a leader; Acknowledge, sent by the leader to broadcast  ... 
doi:10.1109/tdsc.2009.22 fatcat:zighijhpo5dcjewn7tcynavqcy

LaKSA: A Probabilistic Proof-of-Stake Protocol [article]

Daniel Reijsbergen, Pawel Szalachowski, Junming Ke, Zengpeng Li, Jianying Zhou
2021 arXiv   pre-print
LaKSA can support large numbers of nodes by design, and provides probabilistic safety guarantees in which a client makes commit decisions by calculating the probability that a transaction is reverted based  ...  LaKSA minimizes interactions between nodes through lightweight committee voting, resulting in a simpler, more robust, and more scalable proposal than competing systems.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT This project is supported by by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, under its MOE AcRF Tier 2 grant (MOE2018-T2-1-111).  ... 
arXiv:2006.01427v2 fatcat:7qgreqptjbffhaqostzi445uya

Mokka: BFT consensus [article]

Egor Zuev
2022 arXiv   pre-print
The algorithm relies on the voting process to elect a new leader and uses multi-signatures to prove that voting was done only by authorized and known nodes in the system.  ...  Mokka uses randomized election timeouts within a predefined time-box (1.5x-2.5x of heartbeat timeout) to prevent multiple candidates in the same voting round.  ... 
arXiv:1901.08435v7 fatcat:7rz6eraxfzhf7pmid7r2xtwwju

A Survey Study of Voting Behavior and Political Participation in Zhejiang

BAOGANG HE
2006 Japanese Journal of Political Science  
This research finds that the level of participation is influenced by three major factors: the perceived worth of the election itself, regularity of electoral procedures, and the fairness of electoral procedures  ...  non-participatory behaviors such as non-voting as a means of protest.  ...  Third, non-voting can be interpreted, as it has been by Zhong and Chen, as a protest vote or a form of participation by which villagers resist unfair and manipulated elections.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s1468109906002349 fatcat:bc3cqfy6szcellapvsahusugj4

Why do women vote for women

Diann Rodgers-Healey
2013 The International Journal of Leadership in Public Services  
A random and larger sample is required as well as further research comparing how Abbott was portrayed in the media and how men would vote for the party leaders.  ...  Abstract: A pre-election analysis of the factors influencing women's vote in the 2010 Australian federal election explored if women who are in positions of leadership are influenced by gender when voting  ...  2010 federal election campaign and how men would vote for the party leaders.  ... 
doi:10.1108/ijlps-05-2013-0011 fatcat:eq7dofitvnautjhxssk2yqmyde

Election fairness and government legitimacy in Afghanistan

Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Clark C. Gibson, James D. Long, Arman Rezaee
2019 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
Using the random assignment of an innovative election fraudreducing intervention in Afghanistan, we find that decreasing electoral misconduct improves multiple survey measures of attitudes toward government  ...  Yet little evidence exists on whether elections enhance the domestic legitimacy of governments.  ...  In this paper we explore the role of election fairness in building government legitimacy by combining data from a randomized controlled trial designed to improve electoral quality in Afghanistan's 2010  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.011 fatcat:dm4sem3kibf25bgn7fuor42oiu

Political Apathy: A Worrisome Impediment to Electoral Process in Nigeria

2020 Research on Humanities and Social Sciences  
Finding also showed good governance/leadership and enabling environment for free and fair election among others as perceived remedies to political apathy in Nigeria.  ...  An election in which a large number of people refuse to participate may not reflect the will of the people.  ...  One of the values that are vital to the working of democracy is the right to vote and be voted in a free, fair and credible election without intimidation which must be enjoyed by all citizens.  ... 
doi:10.7176/rhss/10-4-09 fatcat:7s3sifu7sjfs7jvij3rzujvfsy

Rational Fair Consensus in the GOSSIP Model [article]

Andrea Clementi, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti, Giacomo Scornavacca
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We provide a randomized GOSSIP protocol that, starting from any initial color configuration of the complete graph, achieves rational fair consensus within O( n) rounds using messages of O(^2n) size, w.h.p  ...  The rational fair consensus problem can be informally defined as follows. Consider a network of n (selfish) rational agents, each of them initially supporting a color chosen from a finite set Σ.  ...  The well-known fair leader election problem is the special case of the fair consensus problem where the color initially supported by each agent is his own ID.  ... 
arXiv:1705.09566v1 fatcat:jcam2rtdgbaelezjpfkzz2unya
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