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Experimental results for single period auctions

J. Bernard, R. Either, T. Mount, W. Schulze, R. Zimmerman, D. Gan, C. Murillo-Sanchez, R. Thomas, R. Schuler
Proceedings of the Thirty-First Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences  
The objective of this paper is to present experimental results for testing the performance of different auction mechanisms related to the introduction of competitive markets for the generation of electricity  ...  As a result, traditional theories of efficient markets and auction structures developed for other commodities may not be efficient if applied without alteration to markets for electricity.  ...  The research does not address the issues of multiperiod operations (unit commitment) and multidimensional markets (ancillary services), and considers only real power in a single time period.  ... 
doi:10.1109/hicss.1998.656007 dblp:conf/hicss/BernardHEMSZGMTS98 fatcat:cenpruzbofdpzckxoponugwaim

A comparison of first price multi-object auctions

Katerina Sherstyuk
2007 Experimental Economics  
We compare multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multi-object demands.  ...  Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions' outcomes. JEL classification code: C92, D44  ...  Ariely et al. (2005) support the above findings with laboratory data from second price single-object experimental auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9189-6 fatcat:qan5dk46ifhvnh5dppgxio33fy

Alternative Auction Institutions for Electric Power Markets

John C. Bernard, Timothy Mount, William Schulze
1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review  
Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market power could be a real concern.  ...  For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market.  ...  While restructuring proposals typically contain a single-sided market for the short term, results suggest that speed is desired in switching to a double-sided auction.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s1068280500006444 fatcat:swpf757w3vgb3kkgal3cguqwsq

Chapter 23 Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions [chapter]

Katerina Sherstyuk
2008 Handbook of Experimental Economics Results  
Some results on anti-competitive behavior in multi-unit ascending price auctions by Katerina Sherstyuk • Prepared for: HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS Ed. Charles R. Plott and Vernon L.  ...  without communication. 14 There were two objects offered for sale in each auction period, and two or five of bidders, each demanding both objects.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00023-6 fatcat:uipzeaxtwfe6hkwxeo6dnq4jju

Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment

Katerina Sherstyuk, Jeremy Dulatre
2008 International Journal of Industrial Organization  
Both auctions are common in the real world. With explicit communication among bidders, collusion was more frequent in sequential than in simultaneous auctions.  ...  We suggest that it may be due to lower complexity of sequential auctions as compared to simultaneous ones. Complexity considerations may thus be important in auction design.  ...  You may view previous periods' results by selecting the 'Result' button on your main screen. 13 for B, 90 for C and 71 for D.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005 fatcat:qqfcxebwizfdpnh2vvou2kiepa

Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study

Alexander Elbittar
2009 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
The results support the prediction that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they learn they have the low value.  ...  Consistent with theory, the overall proportion of e¢ cient allocations is lower than in the ...rst-price auction before information is revealed.  ...  For the single-auction markets, each bidder submitted one bid in each period. Table 1 brie ‡y summarizes the experimental treatments.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.006 fatcat:h42233qp4rhohcpwr24appp25y

Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study

A. Alexander Elbittar
2000 Social Science Research Network  
The results support the prediction that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they learn they have the low value.  ...  Consistent with theory, the overall proportion of e¢ cient allocations is lower than in the ...rst-price auction before information is revealed.  ...  For the single-auction markets, each bidder submitted one bid in each period. Table 1 brie ‡y summarizes the experimental treatments.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.238745 fatcat:isr5urty6rfk3lx7krr6l5rlqe

Buy or wait, that is the option: the buyer's option in sequential laboratory auctions

Philippe Février, Laurent Linnemer, Michael Visser
2007 The Rand Journal of Economics  
We report results from an experiment on two-unit sequential auctions with and without a buyer's option (which allows the winner of the first auction to buy the second unit).  ...  The revenue-ranking of the 4 auctions is the same as in single-unit experiments. Successive prices are declining when the buyer's option is available. .  ...  It is therefore of interest to compare our results with those obtained in the experimental literature on single-unit English and single-unit secondprice auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00046.x fatcat:mjtxxjehvjfabdn55ypkfiepgi

Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction

R. Mark Isaac, Duncan James
2000 Experimental Economics  
Section V contains the primary Vickrey experimental results and results from the two-bid auction and heuristic alternatives.  ...  Bidding one's true value is a single period dominant strategy.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf01669206 fatcat:7ofiz3zvuje4ng7daaiww6bnvu

The multiple unit double auction

Charles R. Plott, Peter Gray
1990 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  
Typically, in an oral double auction market, approximately thirty seconds per unit of equilibrium volume is the time allowed for a market period.  ...  The single unit double auction (DA) has been an important tool for the development of an experimental methodology and it has also served as a background "constant" against which institutional influences  ...  The rule of thumb for determining the time of periods for the single unit oral double auction is thirty seconds per equilibrium transaction.  ... 
doi:10.1016/0167-2681(90)90089-v fatcat:m3iz44jjwfeqzf3mbda3dorwsi

Learning in a "Basket of Crabs": An Agent-Based Computational Model of Repeated Conservation Auctions [chapter]

Atakelty Hailu, Steven Schilizzi
2005 Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems  
Auctions are increasingly being considered as a mechanism for allocating conservation contracts to private landowners.  ...  The results clearly indicate that the efficiency benefits of one-shot auctions are quickly eroded under dynamic settings.  ...  Results and discussion The experimental setup used to generate the results for the discriminatory auction mechanism is based on a simulation of 30 successive auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-27296-8_3 fatcat:wbi7ypa3jbgjzfhvfh7fjobdle

Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation

Luca Corazzini, Stefano Galavotti, Rupert Sausgruber, Paola Valbonesi
2016 Experimental Economics  
We experimentally study the effects of allotment -the division of an item into homogeneous units -in independent private value auctions.  ...  We compare a bundling first-price auction with two equivalent treatments where allotment is implemented: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions.  ...  Public Economic Theory, for their comments.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10683-016-9476-1 fatcat:7v5i2on7ije7xlndowgk3cjybi

Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold-up Experiment

Mathias Erlei, J. Philipp Siemer
2013 Metroeconomica  
Our experiment shows that the results by SOS crucially depend on the ownership structure being exogenously assigned by the experimenter.  ...  In this paper, we replicate the experiment by SOS and add another group of treatments in which asset ownership is endogenized by auctioning off the assets.  ...  In Table 10 we give the results of regression estimates for all periods and for periods 10-18.  ... 
doi:10.1111/meca.12037 fatcat:7nt3xdtnrzflxknkm3kfrpc6ya

Experimental Studies of Discrimination Versus Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets

Vernon L. Smith
1967 The journal of business  
Expected utility in such an auction is therefore E 0 (U) = J.'ucP-x)g(x)dx for a single bid.  ...  The above three hypotheses will be labeled H~, H~, and H3 when applied to comparable bid periods under the D and C conditions for the same experimental group.  ...  However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.  ... 
doi:10.1086/294920 fatcat:cgvzwowxmfckxg6haapnkwrw7u

A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform and Discriminative Price Auctions for Reducing Non-point Source Pollution

T. N. Cason, L. Gangadharan
2005 Land Economics  
Our results indicate that subjects recognize the cost-revelation incentives of the uniform price auction, as a majority of offers are within 2 percent of cost.  ...  Nevertheless, the regulator spends more per unit of environmental benefit in the uniform price auction, and the discriminative price auction has superior overall market performance.  ...  After each auction period, the experimenter will tell you when to click the "Continue" button to display the auction results. An example results screen is shown above.  ... 
doi:10.3368/le.81.1.51 fatcat:pcbb4b5ro5a4fpacaty5zydre4
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