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Fair Adversaries and Randomization in Two-Player Games [chapter]

Eugene Asarin, Raphaël Chane-Yack-Fa, Daniele Varacca
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
As the main result, we show that winning in an ABM-game (i.e. winning against a fair player) is equivalent to winning with probability one against the randomized adversary.  ...  In this article, we consider a more realistic scenario when the environment is supposed to be fair. We define a notion of fair player in two-player games.  ...  In this new game, Adam plays as usual, but Eve is split in two. The two halves are called Banach and Mazur.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12032-9_6 fatcat:pv3vnv2qbfhonlaawbvpkeange

Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures

N. Asokan, V. Shoup, M. Waidner
2000 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications  
We present a new protocol that allows two players to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, so that either each player gets the other's signature, or neither player does.  ...  A key feature of our protocol is that a player can always force a timely and fair termination, without the cooperation of the other player.  ...  As before, we show that if A* can win Game A, it can also win Game A'. Clearly, if we stop on rule (1), then in Game A, B would recover ~rA, and so A* would lose.  ... 
doi:10.1109/49.839935 fatcat:24qtpaqseffbrifuahpts4tovi

Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures [chapter]

N. Asokan, Victor Shoup, Michael Waidner
1998 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We present a new protocol that allows two players to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, so that either each player gets the other's signature, or neither player does.  ...  A key feature of our protocol is that a player can always force a timely and fair termination, without the cooperation of the other player.  ...  As before, we show that if A* can win Game A, it can also win Game A'. Clearly, if we stop on rule (1), then in Game A, B would recover ~rA, and so A* would lose.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bfb0054156 fatcat:7w3psm4azjhorhvhmha67t6eha

Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk

Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali, Chris Peikert
2004 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing - PODC '04  
In particular, it enables "cheaptalk" protocols that (a) achieve correlated-equilibrium payoffs in any game, (b) are the first protocols which provably give no additional power to any coalition of players  ...  We provide a completely fair SFE protocol which is secure for any number of malicious players, using a novel combination of computational and physical channel assumptions.  ...  . , τq(k, g), and involves the following two rounds: 1. V selects a random string, β, uniformly at random and sends it to P . 2.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1011767.1011769 dblp:conf/podc/LepinskiMP04 fatcat:asbzza5lgvfe3d5jsxmqlobg3q

Adversarial Scheduling in Evolutionary Game Dynamics [article]

Gabriel Istrate, Madhav V. Marathe, S. S. Ravi
2008 arXiv   pre-print
This dynamics has been studied in (Kittock 94), (Dyer et al. 2002), (Mossel and Roch, 2006).  ...  With random scheduling, starting from any initial configuration with high probability the system reaches the unique fixed point in which all players cooperate.  ...  Department of Energy under contract W-705-ENG-36 and Los Alamos National Laboratory through the LANL LDRD program, and by by NSF Grant CCR-97-34936.  ... 
arXiv:0812.1194v1 fatcat:xmgy4ad4b5hblhy5h7pp7hzqle

The Price of Uncertainty

Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour
2013 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
We call this the Price of Uncertainty and study it in a wide variety of potential games including fair cost-sharing games, set-cover games, routing games, and job-scheduling games.  ...  We also explore a different kind of robustness, which is a robustness to adversarial (Byzantine) players who may move arbitrarily.  ...  We also thank Florin Constantin and Steven Ehrlich for pointing out a bug in an earlier construction for Theorem 4.2. Finally, we would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2509413.2509415 fatcat:zthwmiainve6hmnpa5xbovcgvq

The price of uncertainty

Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour
2009 Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '09  
We call this the Price of Uncertainty and study it in a wide variety of potential games including fair cost-sharing games, set-cover games, routing games, and job-scheduling games.  ...  We also explore a different kind of robustness, which is a robustness to adversarial (Byzantine) players who may move arbitrarily.  ...  We also thank Florin Constantin and Steven Ehrlich for pointing out a bug in an earlier construction for Theorem 4.2. Finally, we would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1566374.1566416 dblp:conf/sigecom/BalcanBM09 fatcat:zypir7r4y5bwrbfsd3pxiogeee

Fast Symbolic Algorithms for Omega-Regular Games under Strong Transition Fairness [article]

Tamajit Banerjee, Rupak Majumdar, Kaushik Mallik, Anne-Kathrin Schmuck, Sadegh Soudjani
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We consider fixpoint algorithms for two-player games on graphs with ω-regular winning conditions, where the environment is constrained by a strong transition fairness assumption.  ...  ω-regular games that runs in O(n^k+2k!)  ...  Acknowledgments: We thank Daniel Hausmann and Nir Piterman for valuable comments on an earlier version of this manuscript, in particular for the observation that the parity fixpoint does not allow for  ... 
arXiv:2202.07480v2 fatcat:zqzb5nuwevalbesjl66v4ltjbu

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

Bernardo A. Huberman, Tad Hogg
2003 Quantum Information Processing  
Unlike prior proposals for quantum games our approach retains the same choices as in the classical game and instead utilizes quantum entanglement as an extra resource to aid the participants in their choices  ...  In games for two players each having two choices (A or B), the configurations of the game are all possible joint choices.  ...  In a competitive setting, the negotiation might be such that the players wish to choose their equilibria at random as it would then be perceived as a fair choice.  ... 
doi:10.1023/b:qinp.0000042201.34328.61 fatcat:t5v23njotjf7tlflka5mn75kzm

Achieving State Machine Replication without Honest Players [article]

Conor McMenamin and Vanesa Daza and Matteo Pontecorvi
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In the ByRa model, we identify the properties of strong incentive compatibility in expectation and fairness that all protocols must satisfy in order to achieve state machine replication.  ...  To this effect, we propose the ByRa player model for state machine replication protocols. In the ByRa model, players either attempt to maximise their tokenised rewards, or behave adversarially.  ...  With SINCE and fairness, we have two intuitive properties which turn out to be crucial in achieving ByRa SMR.  ... 
arXiv:2012.10146v2 fatcat:w4rf4fc7kbb43n7fazxhvh3ybq

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

Bernardo A. Huberman, Tad Hogg
2003 Social Science Research Network  
Unlike prior proposals for quantum games our approach retains the same choices as in the classical game and instead utilizes quantum entanglement as an extra resource to aid the participants in their choices  ...  In games for two players each having two choices (A or B), the configurations of the game are all possible joint choices.  ...  In a competitive setting, the negotiation might be such that the players wish to choose their equilibria at random as it would then be perceived as a fair choice.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.417080 fatcat:fylfnyymmbfwrdsfkpofnt3ovy

Toward a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation

Gilad Asharov, Ran Canetti, Carmit Hazay
2015 Journal of Cryptology  
as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players.  ...  Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent.  ...  Definition 4.5) and any ppt fail-stop adversary A, we define the following game: Game Fair π,A (x 0 0 , x 1 0 , x 0 1 , x 1 1 , n): 1. Two bits b 0 , b 1 are picked at random. 2.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00145-015-9212-6 fatcat:2a2im4xaijafpoeadm6wuefp2i

Fast and Fair Randomized Wait-Free Locks

Naama Ben-David, Guy E. Blelloch
2022 Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing  
We present a randomized approach for wait-free locks with strong bounds on time and fairness in a context in which any process can be arbitrarily delayed.  ...  Given an upper bound κ known to the algorithm on the point contention of any lock, and an upper bound L on the number of locks in a try-Lock's set, a tryLock will succeed in acquiring its locks and running  ...  This work was supported by the National Science Foundation grants CCF-1901381, CCF-1910030, and CCF-1919223.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3519270.3538448 fatcat:krok6ds565atxerhfc4ejynwiu

Towards a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation [chapter]

Gilad Asharov, Ran Canetti, Carmit Hazay
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players.  ...  Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent.  ...  Definition 4.5) and any ppt fail-stop adversary A, we define the following game: Game Fair π,A (x 0 0 , x 1 0 , x 0 1 , x 1 1 , n): 1. Two bits b 0 , b 1 are picked at random. 2.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_24 fatcat:wrloku7wbng4bcnjjnobvguilq

Cake cutting really is not a piece of cake

Jeff Edmonds, Kirk Pruhs
2011 ACM Transactions on Algorithms  
The standard Robertson-Webb model allows the protocol to make two types of queries, Evaluation and Cut, to the players.  ...  This improves previous lower bounds, in that the protocol is allowed to assign to a player a piece that is a union of intervals and only guarantee approximate fairness.  ...  Subsequent to this work, we obtained a randomized algorithm that achieves approximate fairness for honest players with O(n) queries [Edmonds and Pruhs 2006; Fig. 1 . 1 The two path queries and one triangle  ... 
doi:10.1145/2000807.2000819 fatcat:a7xlidivljgrxpq4qp5zzu5wli
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