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Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection

Guilherme Carmona, José Fajardo
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems.  ...  In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches. We wish to thank Luís Vasconcelos and Mehmet Barlo for very helpful comments.  ...  Such a common agency model has been the focus of much of the recent research in incentive theory. 1 In the common agency model, principals offer a menu of contracts to the agent, who chooses one contract  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.003">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.003</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/gtu3kwhp4nhtbjk6oj6vj44why">fatcat:gtu3kwhp4nhtbjk6oj6vj44why</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080311182833/http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2006/wp490.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/eb/8c/eb8c3cc8f682dd3c118698b1444d033a7248c0d1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.003"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

José Fajardo, Guilherme Carmona
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems.  ...  In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches. We wish to thank Luís Vasconcelos and Mehmet Barlo for very helpful comments.  ...  Such a common agency model has been the focus of much of the recent research in incentive theory. 1 In the common agency model, principals offer a menu of contracts to the agent, who chooses one contract  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921806">doi:10.2139/ssrn.921806</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/i6uz3kksffhpvjck36kzwx4kky">fatcat:i6uz3kksffhpvjck36kzwx4kky</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080311182833/http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2006/wp490.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/eb/8c/eb8c3cc8f682dd3c118698b1444d033a7248c0d1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921806"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency

David Martimort, Lars Stole
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
We derive equilibrium existence and characterization theorems for both the adverse selection and moral hazard versions of these games.  ...  We illustrate the value of this approach in common-agency games where the players' strategy space is an infinite-dimensional space of nonlinear contracts.  ...  common agency games under adverse selection.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/m46n5kv6ibcr7kjikbadmlo5a4">fatcat:m46n5kv6ibcr7kjikbadmlo5a4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180721061955/http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/01-11-12-LS2.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f1/c2/f1c24585acf46fb5cf1e600368003430789d022a.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.005"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

David Martimort, Lars Stole2
<span title="">2002</span> <i title="The Econometric Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tzeeifoj3jgqphcasnbbgoqblq" style="color: black;">Econometrica</a> </i> &nbsp;
Abstract In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games.  ...  We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle -what we term the "delegation principle" -can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria.  ...  of the equilibrium set of a common agency game.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345">doi:10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/qv5s3d3q6jgk5ojeglbp2y2u4e">fatcat:qv5s3d3q6jgk5ojeglbp2y2u4e</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170923032531/https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/75842/1/cesifo_wp575.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/09/4e/094e795e82b55d1c920d424780a4fa91b9f8668c.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

David Martimort, Lars Stole
<span title="2003-01-24">2003</span> <i title="Walter de Gruyter GmbH"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/3hyin6yu4fanbfsq36bsywf4z4" style="color: black;">Advances in Theoretical Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities between principals when they compete with nonlinear prices.  ...  The introduction of asymmetric information has the effect of restricting the set of equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game. JEL Classification Nos.: D82, L51.  ...  It therefore seems natural to study common agency games under adverse selection in the hope of getting sharper predictions on the equilibrium set.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1037">doi:10.2202/1534-5963.1037</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/rvcji6umcrdhzbot7s6y7g4ata">fatcat:rvcji6umcrdhzbot7s6y7g4ata</a> </span>
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The Dilemma of Tax Competition: How (not) to Attract (Inefficient) Firms?

Khaled Diaw, Jerome Pouyet
<span title="">2004</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
In one equilibrium, efficient MNFs are attracted in the two countries, while in the other equilibrium, inefficient MNFs are attracted.  ...  Our results suggest that, the existence of (small) countries who are aggressive in attracting MNFs by offering substantial tax advantages allows competing governments to keep inefficient firms away from  ...  Therefore, the literature on common agency under adverse selection has followed two paths: in asymmetric settings, postulate the existence of a differentiable equilibrium characterized by a first-order  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.603323">doi:10.2139/ssrn.603323</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/u7maphfhuzhmfokqjynfqpwrqu">fatcat:u7maphfhuzhmfokqjynfqpwrqu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190216155944/https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/628414/68.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d1/02/d10218c8a23aa5074bbca6eed9a6e551f77e5038.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.603323"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?

Yu Chen
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
in general multi-agency games with ex post implementation.  ...  I explore whether two major contracting procedures, decentralized menu design and centralized mechanism design, are strategically equivalent in multi-agency contracting games.  ...  Myerson (1982) formulates a generalized Bayesian model setup of the principal-agent problem with both adverse selection and moral hazard in multi-agency cases.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2186012">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2186012</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zlhwn3626fdttgbslrse55o5ry">fatcat:zlhwn3626fdttgbslrse55o5ry</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200321110321/http://www.gtcenter.org/Archive/2013/Conf/Chen1597.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b6/98/b698cb962067370ec27878946889279b72a8506e.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2186012"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Dynamic common agency

Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
<span title="">2003</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sj24t22gfnfprddmjorsfd6flq" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered.  ...  A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game.  ...  In order to preserve the spirit of the common agency game, we allow the principals to influence the selection in the initial stage.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00079-6">doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00079-6</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/cllzjku2yvbkfngjqu4urbni2u">fatcat:cllzjku2yvbkfngjqu4urbni2u</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170706073717/http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/pub/p1073.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/94/9e/949e0c7efc4b8d94062af3f8970367187200681f.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00079-6"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Page 5834 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 99h [page]

<span title="">1999</span> <i title="American Mathematical Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/pub_mathematical-reviews" style="color: black;">Mathematical Reviews </a> </i> &nbsp;
; and (iii) contract auctions with moral hazard and/or adverse selection.  ...  The model is analysed in two ways: as a simultaneous game, of which the Nash equilibrium is determined; and as a game in extensive form of coalition formation, of which the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> </span>
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Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

Andrea Attar, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Gwenael Piaser, Nicolas Porteiro
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper examines the role of the revelation principle in common agency games.  ...  We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the revelation principle to hold.  ...  which the adverse selection problem co-exists with one of pure moral hazard.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.729933">doi:10.2139/ssrn.729933</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/uvbp5nflhnbqnd5iq67h7qj5qa">fatcat:uvbp5nflhnbqnd5iq67h7qj5qa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040609034438/http://www.core.ucl.ac.be:80/services/psfiles/dp03/dp2003-102.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/5b/c8/5bc8dab6b128a238cfb4966354d09c87001baa95.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.729933"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Selecting equilibria in common agency games

David Martimort, Lars Stole
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sj24t22gfnfprddmjorsfd6flq" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution schedules.  ...  Alternatively, we may consider an exponential distribution with unbounded support (and hence no out-of-equilibrium choices) and we find that the refinement selects a unique equilibrium payoff vector equal  ...  This paper supersedes an earlier version entitled "On the Robustness of Truthful Equilibria in Common Agency Games." All errors are ours.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010">doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/h7qitgjcxzhr3k6kcofdbhrm5e">fatcat:h7qitgjcxzhr3k6kcofdbhrm5e</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170813135534/http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/martimort/select_equilibria.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/fd/20/fd208d85dd3657a37e7c4cac92db50b95b486737.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Page 4058 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 91G [page]

<span title="">1991</span> <i title="American Mathematical Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/pub_mathematical-reviews" style="color: black;">Mathematical Reviews </a> </i> &nbsp;
Summary: “A model of common agency under adverse selection is analysed. We determine the conditions under which a separation equilibrium of the noncooperative game exists and is unique.  ...  Williams (1-NW-EC) 91g:90033 90A14 Berkok, Ugurhan G. (3-MTRL) Common agency with adverse selection: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of separation equilibrium. Econom.  ... 
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Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue

Pierre Picard
<span title="">1996</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/nrmdhgqdejgszgl7b6jadevtxa" style="color: black;">Journal of Public Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
Finally, we show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget-balanced common agency would mi tigate the commi tment problem.  ...  This implies P = q_ = 0 (see the assumption at J J J J the end of section 2) and (ii) holds with EU (q ,P) = U, hence a h J j contradiction.  ...  in such a competitive market with adverse selection depends on how firms anticipate the reactions of competi tors.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01569-8">doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01569-8</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/twezcgkt3zejnfj6ksmdb254wa">fatcat:twezcgkt3zejnfj6ksmdb254wa</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190429015127/http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9420.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/11/2a/112a67df5fa121bfb3e47965580fec6781531eae.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01569-8"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Common agency with risk-averse agent

Aggey Semenov
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ijla7jindbbs7oanp2ahig343y" style="color: black;">Journal of Mathematical Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent.  ...  The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case.  ...  In Section 2, we introduce the common agency model with the risk-averse agent. Section 3 shows the equilibrium in the one-principal model with adverse selection and the risk-averse agent.  ... 
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Sequential contracting with multiple principals

Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/sj24t22gfnfprddmjorsfd6flq" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and noncooperatively with the same agent.  ...  We then show that, in most cases of interest for applications, the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is further facilitated by the fact that the principals can be restricted to offer incentive-compatible  ...  Supplementary material The online version of this article contains the formal statements and the proofs of the results in Section 6. Please visit DOI: 10.1016/j.jet2008.07.003.  ... 
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